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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the 1980's the debt problem of the developing countries figured 
prominently In the news. Although at the end of the 1980's ¡t was pushed Into the 
background, due to other major events, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall In 1989 
and the Gulf War in 1991, the financial problems of the debtor countries still determine 
the daily struggle of the majority of their population. 
After Mexico announced. In August 1982, that It was no longer able to service Its debts 
according to the agreed terms, many more developing countries followed suit. During 
the past ten years the governments of many debtor States have had to request a 
rescheduling of debts from their creditors. 
Such negotiations are conducted In different fora, along similar lines. Negotiations 
with State creditors are conducted In the Paris Club; negotiations with commercial 
creditors, mostly major banks, take place within the framework of the 'London' Club. 
The outcome of these negotiations is, of course, determined largely by economic 
and political factors. The debt problem is an economic problem, caused by 
economic factors. 
However, these loans are legal by nature. Loans engaged In by a debtor State and 
a creditor State are International treaties ruled by public International law. Loans 
engaged In by a debtor State and commercial creditors are contracts ruled by 
private law. The rules of law are the boundaries of the framework within which the 
economic and political solutions to the debt problem have to be found. 
The point of departure of an analysis of the role of public international law Is the 
situation which the debtor States are faced with: a tremendous burden of debt in 
unfavourable world economic surroundings. Can public International law offer the 
debtor countries tools which will enable them either to restructure their debts In such a 
manner that this burden becomes bearable or to repudiate part of their debts. Do the 
recognized rules of International law supply a lead or are they stumbling blocks on the 
road to a solution of the debt problem? 
The first stop In my search will be the rules of state succession. Is It possible for a 
debtor state that has replaced a dictatorial regime by a democratic government to 
dispose of part of its foreign debts, that Is those debts that have been engaged In for 
the benefit of a very small group of people affiliated with the previous regime? Could it 
appeal to the odious debt doctrine to legitimize this conduct? 
The largest part of the foreign debts of the debtor countries consists, however, of 
legitimate debts. They are contracted according to the rules of law. Many of the 
original debts, however, date back to a time when the perspective for economic 
development of the developing countries was very favourable. 
The situation has changed radically since the end of the 1970's: the prospects for 
these countries have turned very bleak. Many debts contracted during that time and 
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thereafter were not used for stimulating economic development, but solely to 
redeem previous debts, to roll over former loans. Can debtor states Invoke these 
changed circumstances (Article 62 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties)? If they can be Invoked, the next step Is to see what the consequences are 
for those loan treaties to which they apply. What will be the effect of a successful 
appeal? Does It terminate the existing loan treaties permanently? Or can It only be 
used to suspend the application of the treaty, to enable the debtor state to request 
and conduct renegotiations? Are the creditor states obliged to enter Into 
negotiations? 
These negotiations could lead to new loan treaties In which the new economic and 
financial circumstances determine the conditions on which the terms of the 
repayment of the debt are based. The economic and financial (Im)posslbllltles of the 
debtor states are the modifying factor. The same questions arise with regard to 
Invocation of rules on state responsibility. Are the economic and financial 
circumstances to be regarded as circumstances precluding wrongfulness? Could 
either force majeure or state of necessity justify non-payment by a debtor state? 
In Its relationship with Its commercial creditors the debtor state cannot call upon rules 
of public International law, although the national legislation of most countries contains 
provisions similar to those mentioned above: changed circumstances, force majeure 
and state of necessity. The debtor state has the possibility to revert to unilateral 
measures to curb the outflow of foreign currency. Such measures are taken In order to 
protect its economic and financial situation. This is a procedure that affects both Its 
relationship with its commercial creditors as well as the relationship Its nationals have 
with foreign creditors. Are these measures to be Invoked before a foreign Judge, In the 
case that the creditor decides to summon either the debtor state or the private 
debtor, a national of that state? Handles for the defense may be the notion of 
Immunity from Jurisdiction and execution and the act of state doctrine (the debtor 
state) or Just the act of state doctrine (the private debtor). 
After reviewing the 'traditional' notions of public International law it might be useful to 
cast an eye upon developing principles of public international law, the right to 
development and the notion of equity. Could they be of use for the debtor state In Its 
effort to maintain Its debt burden within 'bearable' limits? The economic and financial 
costs must be taken into account, as well as the social costs. 
This thesis Is a voyage into the role of the rules of public International law In the handling 
of the current debt problem. What are they: remedies or stumbling blocks? 
2 
CHAPTER 1 
A SHORT HISTORY 
Introduction 
Financing economic development by way of external loans Is not a recent 
phenomenon. Direct investment and loans flowing from capital-abundant countries to 
capital-scarce countries have been used as Instruments for economic progress 
throughout modern history. Creditors have always assumed the risk that a debtor 
might not be able to meet the original terms of debt, either because of Internal or 
external causes. ' What is new about the present debt crisis Is the speed with which the 
crisis has developed, and the severity of the situation. Many countries are Involved -
either as debtor or as creditors -, and the amounts at stake are enormous.2 The growth 
In debt since 1973 can be largely attributed to higher oil prices In 1973-74 and In 1979-80, 
higher Interest rates In 1980-82, declining export Income due to world recession and 
worsening of terms of trade, the Inability of most countries to keep their exports 
growing faster than the total debt, debt servicing costs, and higher Import cost and 
Internal mismanagement.3 Those factois eventually produced the debt crisis of 1982. 
But the seeds for the problem had been planted much earlier.4 
Regional or universal problem? 
The external debt problem has not been confined to a specific, regionally 
determined, group of countries. In all regions of the worid, Asia, Africa, Latin America 
and Europe countries are faced with the problem of how to serve their financial 
commitment to their creditors.5 
A distinction can be made with regard to types of debt. African countries, mostly 
sub-Saharan countries, do not have a large amount of outstanding debts towards 
commercial banks (10 % of their outstanding external debt); since they were never 
1 Hallberg, К.. International Debt, Origins and Issues tor the future; World debt crisis. 
International lending on trial, edited by M.P. Clandon. p. 3. 
2 Bothe, M. and J. Brink, Public debt restructuring, the case for International economic 
cooperaflon. G.Y.I.L.. Vol. 29 (1986), p. M et seq. 
At the end of 198Θ total disbursed debt of the developing countries amounted to $ 1.240 
ЫШоп (OECD Survey 1988, Paris 1989). 
For more detailed figures, see Annex I. 
3 Total debt service Is defined as the sum of (1) principal repayments and Interest 
payments on long-term debt (public and publicly guaranteed and private non-
guaranteed) (2) repurchases and charges on use of IMF resources, and (3) principal and 
Interest payments on short-term debt. 
World Debt Tables 1989-1990. p. XIII. 
4 Lomax, D.F.. The developing country debt risk. 1986, p. 1. 
5 The countries that are Involved on the debtor side are as different as shown by this list: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'lvore, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Gambia, Guyana, Jamaica, Liberia, Mexico, Niger, 
Poland, Senegal. Sierra Leone. Sudan, Venezuela. Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia (World 
Debt Tables. 1986-1987). 
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regarded as creditworthy, they did not gain entrance to the International financial 
markets. They mostly have debts towards official creditors (90 % of their outstanding 
external debt). 
Latin American and Asian countries borrowed heavily during the 70's on the 
International credltmarket. Their main cfeditors are the commercial banks. (Eastern) 
European countries have mainly turned to (Western) European Banks and 
governments for credits. In short, the debt problem Is a global problem. And the 
players, both creditors and debtors, come from all regions of the world. 
The repercussions of a possible collapse of debtor countries would be felt both In 
the developing world and In the developed. Industrial world. The developing world 
would be faced with a total collapse of Its economy, a sharp deterioration of Its living 
standard, which at this moment Is already not too high. The developed world would 
be faced with enormous losses of the commercial banks and loss of export markets, 
which would have a counterproductive effect on its economy, and Its employment 
policies. 
Causes of the debt problem 
After the second World War there was a massive expansion In national economic 
growth and world trade for the developed as well as the developing countries. At the 
end of the forties and In the beginning of the fifties, the currency flow was mainly made 
up of direct Investment, of which the point of focus slowly shifted from developing 
countries (mainly Latin America) to Europe, where great opportunities for Investment 
occurred.6 
In the sixties, the flow of direct Investment declined still further In most Third World 
countries because a hostile climate towards foreign Investment arose. This 
manifested Itself In a growing tendency towards nationalisation and expropriation In 
those countries. In the seventies, official development aid decreased and 
International banks came In to fill the gaps. Due to an Increase In 'petro-dollars' the 
banks could provide Immense credits to developing countries to make It possible for 
them to expand their economic activities or to finance their oil-Imports. The very high 
rates of Increase of commodity prices and the consistent rise In the balance of trade 
of the developing countries during the early seventies made them very attractive 
clients for the banks.7 The advantage for the developing countries In lending from 
commercial banks, compared to lending from multilateral organisations or bl-lateral 
official lending, was the fact that hardly any conditions are attached to such loans.8 
The conditions of these loans, however, were less favourable than those of official 
sources of finance. There was a trend towards prlvltlzotlon of the external debt.' This 
6 Lomax, D.F.,op. cit.. p. 2. 
Grlffllh-Jones, S., fritemaftono/ Finance and Latin America. 1964, p. 29. 
7 The multinational banks are the main players In the Euro-dollar market, where the petro­
dollars were planted. 
The Euro-dollar market Is the market for dollar-credits and deposits that are drawn and 
held by banks outside the United States, in the beginning mainly In Europe. 
De Beaufort Wljnholds, J.A.H. and A.A. Scholten, DollardlSema en schuldencrisis. 1988. p. 
41. 
β Most lending took place between middle-Income LDC's and banks. The poorest 
countries did not have access to the International financial markets. 
9 'It can been seen that despite Increased deficits In the balance of payments on current 
account the growth In the developing countries' Indebtedness was barely faster between 
1973 and 1977 than It had been In the four years preceding the oil price shock. However 
4 
CHAPTER 1 
trend altered completely when. In 1982. Mexico announced that It was no longer 
capable or willing to service its debt. Ttie flow of private commercial capital first came 
to a virtual stand-still, only to be reluctantly resumed later. Due to the current world 
economic crisis, the tight monetary policy of commercial banks, and the fact that the 
ODA flow remained on the same level, there now is a situation of reversed flows. The 
Third World countries have become net exporters of capital (Interest and principle) to 
the developed world.10 
The external factors 
The causes of the debt problem can be divided Into two categories: external factors 
and Internal factors. The external factors are the two oil shocks, the rise In Interest 
rates, the rise In the value of the dollar, the deterioration of the world trade market and 
the fal l In the prices for primary commodit ies. The Internal factors are the 
mismanagement of the loans, the overrating of the local currency and capital flight. 
During the óO's and the early 70's, the prices of primar/ commodities (with the 
exception of oil) rose steadily. The rise In oil prices, as enforced by the oil producing 
and exporting countries (OPEC) in 1973, could be regarded as a manoeuvre to 
overtake the other commodities, although the correction made up more then enough 
for the Initial difference. ' ' 
The macro-economic effects of the rise In oil prices were a sharp rise In the level of 
Inflation In most OECD countries, but the non-oil commodity prices remained relatively 
stable and world trade continued to grow. ,2 
The surplus of petro-dollars, as a result of the sudden price rise, had to be 
reinvested by the International banks. The two themes underlying the encouragement 
given to the banks to lend money to the oil-importing countries, among others, to 
enable them to meet their Increased price for oil, were the expectation that the oil 
dollar surpluses were bound to last and the conviction that the banking system had to 
be the main vehicle of channeling the funds to capital scares countries. I.e. the oil-
importing, developing countries.13 
The financing of economic development In the developing countries In this period 
by the commercial banks contributed to a large extent to the continuing growth In the 
economies of these countries and to the growth In world trade. This continued growth 
enabled these countries to fulfil their external financial obligations.M 
there was a market shift towards private lenders, who now account for 60 % of total credit. 
At the same time, concessional credit Increased as a proportion of lending by official 
creditors, thanks to the OPEC countries' greater commitment to development and a 
substantial expanston In lending by multilateral agencies'. 
Holthus. M., Developments In external Indebtedness since 1973; Indebtedness and 
growth, edited by A. Qutowskl. p. 20. 
Ю Net transfers, disbursements minus total debt service payments (amortization + Interest 
payments), are negative since 1985 
1985: S -0.7 ЫІІоп; 1986: S -1.9 ЫІІоп; 1987: $ -9.9 ЫИоп; 1988: S -9A billón. 
Total external debt all developing countries: 
1982:$ 839Mlon; 1987: S 1.292Ыоп: 1988: S 1.2МЫІІОП,· 1989: $ 1290bUton; 1990: S 1.319ЬИоп 
(estimated). 
Wortdctebffafc>tesl989-1990.Vol.l.p.2and 10. 
11 Lomax. D.F..op. c/f.,p. 15. 
12 Wem, p. 16-19. 
13 Idem.p. 21-22. 
14 De Bruin. M.A., Problematiek ten aanzien van internationale schulden aan het 
bankwezen; 10 Jaar International economische crisis. 1983, p. 52. 
This situation of seemingly unlimited national and international economic growth 
was abruptly altered in 1979 when the second rise In oil prices was enforced by the 
OPEC Contrary to the reaction of the OECD countries in 1973, the economic policies In 
these countnes after the second oil shock were focussed on bringing down Inflation 
and tightening monetary targets This change In economic policy had great adverse 
effects on the economics of the Third World 15 
The fight against inflation caused a sharp rise In interest rates The levels of Interest 
rates rose sharply worldwide. Including the rate of the dollar which Is the currency in 
which most international loans are denominated The loans, as given by the banks to 
the developing countries, were hit twice, both by the rise of the dollar and the rise In 
interest rates The loans were contracted on the basis of a floating interest rate A rise 
In interest rates directly affects the level of external debt of a country This sharp 
increase In real interest rates, - up to 1980 the real Interest rates had been low or even 
negative, due to the high rate of inflation -, had different adverse effects 'It Imposed a 
greater cash cost on Indebted countnes. It deepened the recession in Individual 
countnes and in the OECD as a whole, it increased the real cost of developing country 
debt, by increasing the cost of funding It In relation to the economic return that could 
be obtained on individual projects or on the government s spending programme as a 
whole , 6 
The policy of tightening monetary targets In order to curb Inflation, to create a 
scarcity of money as executed by, among others, the government of the United 
States, caused a sharp nse in the price of the dollar Since most loans by commercial 
banks to developing countries where financed by dollars which were available on the 
Euro-dollar market, this marked a sharp increase in the cost of the external debt for the 
developing countries The dollar, at the time they had to repay, had a higher value 
than at the time they had borrowed rt They had to Increase their exports In order to 
earn the money they needed to pay back their Interest and principle at the agreed 
time They had to find additional financing to be able to meet their obligations, 
financing at much less favourable terms than the old loans 
Due to the Increase in the real interest rates, the price of oil and the rise of the dollar, 
the OECD countries plunged Into a severe recession This recession was fought with a 
policy which called for a restriction of imports In these countnes This limited the market 
for exports from developing countries and worsened the situation for them The 
combination of a sharp increase In the oil price and a recession In the OECD countries 
also caused a sharp fall in the prices for the primary commodities, one of the mam 
export products of most developing countries17 
The devastating effects of this combination of unfavourable trends for the 
developing countnes can be summarized as follows The borrowing countries had to 
pay more for their debts, due to the much higher nominal and real rates of Interest and 
to the nse in the price of the dollar, they had to pay more for their oil, which Increased 
their debt, they saw their export revenues decrease, due to the economic policies 
followed by the OECD countries Undoubtedly the appearance of the current debt 
problem Is to a great extent a result of the sudden change In monetary and economic 
policies in the major Industnal countries after the second oil shock During the 
seventies, the policy was aimed at higher economic growth (Inflation and negative 
real Interest rates were not seen as damaging), the turn-around in this policy after the 
15 Lomax D F op clt ρ 43 
16 Idem ρ 44 
17 Idem ρ 46 
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second oll shock struck like lighting. The execution of this policy was mainly d ictated 
by Internal political considerations and hardly any attention was paid to the external, 
devastat ing, effects it caused In other countries. In particular the developing 
countries.1 8 
"The role of external factors needs to be stressed. In the short term, unfavourable 
external shocks, higher Interest rates, a decline In the terms of trade, or inadequate 
external flows may derail the implementation of any well-designed adjustment 
program. Over the long term, a strong worid economy could encourage the 
a d o p t i o n of economic reforms. This would Improve domestic eff iciency a n d 
ensure that countries wouldfully benefit from the continued expasion of global 
markets. Although the quality of economic management is what matters most, 
global economic conditions are Important In shaping the outlook for developing 
countries.' 1 9 
Internal causes20 
Not only external causes contributed to the external debt servicing problems of the 
developing countries. The domestic policies of these countries also had an Impact 
on the worsening of the situation during the years preceding the outbreak of the debt 
crisis in 1982. The borrowing countries adopted expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies, overvalued exchange rates, set inappropriately low levels of domestic real 
Interest rates and did not always use the borrowed funds In a way that would 
guarantee a high economic return on their Investments.The funds were not used In a 
way that would regenerate foreign exchange In order to repay the Initial loans. 
These policies of the indebted countries tended to reduce domestic savings, to 
unfavourably affect investments (since It was cheaper to Import than to make a 
product domestically), to discourage the growth of exports, and to stimulate capital 
outflows (since Interest rates were so low). Until 19Θ2 It was relatively easy for middle-
Income, developing countries to borrow money, with no conditions attached. These 
loans were often used to finance the budget deficits that had occurred due to 
Irresponsible monetary policies and to an unacceptably high level of public 
spending. 
Policies pursued since 1982 by the debtors and creditors 
In the ten years that have passed since Mexico annouced In august 1982 that It was 
unable to sen/Ice Its external debts, the debt problem has not been solved. Efforts 
undertaken by debtors, creditors and the appropriate International organizations 
have at most resulted in a situation in which the debt crisis no longer threathens the 
International financial system. The international banks, which still have a great amount 
of loans outstanding In the Latin American countries, have taken provisions for debts 
unlikely to be recovered fully. The debtor countries, the majority of them, are still 
struggling to keep their heads above water. They still have to Implement austere 
18 Peeters, M.P.C., De stabiliteit van het Internationale financióle systeem, Ю Jaar 
Internationale economische crfsfe, 1983, p. 64. 
19 lVoridDeve/opmenf/?eportl991,p.l23, 
23 Garrltsen de Vries, M.. Balance of payments adjustment 1945 to 1986. the IMF experience. 
IMF19e7,p.217. 
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economic measures In an effort to achieve economic growth, with which to repay 
their ever severe debt burden. 
The debt (servicing) problem Is regarded as "a major obstacle that restricts their 
economic recovery and long-term development... adversely affecting the ability of 
debtor countries to Import and creditor countries to export and thereby their growth 
and employment performances". It Is regarded as a threat to the economic, social 
and political stability of the countlres concerned.21 
The problems should be dealt with within the framework of co-operation to Improve 
the economic environment. Efforts should be undertaken by all the parties concerned 
(creditor developed countries, debtor developing countries, multilateral financial 
Institutions and international private banks), through continuous dialogue and shared 
responsibility, to ensure a durable, equitable and mutualiy agreed solution. 
Developed countries are called upon to takes measures In order to reduce fiscal 
Imbalances, to promote a non-Inflationary sustainable growth, to lower Interest rates, 
to diminish protectionistic measures In order to make markets more accessible for 
export products from developing countries and to ensure greater foreign exchange 
market stability. 
Developing countries are called upon to Improve their internal savings and 
Investment efforts, and to reduce their rate of Inflation, taking Into account the 
vulnerability of the poorer strata, when implementing these measures.22 
Multilateral financial Institutions are requested to deal with the problems of "debt, 
money, finance, resource flow, trade, commodities and development In their 
relationship".23 
In order to reduce the debt burden, appropriate and realistic measures are to be 
taken by the main actors, taking Into consideration the specific needs and 
circumstances of Individual countries, the relevant factors determining the debt-
servicing capacity of each country and any unforeseen changes In a country's 
external payments. One of the measures promoted In the resolutions Is to Increase 
offical and private capital flows to the developing countries.24 The period from 1982 to 
1992 has been characterized by the pursuit of a debt-strategy which has gradually 
shifted from restructuring and fresh money to restructuring and partial debt reduction. 
Until recently this stategy was based upon three pillars: restructuring of the external 
debt, the supply of "fresh" money and the Implementation of Internal economic 
adjustment programmes, conceived In cooperation with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The restructuring of the debt buy the debtor time to Implement Internal 
economic adjustments, which In due course would lead to a situation In which the 
debtor would be able to fully service its debt repayment obligations.25 New money 
was regarded as necessary to support these adjustments. 
This approach to the handling of the debt problem Is in line with the view the 
"Western" countries have taken from the start. The policies which the developing 
countries should adopt In order to effectuate substantial growth in their economies are 
effective structural adjustment policies, measures to mobilize domestic savings, 
encourage the repatriation of capital. Improve the environment for foreign 
Investment, and promote more open trading policies. In first instance, the "Western" 
21 A/Res/41/202 and A/Res/42/198. 
22 Idem. 
23 A /Res /41 /202 . 
24 A/Res/41/202 a n d A/Res/42/198. 
25 Lutttk, J. , Schuldvermindering: d e laatste fase In d e schuldencrisis. International Spectator 
1989. p. 533. 
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countries a d o p t e d the view that they would "support the developing countries In the 
effort they make t o promote their economic a n d social development within the 
framework of their own social values and tradition".2 6 Gradually they a d o p t e d the 
more austere adjustment programmes of the IMF as part of the solution for the debt 
problem. They put emphasis upon "the role the IMF and the WorldBank group play In 
supporting policies by debtor countries necessary t o strengthen the conf idence of 
domestic a n d foreign creditors and Investors, to mobilize domestic savings a n d to 
ensure efficient use of resource a n d the sound long-term development". 2 7 They 
support the flexible case-by-case a p p r o a c h as a d o p t e d by the IMF. helping the 
debtor countries t o make the necessary economic a n d financial policy changes, 
taking due account of political and social difficulties.2* 
The growth-oriented case-by-case strategy should contain three elements: 
a. the adoption of comprehensive macro-economic and structural reforms by the 
debtor countries themselves; 
b. the enhancement of lending by International financial Institutions, especially the 
World Banlc 
c. adequate commercial bank lending, inter alia stimulated by the "menu-
approach.29 
A high level of financial flows and official assistance should be maintained; their 
amount and effectiveness should be increased as far as possible, with the 
responsibilities shared broadly among all countries capable of making a 
contribution.30 They recall the 0.7% target for the future level of Official Development 
Ald(ODA).31 This flow should be conducted by bilateral as well as multilateral financial 
and development Institutions.32 Private financial flows will continue to play an 
Important role In the development process; these can take form of direct Investment 
or commerlcal lending. 
The developed countries do recognize the interdependence of the world 
economy, the Impact their economic policies can have on the economic prospects 
of the developing countries.33 They advocate special treatment for the poorest 
countries, In particular the Sub-Saharan African countries, which undertake structural 
adjustment efforts, such as lower interest rates, longer repayment and grace periods 
In their negotiations In the Paris Club. 
The developing countries have taken a different view to the debt strategy as it has 
developed. UNCTAD, which Is the main forum for the developing countries, has 
approached the problem In a two-fold way: Increase In the flow of real resources, and 
an Improvement/softening of the terms of lending and the design of procedures and 
standards which can be applied to future debt negotiations.34 In resolution 165 (S-IX) 
2b Ottawa. JJy 21,1981, ILM 1981, p. 955-959. 
27 B o m , May 3,1985, ILM 1985, p. 878-882. 
28 London, Jme9,1984, ILM 1984, p. 1179-1181. 
2) Venlce.Jun© 10,1987. 
The 'menu-approach' Is a part of the Baker Plan a n d the Brady Initiative. 
30 Versailles. J m e 6.1982. ILM 1982, p. 882-883. 
31 Venice. Jine 10,1987. 
32 London. J i n e 9,1984, p. 1179-1181. 
33 Idem. 
34 See res. 165 (S-IX) part A concerns Itself w ich the f inancial aspects, part В with the 
procedural aspects. This resolution constitutes the basis for the deliberations a b o u t the 
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and resolution 222 (XXI) some basic concepts relating to future debt renegotiations 
are formulated. These are: 
a. considerations of the debt problem can only take place at the request of the 
debtor country; 
b. the considerations should ensure expeditions and timely action; 
с the considerations should take Into account the development prospects of the 
debtor country; 
d. the considerations should restore the debtor country's capacity to service its debt; 
e. In the considerations the interests of both the debtor and the creditors should 
equally be protected. 
"The point of view of the developing countries in respect of the creditor's Club ... 
could be summarized In the following principles: 
a. The distinction between "debt relief and "assistance for development" should 
be eliminated. 
b. Emphasis on the restructuring of the debt should be made on aspects related 
with medium-term development of debtor countries, and therefore the amount 
and conditions of relief should be adequate for more purposes. 
с A formal multilateral frame should be established to review restructuring 
applications and to verify the application of guidelines approved In 
International forums, mainly UNCTAD. This would allow Impartiality In dealing with 
different debtor countries. 
d. Closer co-operation should be achieved between those Institutions that can 
help In the solution of these problems."35 
Until 1985 very little changed In the debt strategy. The creditor countries, the 
commercial banks and the IMF closed ranks In their approach to the crisis. The 
renogotiatlons and the strengthening of their own capital by the major European 
banks, by way of taking provisions for future losses, caused the threat of a breakdown 
of the international financial system cease to exist. Due to this development the 
attitude of the international banks towards the handling of the debt crisis shifted. The 
major European banks started to run down their outstanding debts, by Introducing, 
among other things, techniques such as debt-equity swaps, the trading of debts on 
secondary markets and debt buy-backs. This was a sign towards the debtor countries 
that the commercial banks preferred to take their losses rather than be forced to lend 
new money. Until 19Θ7 the American and British banks, due to their national regulations, 
which did not allow for the taking of losses, stuck to the debt strategy based on debt 
restructuring and the provision of "fresh" money.36 
In short, one can say that: 
"The absence of an international equivalent to our (American, edv.) bankruptcy 
procedure left debtors, creditors, and governments without a framework for 
dealing with these new realities. Banks adjusted by accepting the rescheduling of 
payments and extended new loans. Countries were obligated to undertake broad 
adjustment and economic reform programs to address problems which had 
debt problem within Unctad. In later resolutions again and again reference Is made to this 
resolution. 
36 MacLean.R.C.,tego/aspecfcorfheexfema;ctebf,i?.d.C. 1989-111.t.214,p. 78. 
36 Weekberichten KB Kredietbanken. Jrg. 45. nr. 38,23 november 1990, p. 3-4. 
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contributed to their payment difficulties. This process was guided by the need t o 
avoid a breakdown In the International payments systems a n d the Imperative of 
preserving the sanctity of loan contracts In a changing context... Ongoing debt 
problems required continues evolution of the framework. At the outset, preserving 
the International payments system a n d commercial banks solvency was the 
predominant concern of the creditor governments. Gradually, however, the 
International community Increasingly focused on means to help countries t o 
resume growth." 3 7 
This change In attitude by the creditor governments found Its reflection In the different 
plans for adjusting the debt strategy, namely the Baker plan and the Brady plan. Both 
are named after their creative fathere. both Ministers of Finance of the United States. 
The Baker plan: Program for sustained growth 
The initiative which was Introduced in 19Θ5 during the annual conference of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development(IBRD) is based upon two pillars: market-oriented policies to foster 
growth and adequate financing to support It.38 
It reflected the growing awareness that the financial crisis which confonted the 
developing countries was not a temporary problem but a structural one, a problem 
which could not be solved by adjustment programmes alone.3' The central feature In 
the plan Is to gain control over the threat which loomed over the International financial 
system, as well as the threat to the Internal economy of the debtor countries. The main 
goals of the strategy are the control of the existing debts and economic growth. In 
order to achieve these goals several policies were worked out. 
The aim was to restructure the debt according to market conditions. This 
restructuring should be accompanied by internal adjustments in the debtor countries. 
Both the official and the commercial creditors were asked to provide new credits up 
to 20 billion dollars In 3 years' time. The governments of the industrialized countries 
were asked, as a complement to the plan, to open up their market for products from 
the debtor countries and to reduce the existing tarriff-barrlers. 
The restructuring process would continue to take place In the appropriate fora, the 
Paris Club and the London Club. The new credits should be given within this framework. 
The Initiative enables commercial creditors to choose different market-oriented 
options for the restructured debts, the so-called menu-of-options approach. As a 
prerequisite for the restructuring along the lines of the Baker plan the debtor countries 
are still required to enter Into negotiations with the IMF. 
The Baker Initiative did not achieve the desired result, mainly because the required 
20 billion dollars were never provided for by the creditors. The exposure of the 
commercial banks did diminish during that time. The menu-of-options approach did 
achieve some success In some restructurings, but It did not provide the "breathing" 
space which was needed for the debtor to be able to Implement the adjustment 
policies.40 
37 Mulford. D.C.. Non-legal arrangements In International e c o n o m i c relations; Virginia 
Journal of International LCJW.VCA. 31,no. 3,1991.p. 443. 
38 LM 1986, p. 414-427. 
39 LA report 1986, p. 494. 
43 Devuyst, Y.. The United States a n d the Latin American d e b t crisis: Studia Diplomatica. Vol. 
XUI. No. 1.1989, p. 87. 
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At the end of 19Θ7, and In earty 1988, It became clear that the Baker Initiative had not 
achieved Its set goals In order to tackle the problems of the poorest, mostly African, 
countries the group of the seven main Industrialized countries proposed debt 
reduction measures at the economic summit of 1988 in Toronto The measures can to 
be divided Into three options 
a Cancellation of one third of the outstanding debt and a renegotiation of the 
remaining debt at the market Interest rate over 14 years with a grace period of 8 
years, 
b Rescheduling of the total debt at the market Interest rate over a period of 25 years 
with a grace period of 14 years, 
с Rescheduling of the total debt over a period of 14 years, with a grace period of 8 
years, at an Interest rate 3,5 percent below market Interest rate 
The Brady Initiative 
In 1989 the new US Minister of Finance, Nicolas Brady, announced a new Initiative 
concerning the external debt problems of the developing countries This Initiative is to 
be seen as a supplementation of the Baker Plan, it Is also mainly directed at the 
developing countries which have large commercial debts The emphasis is shifted 
from the supply of new credits by the creditors to debt reduction by the creditors The 
core of the initiative is the same, it still has as Its focus the threat posed to the 
International financial system by the debt problem and the threat it poses towards the 
Internal order of the debtor countries It Incorporates the three pillars of the Baker 
Initiative adjustment of the economic policies by the debtor, adjustment of the trade 
policies by the Industrialized countnes and the case-by-case approach As a fourth 
element, voluntary debt reduction is Introduced This is to be seen as an official 
recognition of the failure of the pursued debt strategy of restructuring and fresh" 
money It Is now acknowledged that this strategy will not provide a viable solution to 
the problem It Introduces two new elements, which will help to finance the adjustment 
policies of the debtor countries voluntary debt reduction and a menu-of-option 
approach for the providing of new credits 
There are, however, two major obstacles for the debt reduction and the menu-of-
option approach advocated the requirement of equal treatment of all creditors by 
the debtor and the negative pledge clause 41 These should be omitted in the 
rescheduling negltiatlons In the framework of the London club 4 2 In the Brady plan an 
Important role is given to the IMF It is regarded as the institute to asses the public 
sector borrowing requirement of the debtor country, and it should provide financial 
help to stimulate the debt reduction process 
In Its guidelines of 23 May 1989, the Fund stipulated Its conditions for Its support for 
debt and debt service reduction This support "would be linked to medium-term 
adjustment programmes with a strong element of structural reform, adopted In the 
context of stand-by or extended arrangements"43 The mam advantage of debt 
forgiveness or debt reduction is that such an approach threatens the creditworthiness 
of the debtor countries less than the actual default of a country on its loans 
41 See Infra Chapter 5 
42 LuHIk J opclt ρ 538/9 
43 Guidelines of 23 May 1989 o n the Funds support for d e b t a n d d e b t service reduct ion 
operations Press release no 89/17 24 May 1989 
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The Brady Initiative Is based on the assumption that the commercial creditors will 
be willing to reduce the oustanding debts. This reduction is a percentual reduction on 
their claims towards their debtors, a reduction which concurs with the prices on the 
secondary market for external debts. This plan could be seen as complementary to 
the Toronto rules. The Brady plan applies to developing countries with commercial 
debts, the Toronto rules to developing countries with mainly official debts. 
Although the Brady initiative received a positive response. It also gave rise to a few 
critical remarks. It was felt that It p laced too much emphasis on the role of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions and that Is transferred the risks of the commercial creditors to the 
official creditors. An Increase In the quota of the members of the Fund will be 
necessary to provide the financial means to support the debt and debt service 
reduction measures.44 
A conclusion which can be drawn from the above. Is that a cooperative approach is 
needed In order to tackle the current debt crisis. The debtor countries must pursue 
growth-oriented adjustment policies, the creditor countries must create a favourable 
external International economic environment. 
The Ideas formulated in both the Baker and the Brady Initiatives have been used In 
the renegotiations conducted In the Paris Club and the London Club. The above 
summary of the policies, as they have been adopted by the actors in the debt-game, 
Is only Intended to be a frame-work for the following chapters. These will deal In depth 
with the legal problems related to the current debt problem and the proposed 
solution. First, the role which the different actors play will be examined. 
When applying the rules of public International law In the following chapters, we 
should take Into consideration both the external as well as the Internal economic 
factors. They do play an impotrant role In determining whether the conditions as set by 
the law are fulfilled. The applicability of the rules of International law cannot be Judged 
without taking the economic factors into account. When ascertaining a new loan 
agreement on the basis of renegotiations initiated by the debtor country due to actual 
default or due to the invocation of the clausula rebus sic stontfbus.we should also take 
the economic factors Into account. Especially the external factors will play an 
Important role In determining the repayment scheme. This should take the 'capacity 
to pay' of the debtor country into account , a capaci ty which will be determined 
largely by levels of Import and export. 
« Ebenroth/Bdhler. Die Implementierung der Brady Initiative In Mexiko und den Philippinen, 
R.I.W. 1990. heft 1, p. 23. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE MAIN ACTORS 
Introduction 
In this Chapter, the main actors In the debt-game will be Introduced. 
In paragraph 1, the debtor countries will be examined: how are they handling the crisis 
and are they able to restore the balance? In paragraph 2, we will look at the creditor 
countries: what policies did they adopt to tackle the Impending debt crisis?; are they 
providing opportunities for the developing countries?; what is their approach to the 
problem? In paragraph 3. the commercial banks will be discussed: what was their 
reaction to the outburst In 1982 and what policies are they pursuing today? 
The role of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other financial 
Institutions is of major Importance. They coordinate the efforts undertaken by the other 
players In the game. In paragraph 4 we will look into their role. Do their original alms 
permit them to actively Intervene and In what way? As a result of previous debt 
problems, the Paris Club came Into existence in 1956. What purpose does It serve 
now? The current crisis has given birth to a 'Bankers' Club, the London Club. In 
paragraph 5 we will discuss their functioning. The role both 'Clubs' play In the 
renegotiation process and the contributions they make to the reduction of the current 
balance of payments problems of the developing countries will not be discussed In 
this Chapter, but in Chapter 5. 
1 Debtor countries 
The debtor countries can be divided Into three categories: a. the heavily Indebted, 
low-Income, developing countries; b. the non-oil-exporting, middle-Income, 
developing countries; с the oil-exporting, middle-income, developing countries. 
a. The heavily Indebted, low-Income, developing countries are mainly to be found In 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The main bulk of their external debt Is owed to official 
creditors, such as governments, multilateral and bilateral aid agencies.1 Debts to 
commercial banks are virtually absent, since the commercial banks never 
regarded these countries as creditworthy. 
They experienced a severe reduction of export Income, due to the recession In 
the Industrialized countries, and due to the fall In prices of non-oil, primary 
commodities.2 This negative situation has repeatedly been exacerbated in recent 
1 Seyyld Abbuiai. Y., Africa's external debt, an obstacle to economic recovery, OPEC 
Pamphlet Series, no. 27. Vienna 1990, p. 9. 
2 Annua/report/MF 19S4. ρ, 11. 
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years by severe droughts, which caused a food problem and reduced exports 
even more.3 
Most low-Income, developing countries have contracted official debts only. 
Their external debt consists mainly of loans on concessional terms with fixed 
Interest rates. Because of these fixed Interest rates these countries were less 
affected by the rise In Interest rates than countries which had borrowed on 
commercial terms. On the other hand, they do not derive any profit from a decline 
In Interest rates, such as that which occurred In 1986.4 
The low-Income, developing countries still face a generally difficult external 
environment, which dictates low prices for primary commodities, and In which 
protectionist measures are employed by developed countries. This leaves them 
no choice but to Initiate stringent economic policy measures to reduce their 
current balance of payments deficit.5 
They do not benefit from debt reform plans, such as the Baker Initiative and the 
Brady plan, since both have, as a component, debt reduction by the commercial 
banks. These countries are dependent on the willingness of the donor countries to 
grant loans on highly concessional terms or to give grants, and to convert loans 
Into grants. Net capital transfers In the early 1980's were around S θ billion per year; 
they dwindled to less than S 1 billion by 1987. Taking into account the fact that 
interest payments on short-term credits had to be honoured, the real transfers 
became negative.6 
b. The external debt of the non-oll-exportlng, middle-income, developing countries 
contains a high percentage of commercial debts. These countries were. Initially, 
hardest hit by the second oil price rise and the economic policy reaction of the 
Industrial countries. 
Their commercial debts were denominated mostly In US dollars and were 
concluded at a variable Interest rate. The rise In the value of the dollar and In the 
rate of interest, coupled with the rise in the price of oil provided an explosive rise in 
external debt obligations and a worsening of the balance of payments. As a result, 
the external debt grew faster than exports. 
By mid-1982 the credit expansion In these countries virtually came to a halt. 
Major commercial banks were unwilling to supply new money-loans to these 
countries, which caused an Inability to 'roll over1 or refinance maturing loans.7 
Short-term credits had consistently become a greater part of the outstanding 
external debt of these debtor countries.8 
In order to avoid a total lack of foreign exchange, these countries were forced 
to appeal to the IMF for funds, which were only provided In conjunction with a 
stand-by arrangement, a policy adjustment programme.' 
After the conclusion of a stand-by arrangement, commercial banks lent, often 
unwillingly, new money to the debtor countries. But the flow of money was reduced 
3 Annual report IMF 1984, p. 151, Press communiqué of the Development Committee on April 
13,1984. 
4 IMF annual reportWS?. p. 10. 
5 Idem. 
6 Seyyld Abdulal, Y., op. cit., p. 12. 
7 Garrltsen de Vries. M., The role of the International monetary fund In the world debt 
problem; World debt crisis, ed. by M.P. Claudon. p. 113. 
8 Jaarverslag De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) №82. p. 131. 
9 Idem. p. 132. 
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significantly after August 1982, a n d was only Increased slowly in the years that 
followed. In 1984 it appeared that the debt problem was about t o be solved, due 
mainly t o a n increase In exports. Expectations rose that the middle-income 
developing countries were less d e p e n d e n t on new money than h a d b e e n 
expected. They would grow Into their debt problem. 1 0 
However, 1985 reversed this trend: export worsened a n d the e c o n o m i c 
recovery In the Industrialized countries soared. It b e c a m e obvious that the debtor 
countries were not able to create a sufficient foundation to carry their burden of 
debt. In the debtor countries, which h a d a d o p t e d severe adjustment policies, a 
weariness towards these adjustment measures grew. This expressed Itself In 
demonstrations a n d riots against the rise of prices for essential products, such as 
b r e a d a n d oil. This m a d e It more difficult to Implement the policies set by 
government and IMF.11 
In 1987, although the prices for primary commodities continued t o fall, a n d 
economic growth in the industrial countries slowed, there were some positive 
aspects. Progress was being made In controlling Inflation, output grew a n d Interest-
rates continued to go downward. 1 2 
Still, the overall picture Is a bleak one. In order to achieve a manageable 
external d e b t situation In the non-oil middle-Income exporting developing 
countries, more Internal adjustments are needed a n d an Improvement of the 
economic climate In the world Is a prerequisite. 
c. The oil-exporting middle-Income countries encountered b a l a n c e of payments 
difficulties because of the fall in oil prices. These countries had borrowed heavily 
from commercial banks In order t o finance Internal policies. They were also forced 
to adjust their Internal policies because of declining export revenues.1 3 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above Is that all categories have run Into 
grave b a l a n c e of payments problems, despite different, a n d sometimes even 
opposite, economic factors. 
2 Creditor countries 
The creditor countries have provided money In the form of official grants, loans on 
concessional terms and export credits. Due t o the recession, caused by the oil crisis In 
1979 In the OECD countries, which furnished most of the credits, the flow of official 
money t o the developing countries did not expand as forcefully as before. As a resuit 
of the recession the creditor countries were forced t o cut down public expenses. The 
b u d g e t for development assistance had t o c o m p e t e with budgets for national 
expenses, and was not protected from retrenchment or at least from being frozen. 
Apart from granting new loans a n d increasing the amount of official development 
assistance (ODA), the creditor countries are asked to contribute to a sustainable level 
of external debt In the developing countries. This Is done In the first p lace In the 
context of the Paris Club, In which debt rescheduling negotiations are c o n d u c t e d . 
Ю Jaa/v«5tagDNB19e4,p. 133-135. 
η Jaarveislag DNB1985. p. 157. 
12 Annuo/reporf/MF19e7,p. 1. 
13 Idem. 
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Another mechanism Is the conversion of loans Into grants, which will reduce the 
external debt burden. Several creditor countries have taken steps to convert loans 
into grants.1A 
In connection with the debt reduction mechanisms, the creditor countries are 
requested to provide a favourable International economic climate, which will provide 
sufficient opportunities for the debtor countries to Improve their economic 
performance. The creation of a favourable international economic environment is 
one of the pillars on which the debt strategy, advocated by the International Monetary 
Fund, Is based. The countries are requested to take Into account the external effects 
of the economic policies they pursue Internally.15 
3 Commercial creditors 
The commercial banks have only entered Into the field of lending to developing 
countries fairly recently. This practice took off after the oil price rise In 1973-1974, as the 
amount of petro-dollars which had to be reinvested increased dramatically. This was 
a task allotted to the commercial banks. The financing by the commercial banks of 
economic development In this period has contributed greatly to the continuing 
growth In the economies of the developing countries and to the growth In world 
trade.1 6 The Increase in petro-dollars brought the Interests of commercial bankers and 
developing countries together, resulting In a large surge In lending to the latter.17 
Why did the commercial banks turn to the developing countries, mainly the Latin 
American countries, to Invest their excess petro-dollars? 
A first reason would seem to be the fact that these more developed developing 
countries appeared creditworthy. They had for some time enjoyed economic growth 
which equalled and in some cases exceeded the economic growth achieved in the 
developed countries. Even If these countries were to encounter liquidity problems, 
these would be solved by a 'roll-over' of the loans until the debtor generated new 
funds.18 
Secondly, the banks regarded States as a very safe Investment: these would never 
go bankrupt. If States were not able to fulfil their external financial obligations, the 
banks assumed that the IMF or members of the international community would come 
to the aid of the defaulting country to prevent the collapse of the stability of the 
international monetary system." 
Thirdly, the demand for credit from the developed countries slowed down 
considerably due to a reduced economic growth, and lending to the developing 
countries proved to be highly profitable for the banks.20 
During the 70's and early 80's the banks extended loans to the developing countries 
on a grand scale. It appeared that the banks did not become apprehensive about 
the massive increase In loans.21 
14 For example, France, Japan and Ttie Netherlands. 
15 Jaarverslag IMF 1989. Press commurtques Interim Committee. 
16 De Bain. M.A., op. cit., p. 52. 
17 Bamett, B.C.. S.J. Galvb and Jr. G. Gouralge, On third world debt. Harvard International Law 
Journal. Vol. 25. no. 1.. Winter 1984. p. 88. 
IB tetem, p. 89. 
19 tetem. p. 90. 
2D И т , p. 90. 
21 George, S..A fate worse than debt. 1988, p. 31. She cites a young banker on this problem: 
"As a loan officer, you are principally In business of making loans. It Is not your Job to worry 
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In 19Θ2, after Mexico's announcement that It was unable to service Its debt, the 
commercial banks abruptly stopped providing loans to developing countries. Due t o 
pressure exerted by the IMF the banks 'forcefully' lent new money t o the debtor 
countries. New money was regarded as necessary to balance the large amount of 
Interest payments a n d to support the economic adjustment programmes the debtor 
countries had embarked upon, with the help of the IMF.22 
4 International organizations arising out of Bretton Woods 
Both the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
a n d Development emerged out of the 'International and Financial Conference of the 
United Nations a n d the Nations associated with them In the War'.Thls conference, held 
at Bretton Woods from 1 t o 22 July 1944, was the result of the wish to prevent a similar 
crisis In the economic order to that which had occurred in the period between World 
War I a n d World War II. The intention was t o set up three international organizations, 
which were allotted the task t o manage the International economic order. 
a. The International Monetary Fund t o regulate, supervise, a n d promote the free flow 
of International payments based on a system of fixed currency exchange rates'; 
b. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 'to assist those 
countries which, because of their wartime destruction or underdevelopment, 
could not yet participate on their own In such a liberal economic system'; 
с The International Trade Organization 'to monitor the free flow of International trade'. 
(The ITO never c a m e Into existence, some of its allotted tasks were assumed by 
theGATTInl947).2 3 
On December 27, 1945 both the Fund a n d the World Bank c a m e into existence 
officially.2 4 
The tasks of the two organizations c a n be defined as follows: 
"While the Fund Was t o operate the International monetary system. I.e. t o ensure 
unrestricted international payment on current transactions, the Bank was to be In 
charge of the international financial system, providing for the transfer of capital t o 
those countries which n e e d e d It to overcome their wart ime destruction or 
underdevelopmenf.25 (emphasis added) 
about large and unwieldy abstractions, such as whether what you're doing Is threatening 
the stability of the world economy. In that sense, a young banker Is like a soldier on the 
front lines: he Is obedient, aggressive and amoral'. 
22 De Beaufort Wljnholds. J.A.H., Het Internationale schuldenprobleem In e e n nieuwe fase: 
het plan Brady, Internationale Spectator. Juni 1989. p. 355. 
See for deta i led analysis of the relations b e t w e e n debtor States, creditors a n d the IMF 
a n d WB Chapter 5. 
23 Petersmann. H.G., Financial assistance to developing countries; the changing role of the 
Wortdbank and International Monetary Fund. August 1988, Europe Union Verlag G m b H , p. 
7/8. 
24 Van Meerhaeghe, M.A.G., International Economic Institutions. MarHnus Nljhoff Publishers, 
1985.41h ed., p. 24. 
26 Petersmann. H.G., The legal evolution of the International monetary system since Bretton 
Woods, G.Y.I.L Vol. 25, p. 379. 
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During World War II both the English and the American governments designed plans 
to organize the world economy after the war The Americans came up with the White 
plan, the English presented a plan prepared by Keynes 
The White plan was based on the Amencan need for a free and liberalized world 
trade Any economic order should put the least possible restrictions on the economic 
sovereignty of States It emphasized that the Fund should conduct its operations with a 
certain degree of discretion. It should not act as an automatic body as the Keynes 
plan envisaged 
The Fund was based on the Idea of 
" establishment of a fund of at least 500 million dollars to which the member states 
would transfer a part of their exchange reserves, this fund would serve to grant 
credit, within certain limits to signatories"26 
The Keynes plan, representing the English view of the economic organization of the 
new world order, gave a more prominent role to the Fund in regulating the new 
economic order The basis of this plan was formed by a liberal concept of the world 
economy, but It abandoned the old lalssez-falre approach regarding International 
currency regulations Gold was to be solely used as a central reserve and as a means 
of International settlement The plan also emphasized the need for exchange control, 
at least during the transitional period In short, 'the purpose ( ) would be a multilateral 
system in which all International monetary transactions would be cleared between 
central banks, operating on their accounts with an International Clearing Bank'27 
At the Bretton Woods Conference, the American ideas prevailed, three main 
functions were assigned to the IMF 
a a regulatory authority 'to administer a code of conduct designed to ensure 
payments for merchandise trade, services, and other current transactions', 
b a coordinating role to provide a forum In which members could consult with one 
another and collaborate on International monetary matters, 
с a financial role 'to provide Its members with financial resources enabling them to 
observe the code of conduct'2 8 
The articles of Agreement of the IMF can be seen as a code stipulating the Institutional 
rules for the Fund's organs on the one hand, and their operational powers on the other 
hand 2 9 
26 V a n M e e r h a e g h e . M A G . idem, ρ 24 
27 Gold.J.op c/f,p 123 
The Keynes plan also created a bancor". an International unit of account This concept 
was not Included In the plans for the IMF, In the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, but In 1969 
The Special Drawing Rights (SDR s) were created ' the British In Bretton Woods lost a 
battle, but their monetary concept would not be forgotten and revised In due time". 
Petersmam, H G , S УIL. Vol 25 ρ 379 
2B Petersmann, H G . fínanclai Assistance . ρ 23/A 
So 'the Fund Is not and may not be seen upon as a super-central bank'. It Is an 
International organization with broad powers to guide Its members along the narrow path 
of International monetary relations As a way to Influence the behavtor of Its members It 
has the power to give or to withhold financial assistance to the state'. Southard Jr, Frank 
A .The évolution of the IMF, North Carolina Journal of International Law. 1980, Vol 5, No 3, p. 
426 
29 Petersmann, H G , G YIL . Vol 25 ρ 379/80 
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Two complementary tasks were assigned to the organs of the IMF: 'surveillance of 
the code of obligations of member States by means of consultative and regulatory 
procedures' and 'management of the Fund's financial resources and activities'.30 
The Fund may not be seen as a development Institution: 
"Il Importe tout d'abord de rappeler que le Fonds n'est pas un organisme d'aide ou 
une Institution de financement du développement... Le rôle du Fonds est d'assurer 
la cooperation monétaire Internationale et d'aider ses pays membres à faire face 
à leurs difficultés de balance des paiements a moyen d'une assistance technique 
et financière accordée à Tappui de programmes d'ajustement économique."31 
The World Bank has as its task to look after the International financial system, the Fund 
had as Its task to guard the International monetary system. While the Bank had to 
provide for the transfer of capital to those countries which needed it to overcome their 
underdevelopment, the Fund had to ensure unrestricted International payments on 
current transactions.32 
4.1 International Monetary Fund 
The purposes of the IMF are defined In Article 1 of the Articles of Agreement: 
(D to promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent Institution 
which provides the machinery and col laboration on International monetary 
problems. 
(II) to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of International t rade, and to 
contr ibute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of 
employment and real Income and to the development of the product ive 
resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy. 
(Hi) to promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements 
among members, to avoid competitive exchange depreciation. 
(Iv) to assist In the establishment of a multilateral system of payments In respect of 
current transactions between members and In the elimination of foreign 
exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade. 
(v) to give conf idence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them 
with opportunity to correct maladjustments In their balance of payments without 
resorting to measures destructive of national or International prosperity. 
(vl) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of 
disequilibrium In the balance of payments of members. 
Membership Is open to all countries, developed or developing, who endorse the 
purposes of the Fund. 
3D Petersmann. H.G., Financial Assistance.... p. 23/4. 
31 Citation of mr. de la Rosière In L'Herlteau, M.F., Le fonds monétaire International et les 
pays du tiers-monde, p. 49. 
32 Peteremann. H.G. G. Y.I.L. Vol. 25, p. 37Θ. 
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Organization 
The different organs of the IMF were allotted two kinds of authority, namely 
surveillance of the code of obligations of member states by means of consultative 
and regulatory procedures and management of the Fund's resources and activities.33 
The organs of the Fund are the Board of Governors, the Executive Board, the Interim 
Committee, and the Development Committee. 
The floord of Governors Is the body in which all the powers are vested. Each 
member country appoints a governor. The Board of Governors meets at least once a 
year to examine the operation of the Fund. 
Most powers, however, have been delegated to the Executive Board. It Is 
responsible, within the limits of the powers conferred upon It by the Board of 
Governors, for conducting the day-to-day business of the Fund. At the moment there 
are twenty-two directors, each representing a country or a group of countries. They 
meet whenever necessary.34 The Executive Board plays a central role In the 
determination of the access policies of the resources of the Fund and supervises the 
countries, that have requested the use of funds.35 
On October 2, 1974, the Board of Governors established the Interim Committee of 
the Board of Governors on the International Monetary System (.the Interim Committee). 
It Is an advisory body made up of 22 Fund Governors. Ministers, or others of 
comparable ranks (mostly, governors of the national central banks), representing the 
same constituencies as those represented In the Fund's Executive Board. It advises 
and reports to the Board of Governors on the functions of the Board of Governors In 
supervising the management and adaption of the International monetary system.30 It 
therefore considers proposals made by the Executive Board. It also deals with sudden 
disturbances that have occurred and might threaten the international monetary 
system.37 Over the years the Interim Committee has become the most Important 
consulting body of the IMF.38 
The Joint Ministerial Committee of the Board of Governors of the Bank and the Fund 
on the transfer of real resources of developing countries (the Development 
Committee) advises and reports to both the Board of Governors of the Fund and the 
Board of Governors of the Bank on all aspects of the transfer of real financial resources 
to developing countries.39 
Arrangements and facilities under which the IMF provides resources to Its members 
The IMF's financial resources are made available to its members through a variety of 
facilities, which differ In the type of balance of payments needs they address and In 
the degree of conditlonallty attached to them.40 
33 Petersmann, H.G.. G.Y.I.L. Vol. 25. p. 382. 
34 V a n Meerhaeghe, M.A.S.. o p . cit., p. 30/1. 
36 L'Heriteau, op. cit.. p. 19. 
36 International monetary system: 'a set of International legal rules w h i c h are designed to 
allow for free a n d orderly payments, especially o n current transactions, across national 
borders." Petersmann, H.G.. G.Y.I.L. Vol. 25. p. 376. 
37 Annua/ report IMF 1989. p. 10. 
38 Petersmann. H.G..G.V./.L. Vol. 25. p. 392. 
ЭР Annual report IMF 1989. p. 10. 
40 IMF Survey, Supplement o n the Fund. Volume 19, August 1990. p. 10. 
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The Fund provides these funds through resources in the General Resource 
Account , resources In the Special Disbursement Account , and resources In Fund 
administered accounts, such as the Trust Fund.41 
The rules governing the use of the resources of the IMF apply uniformly to all 
members.42 Access to resources Is primarily determined by the balance of payments 
needs of the member and the adjustment policies It Is willing to undertake. The extent 
of the purchase made under a facility depends upon the quote of the member.43 
a. General resource account 
The general resource account provides financial assistance by providing resources 
contributed by Its more fortunate members to the less fortunate members, who are in 
need of assistance In order to fulfil their external financial obligations. This assistance is 
given on a cooperative, non-profit basis. The IMF pays remuneration to the creditor 
and the debtor pays periodic charges to the Fund on levels below market rates. 
Justification for this policy Is found In the objective of the IMF. as formulated In Article I 
of the Articles of Agreement, namely, to enable Its members to solve their balance of 
payments difficulties without resorting to measures which would be detrimental to the 
International financial and economic environment.44 
The general resource account Is made up of a variety of facilities, the reserve 
tranche, the credit tranche, the extended fund facility, the enlarged access policy, 
the compensatory and contingency finance facility, and the bufferstock financing 
facility. 
Reserve Tranche: A member may purchase up to the full amount of Its reserve 
tranche (25 % of its quota) at any time. It should establish a balance of payments 
need, a representation which cannot be challenged by the IMF. A purchase out of this 
tranche does not constitute a use of IMF resources and is not subject to charges or 
any other obligation.45 
Credit tranches: The credit tranche policy Is the basic lending policy on the use of 
the IMF general resources. There are four credit tranches, each made up of 25 % of 
the members quota. The first purchase In the credit tranche Is referred to as the credit 
tranche. It Is requested when a member Is confronted with relatively small balance of 
payments difficulties, and the assistance will be made available If the member 
country demonstrates that It Is making reasonable efforts to overcome Its difficulties. 
Subsequent purchases are known as upper credit tranches. Its use Is linked with a 
4i Wem. 
42 Glanvltl, F., The International monetary fund and external debt. R.d.C. 1989-111, p. 248: "There 
are four conditions tor assistance (Art. V, sec. 3 (b)): the use of the Fund's resources must 
b e consistent with the Articles and the policies adop ted under them; the members must 
represent that It has a need to make the purchase because of Its ba lance of payments or 
Its reserve position or developments In Its reserves; the proposed purchase must be a 
reserve t ranche purchase or wou ld not raise the Fund's holdings of the member's 
currency above 200 percent of the member's quota; the member has not been declared 
Ineligible to use the Fund's general resources." 
43 The quote serves as a means to determine the rights and duties of the members and as 
such constitutes a link between the economic relevance of the member a n d Its weight In 
the organization of the Fund. Barents, R., Studies over Internationaal economisch recht. 
deel 1.3 (a), p. 33. Organisaties op het gebied van het Internationale monetaire stelsel en 
de ontwlkkeUngsñnanclering. red. P. Verloren van Themaat. 
44 Glanvltl. F.. op. c/f../?.d.C. 1989-111. p. 246. 
45 IMF survey, supplement. Vol. 19,1990, p. 10. 
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stand-by arrangement that ensures that the members will adopt policies which will 
Improve their balance of payment.46 
Extended Fund Facility (FFF): Under this facility, which was established in 1974, the 
Fund has the opportunity to provide assistance to members to meet their balance of 
payments deficits for longer periods and In amounts larger than under the credit-
tranche policies. In order to be able to make purchases out of this fund a member is 
required to show Its willingness to adopt adjustment policies. A stand-by arrangement 
Is required.47 
Enlarged Access Policy. This enables the Fund to provide additional money. In 
conjunction with Its ordinary resources, to members who are confronted. In relation to 
their quota, with a large balance of payments deficit. These purchases are subject to 
the relevant policies of the Fund.48 
Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF): This facility may be 
used by countries which encounter shortfalls In their export receipts and/or excesses 
In the cost of cerial imports, or by countries facing adverse external shocks that are 
beyond their control to maintain the momentum of adjustment programmes; the 
export shortfalls must be temporary and attributable to circumstances that are largely 
beyond the member's control.49 A contingency mechanism may be attached to an 
IMF arrangement. It can be used to cover unfavourable trends In export or Import 
prices and International Interest rates. Purchases under CCFF are additional to 
purchases under credit tranche policies.50 
Buffer stock financing facility. A special facility to help finance members' 
contributions to approved International commodity buffer stock schemes. Funds are 
subject to existence of balance of payments needs. No use has been made of this 
facility since 1984.51 
b. Special disbursement account 
Within the special disbursement account, the Fund has established the structural 
adjustment facility (.SAP). It provides balance of payments assistance on 
concessional terms to low-income, developing countries. The objective of the facility 
is 'to help these countries establish the conditions for sustained growth, strengthen 
their balance of payments position, and facilitate orderly relations with creditors and a 
reduction In trade and payments restrictions'.52 A member who seeks to draw from this 
facility Is required to develop, with assistance of the staff of the IMF and the World 
Bank, a policy framework for a three-year adjustment programme. Such a framework 
Is also Intended to serve as a catalyst for financial assistance In support of the 
adjustment programme.53 
41 fctem.p. 11. 
47 /dem, p. 11. Stand-by arrangements wlH extensively be dealt with In Chapter 5. 
« Idem. p. 11. 
49 See also Infra par. 2.2., Chapter 4. 
50 IMF Survey, simplement. Vol. 19,1990, p. 12. 
51 fctem.p. 12. 
S fctem.p. 13. 
53 Such a framework Is set out In a policy framework paper (PFP). Idem. p. 13. 
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с. Administered funds 
For the enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) the objectives are basically the 
same as the SAF. The differences relate largely to the monitoring and strength of the 
programme. The measures are expected to be particularly ambitious, with a view to 
fostering growth and achieving a substantial strengthening of the balance of 
payments position.54 The loans are extended. In conjunction with SAF loans, by the 
Fund as Trustee. The ESAF Trust is funded from trusts and donations by members.55 
The main objective of the fund Is to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of 
disequilibrium In the balance of payments of members'.50 
The policy of the IMF In providing financial support to its member countries Is 
geared toward assuring that their policies, adopted In order to achieve sufficient 
adjustment, will reduce their balance of payments Imbalances and are consistent 
with the purposes of the IMF. This requirement, which Is known as 'conditlonallty of the 
use of the Fund's resources', proposes to strike an appropriate balance between 
financing and economic policy changes.57 
The role of the IMF In managing the debt crisis 
From the onset of the current crisis, the IMF has played a central role In the handling of 
the problem. A decisive factor which contributed to the role the Fund was to play, was 
the ability of the IMF to provide credits and at the same time ensure that countries with 
debt-servicing difficulties enforced an Internal economic adjustment programme.58 
This was due to the fact that although Its funds provide credit to members with 
balance of payments difficulties, this 'aid' Is tied to certain conditions. Through the 
Imposition of these economic recommendations the IMF is able to exert 
considerable pressure upon member States to get their economic and monetary 
bookkeeping back in order. One or more Fund facilities will be used, according to the 
specific features of the balance of payments problem of the individual member 
States. Besides providing credits to the debt-ridden countries, which could Only be 
done on a limited scale due to the character of its funds59, the IMF serves as a catalyst 
for continued commercial and official funds. The adjustment programmes the 
member countries consent to are seen by the creditors as a seal of approval, a sign 
that serious efforts are being undertaken to correct the balance of payments 
Imbalances.60 
54 fctem.p. 13. 
» Gkmvltl, F., op. cit., R.d.C. 1989-111, p. 258. 
56 Art. 1 (vD Articles of Agreement. 
57 In Chapter 5 the aspect of conditlonallty will be described. 
58 De Beaufort Wljnholds, J.A.H. a n d A.A. Scholten, Dollardllemma п schuldencrisis, p. 45. 
According to R.G. MacLean, the legal aspects of external debt. R.d.C. 1989-11, p. 73/4: the 
Fund supported the process via adjustment programs; temporary financial support; the 
seal of approval of the fund supported programs; a n d the catalytic role. 
» The funds are limited In a m o i n t a n d In l ime. The funds have a revolving character. 
60 A c c o r d i n g t o F. Glanvltl there are three aspects to the Fund's role In the f inancing of 
external d e b t : 
"The Fund m a y provide a m e m b e r with f inancing from resources held In o n e of Its 
a c c o u n t s (General Resource A c c o u n t . Special Disbursement A c c o u n t , Administered 
accounts), subject to certain conditions; 
the Fund's 'seal of approval ' for a member's adjustment policies m a y b e a condit ion for 
the provision of f inancing from other sources; 
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'A key aspect of the Fund's role has been to explain to all parties concerned the 
thrust of the adjustment policies being undertaken by the debtor countries 
Involved".61 
Although the limited resources the Fund has do not enable It to act as a major supplier 
of credits. Its catalytic role has gained Increasing Importance. In this regard reference 
may be made to the procedure of 'enhanced surveillance' developed in connection 
with the multi-year rescheduling agreements. In this case, the Fund does not provide 
credits Itself, nor concludes a stand-by arrangement, but agrees to conduct a 
surveying role, which Is linked to an Intensification of Its Article IV consultations.62 
The IMF approaches the debt problems of the different member countries on a case-
by-case basis. Together with the country it drafts an adjustment programme, which is 
aimed at a restoration of the country's equilibrium of its balance of payments. As a 
policy the Fund requires the creditors, both commercial and official, to provide credits 
In order to enable the country to Implement the adjustment In a viable way. Until the 
consent of these creditors for new credits has been given, the executive board will not 
give Its authorization to the stand-by arrangements. 
The central theme in the debt strategy as pursued by the IMF is promoting faster 
growth In the developing countries. In order to enable them to service their external 
payments obligations. This requires mutually supportive efforts by all parties 
concerned, the debtor countries, creditor countries, commercial banks and 
International organizations. 
The strategy consists of three elements: 
a. the strengthening of the domestic policies of developing countries In order to pave 
the way for more effective resource utilization and faster growth; 
b. a supportive International economic environment; 
с timely financial support on viable terms.63 
Since the start of the current crisis, the IMF has pursued a policy that aimed at 
facilitating the restoration of normal creditor/debtor relations through economic 
adjustments In debtor countries that would provide the basis for a restoration of 
confidence and a resumption of lending and Investment at levels with countries 
'medium-term prospects'.64 
Initially It was thought that the road to this goal led via debt-rescheduling, 
restructuring and refinancing. Since 1988 the IMF has paid Increasing attention to the 
the Fund may create International means of payments by allocating SDR's to Its members 
that are participants In the SDR Department." 
Glanvlll, F., op. cit.. R.d.C. 1989 III. t. 215, p. 246. 
As a prerequisite to the negotiations both creditor-clubs ask for such an adjustment 
program to be entered Into by the debtor country, see for further details Chapter 5. 
61 IMF Annual report λ<№Λ.ρ. 72. 
62 Art. IV consultations, the Fund conducts regular consultations with Its members o n the 
various aspects of their e c o n o m i c a n d financial policies. The consultation reports are 
established by the staff a n d discussed by the Executive Board. These reports d o n o t 
express the views of the Fund, but the views of the staff. Art. IV consultations are a t best 
annual . Sometimes a credi tor requests semi-annual consultat ions. The staff t h e n 
c o n d u c t s supplementary consultation discussions. The Intensification is referred to as 
"enhanced survemance". Its basis Is then to b e found In Art. V. sec. 2 (b). 
Glanvlll. F., op. dt.. /J.dC. 1989-111, t. 215. p. 260/261. 
63 Annuel report IMF. 1987, p. 36. 
64 fctem, p. 39. 
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questton whether, and In case of a positive answer how, debt reduction mechanisms 
could provide a contribution to the achievement of an endurable debt ratio. This debt 
reduction would only be available for countries which pursue a proper Internal 
adjustment programme. 6 5 
To promote growth-oriented adjustment policies, the Fund has continued to a d a p t 
Its facilities a n d Instruments. The SAF has been created in order to facilitate the low-
Income countries; the CCFF has been established to help maintain the momentum of 
adjustment in the face of adverse external shocks.66 
Through the years, the role the IMF plays has c h a n g e d considerably. From an 
organization which had as Its purpose to normalize, examine a n d coordinate the 
exchange policies of the major Industrialized countries, it almost transformed itself Into 
an organization which mainly occupies Itself with developing countries. Through Its 
role as catalyst for other money flows a n d through 'forced condltlonallty'. It has 
gained great Influence In many developing countries. This Influence does not appear 
t o suit an organization, which has not been set up as an aid or developing 
organization, well. But through adjustment programmes It has a great impact on the 
economic policies in these countries, and It has therefore been forced t o evolve a 
vision with regard to development In general and the role the organization Is to play.6 7 
The long-term vision the IMF has evolved consists of the three elements mentioned 
above: the need t o strengthen domestic policies and the utilization of the resources of 
the debtor country combined with a faster economic environment. This goal must be 
supported by timely financial support, which may take the form of new money. 
rescheduling or, more recently, debt reduction. 
4.2 The World Bank Group 
The World Bank Group has as Its central purpose 'to promote economic and social 
progress In developing nations by helping to raise productivity so that their peoples 
may live a better and fuller life'.68 
The World Bank Group, which consists of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), the International Development Assoclatlon(IDA) and 
International Finance Corporatlon(IFC), has three Interrelated functions to help poor 
nations to move to that stage of economic strength at which development becomes 
self-sustaining, and eventually to a level that permits the same nations to contribute to 
the development process In countries that are less developed. These functions are to 
lend funds, to provide advice and to serve as a catalyst to stimulate investment by 
others.69 
Contrary to the IMF. which must guard the International monetary system, the World 
Bank Group has as its task to look after the international financial system. 
"The World Bank Group's global development strategy Is built on the basic 
assumption that international development assistance must not be understood as 
a permanent redistribution of wealth, and consequently that the World Bank Group 
66 Jaarverslag DNB, 1988. p. 100. 
об Annual report IMF WB7 a n d 1988. 
67 L'Herlteau. M.-F., Le FMI et les pays du tiers-monde, p. 81. 
de Τίιβ World Bank, The world bank a n d the International finance corporation; International 
borrowing, e d . D.D. Bradtow. p. 31. 
» Idem. 
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was not Intended as, or in a position to assume a role of a 'giant global welfare 
agency'. (...) the World Bank Group's assistance Is designed to help developing 
member States to help themselves, thereby making them Increasingly 
Independent of external assistance until they reach a point of self-sustained 
development at which they are able to stand on their own."70 
In short, two main functions can be distinguished for the World Bank Group. These are 
making or guaranteeing loans for developing projects in less-developed countries, 
either from its own capital or with borrowed funds, and provision of technical 
assistance to the less-developed countries.7 ' 
Organization 
The IBRD Is one of the 'two sisters' of the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944. Its Articles 
of Agreement were formally accepted by a majority of the participants by December 
27,1945; it opened for business on June 25, 1946. Under the Articles of Agreement only 
members of the IMF are eligible to become members of the IBRD. 
The IDA, established In 1960, and the IFC, established In 1956, are affiliates of the 
IBRD. The IBRD and the IDA share the same staff; the IFC has Its own operating and legal 
staff, but shares certain administrative and other services with the IBRD. The President 
of the IBRD Is also President of the IDA and the IFC. 
The funds of the IBRD are only available to governmental borrowers that are 
creditworthy in aid of projects which promise high real rates of economic return to the 
country. The funds are obtained by the IBRD through borrowing on the capital market, 
from paid-in capital, from Its retained earnings, and from flows of repayments on its 
loans. 
The IDA has the same goal as the IBRD, but emphasis Is put on assistance to the 
poorer developing countries. Loans are made on terms that would bear less heavily 
on their balance of payments than loans from the IBRD. IDA credits are given only to 
governments. When granting a loan the following criteria are taken Into consideration: 
the poverty level In the member State, the creditworthiness of the prospective 
borrower, the economic performance of the country and the availability of projects 
suitable for IDA financing. The IDA obtains Its funds from different sources. 
These are contributions from Its richer member countries, the transfer of net 
earnings from the IBRD and subscriptions from members. Its membership is open to all 
members of the IBRD. 
The establishment of the IDA made It possible for the World Bank Group to enter 
Into the field of concessional lending and to expand Its role in International 
development lending. The IDA is the World Bank's 'soft loan facility' for the poorest 
developing member States which do not fulfil the creditworthiness criteria the Bank 
requires for its normal loans.72 
TD Petersmann. H.G., The operations of the world bank and the evolution of Its Institutional 
functions since Bretton Woods, G.Y.I.L, Vol. 26, p. 27. 
71 MacLean, R.G., op. dt.. R.d.C. 1989-11, t. 214, p. 48: 
"The principle Instruments used In connection with the Bank's loan transactions Include a 
loan agreement with the borrower, and If the borrower Is not the member In whose 
territories the project Is located, a guarantee agreement with that member. The standard 
legal Instrument evidencing the sale of portions of loans is a certificate Issued by the Bank 
covering the amount, currency, maturily and rate of Interest of the portion sold.' 
Van Meerhaeghe, M.A.G., op. cit.. p. 73. 
72 Petersmann. H.G., op. dt.. vol. 26, p. 25-27. 
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The IFC has. like the IDA, the same goal as the IBRD, but emphasis Is p laced on its 
role to assist the economic development of less developed countries by providing 
domestic and foreign capi ta l to promote growth In the private sector of their 
economies. The present day role of the IFC Is defined as follows: "to provide financial, 
legal and technical advice aimed at bringing together and harmonizing the often 
diverse Interests of the parties Involved In an enterprise - domestic and foreign 
sponsors, f inancial Institutions and Investors, technica l partners, and the host 
governments - and thereby to contribute an element of confidence to the venture".73 
The IFC plays an Important role as a catalyst, both for private direct Investment, and 
private 'Indirect' Investment, attracting private resources. 
Although the three Institutions have different features, their organizational structure 
Is broadly the same. The main body Is the Board of Governors, which meets once a 
year to review the operations of the Bank and to discuss Its basic policies. Each 
member country appoints a Governor. Most functions are delegated to the Board of 
Executives, which takes care of the day-to-day running of the Bank. There are 21 
Executive Directors. 
The role of the World Bank Group In managing the debt crisis 
The World Bank Group's development strategy Is built on the presumption that 
development assistance should not be seen as a permanent redistribution of wealth, 
but as a means to enable developing countries to become 'self-sufficient', to stand 
on their own feet. This process Is underlined by the graduat ion system the Bank 
employs. This system has as Its goal to lead countries, which were at first only eligible 
for IDA loans, to a stage In their economic development which will make them eligible 
for ordinary IBRD loans; and , as its final step, to help the member to achieve such 
economic progress, with the support of the IBRD loans, that It will gain access to the 
International capital markets, the stage where further financial assistance from the 
World Bank Is no longer necessary.74 
In order to enable a member country to graduate to this final stage the World Bank 
Group provides, besides loans and credits, technical assistance. This assistance can 
be either country-related or project-related.75 In this way the World Bank can Increase 
the effectiveness of Its f inancial assistance without Increasing the volume of its 
lending. 
In response to events In the early IÇSO's, the World Bank Group strengthened Its 
'multi lateral strategy for development ' . This strategy alms to ach ieve bo th 
acceleration of economic growth and reduction of the level of poverty. It adop ted 
three ways to achieve this goal: 
73 Idem. p. 24. 
MacLean. R.G.. op. cit.. R.d.C. 1939-11. t. 214.p. 48: 
The existence of a government or other public Interest In such an enterprise shall not 
necessarily preclude the Corporation from making an Investment therein. To ensure that 
the IFC would b e ab le to fulfil Its deve lopment role exclusively In a commerc ia l , risk 
oriented way. the IFC was given the power to provide equity capital and was prohibited 
from accept ing government guarantees of repayments." 
74 Idem. p. 29. 
75 The IBRD acts as executing agent tor the UNDP, which Is the world's most Important source 
of f inancing for technical assistance In the pre-Investment stage. 
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α. It concentrates Its advice and financial assistance on those objectives which have 
the highest development priority and which, therefore, maximize the effectiveness 
of the assistance; 
b. the limited resources are also used to attract additional financial resources, which 
would not otherwise be available to the member; 
с the World Bank acts as a coordinator of the financial assistance given to the 
member country by other resources. In order to ensure the maximum 
effectiveness of Its limited resources In conjunction with other resources.76 
In addition to the strengthening of its multilateral strategy for development, it Increased 
Its co-financing activities. Initially these activities were limited to projects which were 
financed by official creditors. It now Increasingly enters into co-financing 
arrangements with commercial banks and other private creditors. Initially the co-
flnanclng consisted of direct funding, but as of January 1983 new Instruments have 
been Implemented: direct financial participation by the Bank in the later maturities of a 
commercial loan, guarantees of the later maturities of a private loan, and contingent 
participation In the later maturities of a commercial loan, that, initially would be 
financed by commercial lenders.77 
It Introduced Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL) as a response to the dramatic 
economic developments In the beginning of the 1980's. SAL has been used 'to 
support programmes of specific policy changes and Institutional reforms designed to 
achieve a more effective use of resources, thereby contributing to more sustainable 
balance-of-payments in the medium and long term, to assist countries In meeting the 
transnational costs of needed structural changes In Industry, and agriculture by 
augmenting the supply of freely usable exchange and to act as a catalyst for the 
Inflow of other external capital'.78 
The introduction of SAL into the lending facilities of the World Bank Group brings the 
Bank closer to the lending activities of the IMF. But here Iles a clear distinction: the 
policy requirements of the Fund are limited to the monetary, fiscal and exchange 
policies of the State, whereas the World Bank Is concerned with development 
priorities, the effectiveness of the use made of the funds and the composition of the 
Investment programmes, as outlined in the programme of adjustment. 
In order to combat the current debt crisis the World Bank advocates a modified 
strategy, which combines voluntary debt reductions, sustained adjustment 
programmes, enhanced surveillance and significant changes In the economic 
policies of the Industrial countries In order to create a favourable economic climate.79 
5 International creditors 'organizations' 
Contrary to the debtor countries, which are not allied In a 'debtor-cartel', the two main 
creditor groups have organized themselves Into "Clubs". The official creditors have 
76 Petersmarm. H.G., op. cit.. vol. 26, p. 43-47. Also MacLean, R.6.. op. cit.. R.d.C. 1989-11, t. 214, 
p. 75. 
77 Van Meerhaeghe, M.A.G.. op. cit.. p. 88/89. 
78 The government 's Intention t o u n d e r t a k e a p r o g r a m m e of structural ad justment , w h i c h Is 
referred to In t h e p r e a m b l e of t h e a g r e e m e n t , serves as a basis for t h e l o a n . 
7> Meessen. K.M., Back to t h e markets; t h e d e b t p r o b l e m In legal p e r s p e c t i v e ; Fordham 
International Law Journal. Vol. 12. no. 1, p. 2. 
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created an Informal institutional framework. In which they conduct their negotiations 
with the debtor countries. This Is cal led the Paris Club. The commercial banks have 
created the 'London Club'. 
5.1 The Parts Club 
The Paris Club Is not an International organization. It represents a set of procedures 
which serve as a guideline for negotiations between debtor a n d creditors. The first 
rescheduling took place In 1956 In Paris, many more have followed since. The French 
Ministry of Finance acts as its secretariat, and this fact accounts for Its name. 
Negotiations are open t o all the governments that have extended credits t o the 
debtor country, that requests the rescheduling. 
The Paris Club negotiations are conducted over a very short period, within two days 
as a rule. This is partly due to the long experience of the official creditors, but the fact 
that the agreement that Is negotiated is an a d referendum frame-work agreement has 
contr ibuted t o the speed of the negotiations. This a d referendum frame-work 
agreement establishes the rules according to which the debtor country conducts Its 
bl-lateral debt-rescheduling negotiations with the Individual creditor countries.8 0 
This ad referendum frame-work agreement is called the Agreed Minutes. This is the 
basis u p o n w h i c h the individual creditor country develops the terms of the 
renegotiated loan treaty with the debtor country. The Agreed Minutes are not the 
legal basis of the renegot iated d e b t , they only provide the guidelines for the 
subsequent Individual negotiations between creditor State and debtor State. The 
outcome of these negotiations will be laid down In a Ы-lateral treaty which forms the 
legal basis of the renegotiated debt. The role of the Paris Club within the renegotiating 
process will be discussed In depth in Chapter 5. 
5.2 The 'London Club' 
The c o m m e r c i a l banks have established In the 'London Club'. This Is not an 
International organization. It Is an a d hoc group. Membership will vary according t o 
whether or not credit has been extended t o the particular debtor requesting the 
negotiations by the bank. The negotiations conducted In the framework of the London 
Club take a long time. This is due t o the fact that there are a great number of banks 
Involved, sometimes over 400, a n d t o the character of the Instrument that Is being 
n e g o t i a t e d . At the beginning of e a c h negot iat ion a 'steering commit tee' Is 
established In which the main commercial banks are all represented. The smaller 
banks are represented by a few banks w h o c o n d u c t the talks with the debtor 
country.8 1 
"The Committee will never mislead the borrower Into thinking that it has actual 
negot iat ing authority for the banking community. In the e n d , the best the 
Committee con do Is to endorse the proposed terms of the deal t o the other banks 
Ю Rleffel, Α., The role of the Paris Club In managing debt problems, no. 161. Essays In 
htemattonal finance, p. 13-15. 
81 Clark, K. and M. Hugher, Approach to the restructuring of sovereign debt; Sovereign 
lending; managing legal risk. ed. M. Gruson and R. Relsner. Euromoney Publications, 1984. 
p. 134. 
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and encourage their acceptance. In practice, however, once a deal struck with 
the advisory committee, both the borrower and the banks regard the terms of the 
packages as finalized. The choices for the non-committee banks at this juncture 
are only two: to sign or not to sign."82 
The role the Club of London plays with regard to the current debt problem will be 
discussed In Chapter 5. 
Idem. p. 23. 
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CATEGORIES OF STATE DEBTS AND THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 
Introduction 
The external debt of a country Is composed of different types of debts: State debts 
and private debts. The State debt can be divided into three categories: State debt, 
local debt and localized debt. 
Do they all qualify as State debt? Are debts contracted by a previous regime, for 
purposes contrary to the Interests of the people, the so-called odious or regime 
debts, to be regarded as State debts which have to be honoured by the successor 
State or successor government? This is a legitimate question, since many 
governments are today faced with a colossal burden of debts which have not 
contributed to the development of the economy of the country and the welfare of Its 
people. Most of the debts of the debtor countries are contracted by previous regimes 
or dictators. Do the rules emerging out of the 1983 Vienna Convention on the 
succession of States In respect of State property, archives and debts and out of State 
practice, provide the debtor country with a legally valid tool to renounce or at least to 
diminish these debts? 
1 Categories of debt 
The debt problems emerged because countries, mostly developing countries, could 
not fulfil their external (monetary) obligations. The International debt problem 
concerns Itself with the external debt of a country; the Internal debt Is a matter of 
national concern only. ' 
A country's gross external debt Is the amount, at any given time, of disbursed and 
outstanding liabilities of residents of a country to non-residents to repay principal, with 
or without Interest, or to pay Interest, with or without principal.2 Debtors can be the State 
as well as the nationals of the State. 
There are two main categories of debts: State debts and private debts.3 A State 
debt can be defined as a debt contracted by a State or guaranteed by It. The liability 
1 Internal debt: the debt payable in the national currency, owed to a national of the State 
by another national or by the State. 
Also Walker, M.A. and L.C. Buchhelt, Legal Issues In the Restructuring of Commercial Bank 
Loans to Sovereign borrowers. In International Borrowing, ed. D.D. Bradlow, International 
Law Institute. Washington, D.C., 1986. p. 460: The external debt can be described as 
Indebtedness 
- for borrowed money, or the deterred purchase price of property and services: 
- payable In currency other than the local currency, and payable to a person having lis 
head office or chief place of business outside the country. 
2 This Is the definition accepted by the Fund, the World Bank, the OECD and the BIS. and Is 
used In their common publication 'External Debt, Definition. Statistical coverage and 
methodology. Paris 1988. 
3 In general see: 
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of α State does not arise exclusively from loans contracted by the State, It may also 
arise from a guarantee It gives In respect of a loan contracted by another party. This 
party may be a private Individual. A State d e b t c o n t r a c t e d with a State or an 
international organization I would propose to call a public State debt; a State debt 
towards a private person (for example, a commercial bank) I would propose t o call a 
commercial State debt. 4 A private debt Is a debt contracted by a private person, or 
by the State act ing as a private person.5 In this thesis, the nature of the debtor 
determines whether a debt is a State debt or a private debt. I have chosen for this line 
of approach since, as explained In the Introduction, the international debt problem will 
be examined from the debtors point of view. 
State debt a n d private d e b t together compose the external debt of a country. 
External d e b t Is 'that what Is o w e d by a State as a whole to non-residents a n d 
repayable In foreign currency, goods or services.'6 
In pract ice, a distinction Is m a d e between a long-term external debt and a short-
term external debt. A long-term external d e b t Is a d e b t that has an original or 
extended maturity of over one year, a short-term external d e b t has an original 
maturity of one year or less.7 
Focsaneanu, L. op. cit. p. 299-352. 
Carreau, D., Le réechelonnement de la dette extérieure des Etats, Journal du Droit 
International 1985, p. 5 -48. 
Jèze, G., 'Les défaillances d'Etal". R.d.C. 1935 III. ρ, 381-435; In this theses he makes a 
distinction between a political debt and a commercial debt of a State. This Is almost 
Identical to the distinction between public and private debts used In more recent 
literature, see also ILC yearbook 1981, p. 383 et seq. 
A State debt can also arise from International torts, but that subject lies outside the scope 
of this thesis. 
If the debt has been contracted by a public body that Is not an organ of the State, It wlH be 
a private debt, since International law does not recognize It as a subject of International 
law. This debt will be governed by a national law. In this thesis these debts will be dealt with 
under the category private debt. 
Fob, H.-E., State debts. EPIL Instalment 8, p. 484 et seq. 
Hahn, HJ., Foreign debts, EPIL. Instalment 8, p. 240 et seq. 
World Debt Tables. 1986-1987, Glossary. 
As will be dealt with In the next paragraph, I regard External and State debt as more than 
only a debt of the central government. This may not be the case In relation to problems of 
State succession and State Immunity. This will be dealt with later. 
Definitions as given In the World Debt Tables 1989-1990: 
- Long-term external debt Is defined as debt that has an original or extended maturity of 
more than one year and that Is owed to non-residents and repayable In foreign 
currency, goods or services. 
It has three components: 
- public debt, which Is an external obligation of a public debtor. Including the national 
government, a political subdivision (or an agency of either), and autonomous public 
bodies. 
- public guaranteed debt, which Is an external obligation of a private debtor that Is 
guaranteed tor repayment by a public entity. 
- private non guaranteed debt, wHch Is an external obligation of a private debtor that Is 
not guaranteed by a public entity. 
- Short-term external debt Is defined as a debt that has an original maturity of one year 
or less. 
(Worid Debt Tables 1989-1990. p. Xlll) 
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1.1 Sfofe deb/ 
A State debt c a n be created by way of a direct commitment for a debt contracted 
by a State or an organ of the State or indirectly by way of a guarantee given by the 
State or an organ of the State for a debt contracted by a private person.8 
In order t o call a debt a State debt, w e must first determine which acts c a n b e , 
according to International law, attributed to the State: that Is, the attribution to the State 
of the conduct of an individual, for the purpose of attaching legal consequences t o 
that conduct at the International level.' 
Two points must be examined: 
a. what conduct can be considered as conduct of the State; 
b. under what conditions must such conduct have been engaged In. 
As a general rule, we may state that acts attributed to the State at the International 
level are acts of persons or groups of persons who form part of its organization, the 
acts of Its organs.,0 This means that. In International law, the conduct of persons or 
groups of persons to whom the legal status of organ of the State Is attributed In the 
Internal order. Is In principle regarded as an act attributable to the State. This does not, 
however. Imply that the attribution of an act to the State by International law Is 
prescribed by national law. In fact the attribution by International law, although It may 
run parallel with the national law. Is wholly Independent of the attribution of that act In 
national law. '1 This means thai the criteria by which certain acts are regarded as acts 
of the State In International law may differ from the municipal law of that State. Acts of 
public entities other than the State can be regarded as acts of the State although In 
the Internal order they are not considered as such.12 
According to the International Law Commission the following groups are 
considered to be organs of the State13: 
a. persons who have, under the Internal legal order of the State, the character of 
organs of "public" Institutions, though separate from the State, and who act In that 
capacity In the case at Issue; 
b. persons who, under the internal legal order of the State, do not formally possess the 
character of organs of the State or of a public Institution separate from the State, 
but In fact perform public functions or act on behalf of the State; and 
β Guarantee agreement: 'the commitment to bring about the fulflllment of financial (abluties 
originally payable by another debtor1. 
Hahn, HJ., Agreements for the provision of creditor and financial guarantees by States 
under public International law, Hague-Zagreb Essays 7. p. 23. 
9 Yearbook 1С, 1971, p. 233. 
Ian Brownlle, Principles of PubUc International Law. third edition. 1979, p. 446. 
Ю Yearbook 1С, 1971, p. 233. 
Ian Brownlle., op. dt., p. 445 et seq. 
11 Yearbook ILC. 1971. p. 237 et seq. 
12 YearbooklC. 1971.p.238. 
13 Yecrbook ILC. 1972, p. 72. 
Yearbook ILC. 1975, p. 67. 
Brownlle, I., op. dt.. p. 36- p. 37, p. 445 et seq. 
In the following chapters the question of State Immunity and State succession will rise, the 
deflnlllon of an organ of the State may have to be adjusted when these Issues are dealt 
with. 
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с. persons who have the legal character of organs under the legal order of a State or 
of an International organization, and who have been placed at the disposal of 
another State provided that such persons are actually under the authority of the 
latter State and act In accordance with Its instructions. 
This means that an organ of the State can only carry the responsibility of the State 
when it is acting as such, not when It is acting as a private person. If an organ of a State, 
acting In Its capacity as organ of the State exceeds Its competence, a State cannot 
evade responsibility by Invoking rules of Internal law.M 
Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties creates an exception In 
case of responsibility arising out of a treaty. This article expresses 'that the 
manifestation of the will of an organ of the State expressing the State's consent to be 
bound by a treaty may not be attributed to the State If It Is manifest that this consent 
was expressed in violation of the provisions of Its internal law concerning the 
competence of the organ'.15 
In general it can be said that loan agreements entered into by the State or one of Its 
organs are valid, as long as It is not patently obvious that the State (or the organ) has 
acted outside its competence. 
1.2 Public State debt 
Public State debt Is a debt contracted by the State or guaranteed by the State, the 
creditor is either a State or an international organization, or both. This financial 
obligation is based on a treaty, and will consequently be governed by International 
law.16 
A treaty constitutes a limitation on the state's sovereignty, which means that a State 
cannot unilaterally depart from the obligations, as stipulated In the treaty. 
Non-performance of duties created by treaty constitutes In principle an Internationally 
wrongful act. The question, which Is very relevant in the context of the current debt 
crisis. Is whether there are any Justifying grounds for non-performance which would 
take away the wrongfulness of a refusal to pay or a refusal to pay at a certain time.17 
M Yearbook ILC. 1975, Vol. II, p.69. 
15 YearbooklLC. 1981,Vol. Il,part2. p. 78. 
16 Folz, H.-E., op. cit.. p. 485. 
A. Belaumde-Moreyren., Dramatic Action or Muddling Trough Strategy In the Debt 
Problem. In: Foreign Debte /n the Present and a New International Economic Order, edited 
by Detlev Chr. Dicke, p. 21 et seq. 
'Borrowing arrangements among governments are likely to be subject to public 
International law, though parties remain at liberty to subordinate their relationship to a 
specific national system of law. Including the latter's private law, the latter alternative 
being the rare exception rather than the rule. In the absence of an express choice of law 
In the text, the law applicable has to be traced on the basis of the relevant circumstances 
In their entirety. In particular the object and purpose. 
Agreements between an International organization and a State may be subject to a 
national system of law. Other entitles, such as IBRD and IDA subordinate their transactions 
to public International law'. 
Hahn, HJ.. op. cit.. p. 6. 
17 This question will be considered In Chapter 4. 
36 
CHAPTER 3 
1.3 Commercial State debt 
Commercial State debt Is a debt contracted by a State towards a private person 
(mostly a commercial bank). Such a credit contract is in most cases a normal private 
law contract. 
As was noted above, a State cannot. In general, unilaterally depart from Its treaty 
obligations. However, is there a possibility for a State to modify unilaterally Its 
contractual obligations? Concerning contracts which are subject to the law of the 
debtor State, the question to what extent a State can modify its contractual 
obligations without violating its International obligations is still controversial under 
International law.18 As most credit contracts are subject to the law of the State of the 
creditor or the law of a third State, the problem of unilateral modification by the debtor 
by way of changing the applicable law is fairly academic. 
The problems which a creditor can encounter In his contractual relationship -
regulated by private law of another State than the debtor State- with a debtor State, 
such as Issues of international comity, extra-territorial effect of public acts, and the act 
of State, will be discussed In Chapter 5. 
1.4 Private debts 
These are debts contracted by nationals of a State towards nationals of another state, 
and which are not guaranteed by the State. These contracts are governed by private 
law, either of the debtor's country or of the creditor's country. In most cases, the 
applicable law will be the law of the State of the creditor.19 
Is there a role for the State of the debtor In this relationship? A State may Intervene In 
this relationship. In the performance of Its obligations by the debtor, by way of Internal 
measures relating to transboundary financial transactions. This will affect the 
performance of the private foreign currency obligations. This Intervention Is based on 
the monetary sovereignty of the State. 
International law recognizes a wide scope of competence arising from monetary 
sovereignty: 
a. manipulation of the exchange rate of the national currency; 
b. modified taxation in relation to payment of foreign currency; 
с freezing and blocking of foreign accounts; 
d. temporary sequestration of foreign currency situated on national territory (transfer 
moratorium).20 
Most debtor countries are members of the International Monetary Fund. The Articles 
of Agreement of the IMF contain an important prohibition on State regulation affecting 
18 Bolhe, M.andJ. Brink, op. cff.,p. 86-110. 
Mam. F.A., State Contracts and State responsibility, A.J.I.L. 1960, p. 581. 
This problem has been dealt with extensively In literature regarding, among other things, 
nationalizations and Investment contracts. 
As Is the case with commercial state contracts, the creditor doss not In general want to 
rely upon the debtor's law. 
19 Bothe, M. and J. Brink.op. clt. p. 96. 
SD Article XXX(d) of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, see Infra Chapter 5. 
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transboundary payments.21 It applies to measures taken by the State that hinder or 
even make it impossible for the debtor to fulfil its financial obligations. 
But there are some very important exceptions to this rule. For example, there Is the 
provision that the IMF may permit such measures to be taken by the debtor State as 
part of a debt rescheduling.22 
2 Sfate ctetof and the doctrine of State succession 
2.1 Introduction 
The doctrine of State succession could play a role In the current debt problem. Not 
because the financial difficulties the debtor countries encounter might have their 
origins In the past decolonization process, but because certain rules with regard to the 
treatment of general State debts and odious debts might serve a purpose In the 
present debt problem. 
Is it compulsory for the successor State to succeed In part to the general State 
debts of the predecessor State, and if so, does the principle of capacity to pay play a 
role in the distribution process? What is the position with regard to newly independent 
States? In other words, will the economic circumstances of the newly Independent 
State be a relevant factor In the process of the allocation of financial obligations? The 
principle of capacity to pay, as might be found In the doctrine of State succession. 
could possibly serve as a touchstone in the present process of debt renegotiations. 
Many governments are stranded with debts, engaged In by previous governments 
which they have replaced during the democratization process, which have not 
contributed to the country or Its people. They only served the Interests of the previous 
regime and groups closely connected with It. Are they obliged to honour those 
commitments? The odious debt-doctrine might provide guiding principles which 
could be used In these cases, although the 1983 Convention limits Itself to the 
succession of States only. This starting point links up with established customary law.23 
The treatment of debts as a part of the doctrine of State succession concerns Itself 
with the protection of financial Interests.24 Each case of State succession gives rise to 
the question whether obligations entered Into by the predecessor State will pass on to 
the successor State. This question arises not only with regard to the continuation or 
succession to treaties engaged in by the predecessor State in the name of the 
territory which Is now transferred to another State or which has become Independent. 
It also arises In regard to financial obligations, which the territory had contracted Itself, 
but with the predecessor State acting as a guarantor. 
21 Bolhe, M. and J. Brink, op. cit.. p. 98. 
22 The role these possible measures could play, will b e examined In Chapter 5. 
23 Sack, A.N., íes effets des transformation des états sur leurs dettes publiques et autres 
obligations financières. Paris 1927, p. І6: "Il est donc evident que la transformation 
politiques de l'Etat debiteur ne change rien quant à ses dettes. Elle doivent être prises en 
charge par la nouveau gouvernement de l'Etat'. 
Badaoul, M.T., L'emprunt public et les transformation politiques et territoriales de l'Etat, 
Revue Egyptienne de Droit International. Vol. XIV, 195Θ, p. 24: "La personante de l'Etat est 
Independente de son gouvernement. La gouvernement peut changer sans que la 
personallté de l'Etat soit attalnte'. 
Verdross/SImma. Universelles Völkerrecht, p. 484 et seq. 
TA Fellchenfeld, E.H., Pub//c debt and state succession. New York 1931, p. 581. 
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When, however, does α situation qualify as State succession? "A State succession 
arises when there Is a definitive replacement of one State by another In respect of 
sovereignty over a given territory in conformity with international law".2 5 The doctrine 
of succession of States In matters other than treaties Is one of the most controversial 
topics of International law. A reason for the lack of generally a c c e p t e d rules Is given 
by the f a c t that the consequences of a succession are usually settled by an 
agreement between the parties. These agreements are influenced more by political 
and economic motives than by rules of international law. This has resulted In different, 
sometimes even conflicting solutions for similar situations.26 
Though It might be Impossible to construe generally applicable, widely recognized 
rules t o solve every concrete case of State succession, it Is possible t o d e d u c e 
guiding principles which lie behind the treaty provisions a n d their connection with 
general principles of International law.2 7 
As a main source the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of 
State property, archives a n d debts, which was established In 1983 will be used, 
although it Is a very controversial convention.2 8 
Article 2, subparagraph 1 (a) states that 'succession of States' means the 
replacement of one State by another In the responsibility for the international relations 
of territory'. Article 3 specifies that the Convention Is only applicable t o the effects of a 
succession of States occurring in conformity with International law a n d . In particular, 
with the principles of International law embodied In the Charter of the United Nations'. 
The provisions In the Convention concern the content of succession. Its legal effects, 
not Its modalities.2 9 A legally valid State succession only occurs if one State transfers 
the power (authority) over a certain territory t o another State in such a way that the 
transfer is in accordance with the rules of International law.3 0 
25 Brownlle, I., Principles of Public International Law. 3rd edition, Oxford 1979, p. 651. According 
to the author, the definition must be amended In case of the replacement of a mandate 
or trusteeship: then there Is a case of replacement of a special type of competence 
which Is different from sovereignty. 
O'Connell, D.P., The Law of state succession. Cambridge 1956, p. 3: "The significance of 
the term (State succession) Is to be limited ... to the factual situation which arises when 
one State Is substituted for another In sovereignty over a given territory." 
as Strelnz, R., Succession of States In Assets and Liabilities - a New Regime? the 1983 Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States In respect of State property, archives and debts; 
G.Y.I.L, Vol. 26,1983, p. 202-203. 
27 Strelnz, R., Idem, p. 203. 
O'Connell, D.P., Recent problems of State succession In relation to newStates-, ff.d.C. 1970 
II, t. 130, p. 147: "If the loan Is one between governments or between the predecessor State 
a n d a n International organization, the question Is not one of the appl icat ion to successor 
States of the ordinary rules of International law respecting acquired rights, a n d there must 
b e a special rule of International law providing for succession If the successor State Is t o 
b e Hable for the debts of Its predecessor". 
2B Monnler, J.. La convent ion d e Vienne sur la succession d'états en matière d e biens, 
archleves et dettes d'états: A.F.D.I.. 1984, p. 223. This convention Is closely linked with the 
convent ion of 1978 on the succession of States In treaties, the classification a n d the 
definitions are the same. This convention Is also controversial. 
29 fctem.p. 19. 
30 The 1983 Convention distinguishes five specific categories of succession of States: 
- Transfer of part of the territory of a State; 
- Newly Independent State; 
- Urttlng of States; 
- Separation of part or parts of the territory of a State; and 
- Dissolution of a State. 
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22 State debts 
At the basis of the classical doctrine of State succession with regard to State debts, 
we find the notion that the territory is regarded as a secunty for recourse and/or that 
the population of the territory is looked upon as the 'collective usufructuary and 
therefore Is obliged to honour the obligations flowing from the treaties31 
Article 33 of the 19Θ3 Vienna Convention contains the definition 
"For the purpose of the articles In the present part (Part V), "State debt' means any 
financial obligation of predecessor State arising In conformity with International law 
towards another State, an International organization or any other subject of 
International law" 
2 2.1 Debts excluded from the definition 
Debts owed by a third State to the predecessor State do not fall under the definition of 
Article 33, since they are regarded as a "debt-claim" of the predecessor State 
against a third State These "debt-claims" are considered to be State property and 
are governed by the legal regime which Is applicable to State property In the context 
of State succession 3 2 
The State debts which are covered by Article 33 are the State debts of the 
predecessor State 'for It Is the territorial change affecting the predecessor State, and It 
alone, that triggers the phenomenon of State succession . ' 3 3 Debts of the successor 
State are excluded, because they are not affected by the succession of State Also 
excluded from the scope of Article 33 are debts contracted by non-State 
organs^uch as public enterprises or public establishments, although it can 
sometimes be difficult to distinguish the State from Its public enterprises under the 
domestic law of the country In question ^ 
In the context of State succession, contrary to the option taken In the draft articles 
concerning State responsibility, the answer to the question whether a debt of such a 
body Is to be treated as a State debt Is negative № Debts the predecessor State owes 
to pnvate persons do not come under the definition The Commission agreed that 
debts owed by a State to private creditors were legally protected and not prejudiced 
by a succession of States'36 The ILC selected two criteria for the definition of State 
31 ОСопп І, DP International Lew. vol One. 2nd edition 1970 ρ 394 
Frankenberg G and R. Knleper. Rechtsprobleme der Überschuldung von Ländern der 
Dritten Welt. RIW1983, ρ 575/6 
32 Veo/boc*/LC1981 V d II.Part2.p 73 Part II of the Convention deals with State Property 
33 Wem. ρ 74 
ЗА Idem, ρ 77 with a reference to Yearbook ILC 1971, Vol II. part 1 ρ 254 The Special 
Rapporteur o n State Responsibility has given the following définition 
'publ ic corporations a n d other public Institutions which have their o w n legal personality 
and autonomy of administration and management, and are Intended to provide a 
particular service or to perform specific functions" 
In the case concerning certain Norwegian loans the French stated "In Internal law a 
public establishment Is brought Into existence In response to a need for decentralization, 
It may be necessary to allow a degree of Independence to certain establishments or 
bodies, either tor budgetary reasons or because of the purpose they serve This 
Independence Is achieved through the granting of legal personality under Internal law', 
I С J Pleadings. Certain Norwegian Loans (France ν Norway) (1955). vol 11, ρ 72 
35 УеогЬос* ILC 1981 .Vol II, part 2 . ρ 77 
36 Idem, ρ 79 
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debt In the context of State succession the international personality of the creditor 
and the fact that the financial obligation was chargeable to the predecessor State 3 7 
22 2 Categories of debts 
The basic subject-matter of State succession t o debts Is what becomes of debts 
assumed by the predecessor State In conformity with International law Does the 
change of authorrty have any effect, and If so what effect, on these debts contracted 
by the predecessor State? As w e have seen In the previous paragraph, the definition 
of State debts, within the context of State succession, is limited to debts contracted by 
the State It excludes debts of non-State organs, such as public enterprises, and debts 
owed to non-State entit ies 3 e 
In the commentary to the articles of the Vienna Convention on the succession of 
States In respect of State Property, Archives a n d Debts w e can distinguish three main 
categories of debts a State debts, b local debts, and с localized d e b t s 3 ' The 
underlying principle of this division Is the question who contracted the debt a n d for 
w h a t purpose The quality of the debtor will be the determining factor for the 
qualification of the debt as either a State debt or a non-State debt, the purpose of the 
debt will determine whether It Is to be qualified as a general State debt or a localized 
debt The fact whether a debt Is a State debt or a regime or odious debt will also serve 
as a distinction Different effects with regard to state succession arise from the different 
categories of debt 
a Sfate debts 
A general State debt, which Is any financial obligation of a predecessor State arising 
In conformity with international law towards another State, an international organization 
or any other subject of International law. Is a subject-matter of State succession ^ 0 
37 Yearbook ILC 1981 " that the public character of a debt Is absolutely necessary, but by 
no means sufficient, to Identify It as a State debt ( ) The term 'public debt" (as 
opposed to private debt) Is therefore not very helpful In Identifying a State debt the term 
Is too broad, and covers not only State debts which are the subject of the present part, 
but also the debt of other public entitles, whether or not of a territorial character" 
39 У а/Ьос*А.С1981 Vol II part2 ρ 74 and ILA Conference 1970 ρ 106 
3? Gruber, A І droit Internat fonal de la succession d Etats. Parte 1986 ρ 120 
The ILC or Its Special Rapporteur, made a finer distinction In his reports on State 
succession, with regard to State debts 
a state debts and debts of local authorities, 
b general debts and special or localized debts 
с state debts and debts of public establishments, public enterprises or other quasi-
State bodies 
d. pubic debts and private debts. 
e flnanclal debts and administrative debts, 
f political debts and commercial debts 
g. external debts and Internal debts. 
h contractual debts and delictual or quasi-delictual debts 
I secured debts and unsecured debts, 
J guaranteed debts and delictual or quasl-deHctual debts, 
k. state debts and other State debts termed "odious" debts, war debts or subjugation 
debts and by extension, regime debts 
4D Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on State succession In respect of State property, 
archives and debts, 1983 
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b. Local debts 
Local debts are debts contracted by a local authority, which Is 'a public law territorial 
body other than the State. Whatever debts It may contract by virtue of its financial 
autonomy, they are not legally debts of the State and do not bind the latter, precisely 
because of that financial autonomy'.41 
Debts contracted by a local authority, local debts, are not State debts and 
therefore are not the subject-matter of State-succession. Local debts have never 
been assumed by the predecessor State and, therefore, cannot be passed on to the 
successor State. Although In legal doctrine we generally refer to the fact that local 
debts of the detached territory "pass on" to the successor State, this Is not correct. 
The debts have been the responsibility of the territory before the succession of States 
and will remain the responsibility of the - now detached - territory after the succession 
of States. Only In the case of a newly Independent State will the local debt become 
the responsibility of the successor State because the detached territory and the 
successor State are one and the same.'12 
c. Localized debts 
Localized debts are 'State debts which are used specifically by the State in a clearly 
defined portion of the territory'.43 The distinction between local debts and localized 
debts lies In the facts that local debts are contracted by a local authority and are not 
State debts, while localized debts. If contracted (or guaranteed) by the State, are 
State debts. In that case a localized debt Is a subject-matter of State succession.44 
In order to be a localized State debt, the debt has to be assumed by the State, 
which must have Intended the corresponding expenditures to be effected for the 
territory concerned, the proceeds of the loan must have actually been used in the 
territory concerned and the expenditure must have been effected for the benefit and 
In the actual Interest of the territory In question.45 
Two categories of debts, as given by the ILC In Its reports on State succession, are 
the subject-matter of State succession: State debts and localized State debts. In case 
of a succession of States what is the general policy with regard to these debts, are 
those debts accepted by the successor State or not? 
41 V'ecrt>ooif/LC1981,Vol.ll.pcirt2.p.74. 
42 Idem. p. 74. 
43 Idem. p. 76. 
44 The ILC suggests the following criteria, which might be useful for the distinction between 
localized State debts and local debts: 
- Who Is the debtor: a local authority or a colony or, for and on behalf of either of those. 
a central government?; 
- Does the part of the territory which Is detached have financial autonomy, and to what 
degree?; 
- For what purpose was the debt Incurred: was It for the use of the territory which Is 
detached?; 
- Is there a particular security situated In that part of the territory? 
yeartrac*/LC 1981. Vol. Il,part2. p. 75. 
45 fctem. p. 76. 
Criteria are: 
- the condition of earmarking or Intended use: 
- the condition of actual use; 
- the question of Interest or benefit of the territory. 
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With regard t o general State debts a change In attitude may be distinguished after 
the Second World War. Before 1945. It was an a c c e p t e d pract ice that successor 
States assumed responsibility for part of the predecessors general State debt. After 
1945. the treaties concluded In connection with State succession generally excluded 
the successor State from responsibility of any portion of the general State debt of the 
predecessor State, although w e cannot refer to a uniform State pract ice In those 
cases. 4 6 
With regard t o localized State debts w e c a n distinguish a more uniform State 
pract ice; the attribution of localized State debts, contracted by the predecessor 
State a n d earmarked for the territory now part of the successor State, to the successor 
State.4 7 
2.3 Newly Independent State debts 
Article 3Θ of the 19Θ3 Convention acknowledges the principle of capacity to pay since 
the economic situation of the newly Independent State is taken Into account.48 
Article 36 runs as follows: 
Ί . When the successor State Is a newly Independent State, no State debt of the 
predecessor State shall pass t o the newly Independent State, unless an 
agreement between the newly independent State and the predecessor State 
provides otherwise In view of the link b e t w e e n the State d e b t of the 
predecessor State c o n n e c t e d with Its activity In the territory t o which the 
succession of States relates and the property, rights and Interest which pass t o 
the newly Independent State. 
2 The agreement referred t o In paragraph 1 shall not Infringe the principle of the 
permanent sovereignty of every people over Its principle of the permanent 
sovereignty of every people over Its wealth a n d natural resources, nor shall Its 
Implementation endanger the fundamental economic equilibria of the newly 
independent State." (emphasis added) 
The debts covered by the article concerning newly Independent States a n d State 
debts are debts 'contracted by the Government of the administrating Power on behalf 
a n d for the account of the dependent territory'.49 These are debts which are State 
debts of the predecessor State a n d which are the subject-matter In the succession of 
State. 
46 As early as 18.4.1925 the arbitrator In the Ottoman public d e b t . E. Borei stated: "... o n e 
c a n n o t say that the Power to which a territory Is ceased Is automatical ly responsible for a 
corresponding part of the publ ic d e b t of the State t o w h i c h the territory formerly 
be longed. ' A n d 'One c a n n o t consider that the principle that a State acquiring part of the 
territory of another State must a t the same t ime take over a corresponding position of the 
tatter's public debts is established In positive International law.'. 
United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards. Vol. I, p. 573 & 571 and Yearbook 
ILC1981. Vol. II. part 2. p. 86^8. with regard to the State practice. 
47 Yearbook /LCI 981. Vol. II. p a t 2. p. 88-90. 
48 Art ide 2 (e) of the 1983 Convention: 'newly independent State' means a successor State 
the territory of w h i c h . Immediately before the d a t e of succession of States, was a 
d e p e n d e n t territory for the International relations of which the predecessor State was 
responsible. 
4? yecjboc*//.C1981,Vol.l l,part2,p. 101. 
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In order to determine α general rule with respect to the succession In debts of the 
predecessor State In case of a newly Independent State different criteria have been 
advanced by different authors. The critenon of utility, or intended use and allocation 
has been forwarded as the factor to decide whether a debt was a debt 'proper' to the 
territory. The difficulty with these criteria Is the determination of the actual benefit which 
the debt has had for the territory. It might have been used for an Investment which 
might have been remunerative In the time of government of the administering Power. 
but might become obsolete after Independence. Is such a debt a debt which 
contributed to the development of the newly independent State or not? 
Another criterion which may be taken Into account Is the capacity to pay the 
relevant debts of the predecessor State. To use such a vague criterion as 'capacity 
to pay' may leave the way open for abuse, but It would be highly unrealistic to Ignore 
the economic and financial situation of the newly Independent State This would 
cause harm both to the debtor, the newly Independent State for whom the 
assumption of the debts would be destructive, and to the creditor, which would see Its 
debt-claim transferred to a not so creditworthy debtor.50 
The rule laid down in Article 38. which Is not without criticism, is that as a rule no State 
debt of the predecessor shall pass to the newly Independent State, unless an 
agreement has been reached between the predecessor State and the newly 
Independent State, which takes Into account the benefit of the debt and the 
economic situation of the newly Independent State 
Why Include a separate paragraph on succession of State debts concerning a 
newly Independent State when the decolonization process has almost reached Its 
end? Some might say it comes too late in the day. This might be true if decolonization 
Is viewed solely as a political process, the end of political domination, but not If It Is 
viewed as an economic process. Economic ties are not easy to get rid of and their 
effects are felt for a much longer period. 
"... It cannot be denied that the ... articles on succession of State In respect of State 
debts may be useful, not only with respect to territories which are still dependent 
but also with respect to countries which have recently attained political 
Independence, and even to countries which attained political independence 
much earlier. In fact, the debt problem. Including the servicing of the debt, the 
progressive amortization of principal and the payment of Interest, all spread over 
several years, If not decades. Is the most typical example of matters covered by 
succession which long survive political Independence".5 ' 
3 Odious debts 
The national debt which has been contracted In the ordinary routine of governmental 
administration In the Interest of the entire State has to be accepted and honoured by 
the successor State.52 This is not the case with the regime or odious debts of the 
predecessor State 
Odious debts are debts 'that run counter to the major interests of the transferred 
territory or of the successor State'. They are not specifically connected with a political 
regime 
50 fctem, p . 102-103. 
51 fctem, ρ 91 
52 O'Connell, D P., Law of State succession, p. 369 a n d 448. 
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Regime debts can be divided into two categories, subjugation debts and war 
debts . 5 3 Subjugation debts are debts specifically cont racted for the purpose of 
colonizing or absorbing a particular territory (in peacetime). War debts are debts 
contracted to sustain Its war efforts against another State (in wartime). 
Just as an Internationally wrongful act committed by a government or any other 
organ of State gives rise to State responsibility, because they are acts of State, so 
regime debts are regarded as State debts, since they are assumed by an organ of 
the State 
Although odious debts and regime debts are almost Identical, It may be said that 
'all odious debts are regime debts, whereas not all regime debts are odious debts'.54 
Odious debts are by definition non-transferable, whereas regime debts, or part of 
them, may be assumed by the successor State, if they were not contracted against its 
major Interests.55 
Characteristics of odious debts, as given by M. Bedjaoul In his ninth report on State 
succession In matters other than treaties, are:56 
a. "a debt contracted by the predecessor State to serve purposes contrary to major 
Interests of either the successor State or the territory that Is transferred to It 
(viewpoint successor State); 
b. a debt contracted by the predecessor State for purposes that are not In 
conformity with contemporary International law and. In particular, the principles of 
International law embodied In the Charter of the United Nations (viewpoint of the 
International community)". 
The rule of pacta sunt servanda Is not applicable on obligations which stem from 
regime and odious debts. A successor State is not bound by treaties, which run 
counter to the Interest of the State. This rule does not undermine the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda, but is Inherent In it, since the principle of good faith brings with It that one 
cannot enforce a treaty which has an immoral purpose.57 Odious debts are non-
transferable debts. They remain the responsibility of the predecessor State. The 
successor State will not assume these debts, which are engaged In contrary to Its 
Interests.58 
As stated In the Introduction to this paragraph on State succession and State debt, 
the 1983 Convention limits Itself to the succession of States. The succession of a regime 
S3 Rousseau, Ch.. Droit International Public. Vol. Ill, p. 458. 
Yeabook tC 1977. Vol. II, part 1. p. 68. 
M Idem, p. 68. 
56 fctem, p. 68. 
Sack. A.N., Les effets..., p. 157: 'Cette det te (odieuse pour la populat ion de l'Etat entier) 
n'est pas obligatoire pour la nat ion: c'est une det te de regime, de t te personelle d u 
pouvoir qui l'a cont ractée, par conséquent elle tombe avec la chute de c e pouvoir. La 
raison pour laquelle ces dettes 'odieuses' ne peuvent être considérées comme grevant 
le territoire de l'Etat, est que ces dettes ne répondent pas à l'une des conditions qui 
déterminent la régularité des dettes d'Etat, a savoir celle-ci : tes dettes d'Etat doivent être 
contractées et les fonds qui en proviennent utilisés pour les besoins et dans les Interest de 
l'Etat.· 
56 yearbook /Í.C 1977. Vol. II. p a r t i , p. 68 and 70. 
57 Frankenberg/Knieper. op. cit.. p. 575/6. 
56 Advisory opinion given by the Court on Sept. 10th 1923 on certain questions relating to 
settlers of German origin In the territory ceded by Germany to Poland. PCU Series B. no. 6. 
p. 37. 
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or government Is not α form of State succession, because in such cases the Identity of 
States under International law remains the same. 
3.1 Change of government 
International law, as a rule, does not attach any legal consequences to a change of 
government within one and the same territory, even if it is a revolutionary change. The 
successor government Is obliged to fulfil and honour the obligations engaged In by 
the predecessor government on behalf of the State. A change of government, as 
opposed to a change of sovereignty, does not affect the legal personality of the 
State In question. 
As stated In § 2.2, the basis of the classical notion of State succession Is the notion 
that the territory Is a security for recourse and/or that the population of the territory Is 
looked upon as the 'collective usufructuary' and is therefore obliged to honour the 
obligations flowing from the treaties.59 
Despite the territorial fixed doctrine of State sovereignty a distinction was made In 
the past between private and public debts: "If a ruler acts in his private capacity his 
contracts expire with his death or expulsion; but if he acts In his princely office his 
commitment relates not to himself but to the people through whom. In virtue of the 
social contract, he ultimately derives his authority1.60 
This Is the origin of the distinction between regime debt/odious debt and State 
debt as it is now known In the doctrine of State succession. This traditional approach to 
the question of State succession has been greatly Influenced by the philosophy of the 
personal rule of the eighteenth century, which accounts for the emphasis laid upon 
the notion of change In personality of the State.61 
We might well ask whether this rule still provides just and equitable solutions for 
present day problems, whether a change of government should still be barred from 
the principle of regime debts/odious debts.62 The question of regime debts/odious 
debts must. In my view, play a role In a radical change of government which 
overthrows the previous political system, such as a change from a military or 
dictatorial regime to a democratic regime or visa versa.63 
» Frankenberg/Knieper, op. cit.. RIW1983, p. 575/6. 
60 O'Connell, D.P., Law of State succession, p. 9. 
61 State and ruler were one. so a change of ruler meant a change In the legal personality of 
the State. 
O'Connel, D.P., op. cit., p. 367. 
62 A distinction c a n b e m a d e b e t w e e n different types of c h a n g e of government: 
Type I: "There Is a c h a n g e In the effective h e a d of State, b u t It does not alter the regime's 
basic political make-up In terms of Its c o m p o n e n t fact ion or parties'. 
Type II: There Is a c h a n g e In the leadership b o d y In terms of Its c o m p o n e n t factions On 
the case of f ragmented single-party regimes) or In terms of parties or other autonomous 
political groups (In the case of coalitions)'. 
Type III: 'There Is a replacement of the entire ruling group or coal it ion by another group 
from the same e n d of the established political spectrum'. 
Type IV: There Is a replacement of the entire ruling group or coalit ion by another group 
from the opposite e n d of the established political spectrum'. 
Type V: There Is a revolutionary transformation In which a political group Is r e p l a c e d b y 
a n 'antlsystem' group that fundamentally restructured the political system". - IO summer, 
Vol. 43. (1989) no. 3, p. 508-509. 
63 /dem. p. 510: t w o mechanisms (a) the overthrow of the establishment by a mass-based 
o r i e n t e d m o v e m e n t : or (b) the p e r m a n e n t Intervention by anti-system by military 
"elements In previously non-praetorlan politics. 
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Do not the principles of equity, fairness and Justice demand a revaluation of 
tradit ional notions of International law? One may advoca te the opinion that 
nowadays, when State succession hardly ever occurs and a radical change of 
government Is a more viable expression of the discontent of the people with Its 
"undemocratic" rulers, the same legal consequences which apply In case of State 
succession to debts contracted not in the Interest of the State should be at tached to a 
change of government. In such exceptional circumstances, it might be argued, the 
principle of continuity of the State should not apply. Such a change in government 
should be regarded as the creation of a new State, although on the same territory and 
with the same population as the former State.64 The successor government will not be 
held liable for these debts.65 
The fact that no general rule is applicable to the succession of State debts, that 
State pract ice does tend to be rather diverse in the case of an 'ordinary' State 
succession and the fact that In case a successor State is a newly Independent State, 
there Is generally no succession to debts of the predecessor State, might point In the 
direction of an emerging consensus among the countries first concerned, the 
developing countries. There Is sufficient ground to argue against an automatic 
transfer of debts assumed by previous rulers. The reasons why debts are sometimes 
transferred to the successor State, or rather that the successor State assumes 
responsibility for them, are often politically motivated, rather than based on legal 
principles.66 The less developed countries have always tended toward the concept 
of non-transferability of general State debts, which is, in view of the present foreign 
debt situation of these countries, a very natural standpoint.67 
The unwillingness of a new government to service an external loan could be based 
upon the fact that the predecessor government has used the proceeds of the loans In 
a way which was not beneficiary to the population of the State. They may have used it 
for their personal purposes, transferred the proceeds to foreign bank accounts or 
spent It on prestigious projects. Although the legality of a debt Is determined by the 
governing system of law, it is possible to scrutinize the justice of a debt Independent of 
Its legality.68 The following criteria are generally used to determine whether debts are 
Just debts: the debts should be contracted out of the necessity to raise money for 
64 Glanvltl, F., op.dt. R.d.C. 1989-111, t. 215, p. 240. Gtanvltl does not agree with this view, but 
records that this standpoint Is to be fouxJ In the works of different authors. 
Í6 As Sach states: 
'Cette dette n'est pas obligatoire pour la nation; c'est une dette de regime, dette 
personnelle du pouvoir qui l'a contractée, par consequent еПе tombe avec la chute de 
pouvoir, (...) Les dettes d'Etat doivent être contractées et les fonds qui en proviennent 
utilisés pour les besoins et dans les intérêts de l'Etat. (...) Les créanciers ont commis un 
acte hostile à l'égard du peuple; Its ne peuvent donc pas compter que la nation 
affranchie d'un pouvoir despotique assume les dettes «od ieuses», qui sont des 
dettes personnelles de ce pouvoir.' 
Sach, A.N., les effets....p. 157. 
6b Badaoui, M.T.. l'emprunt public et les transformation politiques et territoriales de l'Etat. 
Revue Egyptienne de droit International. Vol. XIV. 1958. p. 38/39. 
' I parait normal de dire, que le paiement par le nouveau gouvernement renversé est une 
question d'opportunité politique et non une question Juridique. Cependant les auteurs' 
n'admettent généralement pas la répudatlon de ces dettes de régimes ... Cette 
distinction est d'ailleurs plus specluse et politique que Juridique. Le respect de l'emprunt 
public exige sa reconnaissance, non obstant les réformes du môme les revolutions 
politiques, car à tavers elle, l'Etat demeure...' 
67 Gruber, A., les droit International de la success/on d'états, p. 130 and 140. 
68 Fellchenfeld, E.H., Public debts and State succession, p. 701. 
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public purposes and they should be contracted In the Interests of and for the benefit of 
the population.69 
The main criterion Is whether the money raised was used for public purposes which 
benef i t ted the populat ion In general. As has already been touched upon in the 
paragraph concerning newly Independent States, this criterion of utility or intended 
use Is a vague concept , open to abuse. Nevertheless, it might serve as a method to 
separate useful, or development oriented, debts from unuseful, or odious, debts. 
The creditor may object to this point of view and argue that his rights are being 
Infringed upon, but 'an Interest which a creditor possesses in a debt must, In order to 
constitute an acquired right protected by International law, be an Interest In funds 
utilized for the needs and Interest of the State. Any debt contracted for other purposes 
Is a debt intrinsically hostile to the Interest of the territory'.70 
This Is a debt which cannot. In good faith, be asked to be serviced.71 However, In 
the literature the view can also be found that It Is Indeed possible to pass judgement 
on the developmental quality of certain loans. As will be seen In Chapter 6, the 
enforcement of odious debts Is contrary to the notion of equity and international 
solidarity, and the rules deriving from the emerging law of development.7 2 Creditors 
are not obliged to contribute to the development of a country, but they have to bear 
In mind that, if their loans have been used In a way contrary to the benefit of the 
populat ion In general, a new government might deny the responsibility for those 
odious debts. Such an approach, the change In the distribution of the risks and a shift In 
the burden of proof, could contribute to the diminution of the old debts. This, however, 
would mean a change In attitude of the creditor towards Its debtor. A creditor would 
not only have to take Into account the technical aspects of a loan, but would also be 
required to consider the Impact his financing, and the projects it will be used for will 
have upon the deve lopment of a country.73The simple fac t that tradit ional 
International law does not a t tach legal consequences to a change of government, 
which Is based upon a eighteenth century notion of personal rule, seems rather 
outdated. 
tß Fellchenfeld, E.H., op. cit.. p. 702. 
He mentions four principles: a, by necessity of raising money for public purposes; b. 
compensation owned for tortious acts to Injured persons; с consent of the debtor; and d. 
benefits received by the debtor. In the current situation only the first and last principle are 
applicable. 
70 О'СоппеЯ, D.P., Sfate succession In municipal law and Intematbnal law. Vol. One, p. 459. 
Reuter, Yearbook ILC1981. Vol. 1,1671st meeting, p. 147: 
'However, If a State had contracted a loan prior to an act of aggression In order to 
finance the military preparations for that purpose, the fact that the debt thus contracted 
was considered to have an absolute unlawful cause would remove the validity of the 
loan, ab Initio, and therefore render the debt non-existenf. 
Hahn. HJ., op. c/f., Hague-Zagreb Essays 7, p. 15, does not agree with the notion that 
debts might be refused because they are contracted contrary to the Interest of the State, 
that they are ЧпІтІсаЫ ' to development. 
71 There Is opposition to this point of view: There may be lending which would seem hardly 
suitable for advancing the evolution of a recipient third world State. But to deduce from 
that assumption the certainty that the International persons negotiating the pertinent loan 
agreement had condoned its potential detrimental side effect, would require 
considerable probatory effort'. This cannot Justify the denial of service of a debt, even 
less In the case of a change of government 
72 Knleper. R.. Transfer Juristischer Techniken In die Duskussion u m d i e Verschuldung der 
Dritten Welt, Kritische Justiz. 1985/Ιβ,ρ. 453/4. 
73 Wem, p. 453/4. 
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The principles of equity, fairness and justice. Incorporated as part and parcel of 
International law, however, give sufficient cause for contemplating the transfer of the 
distinction between regime debts/odious debts and state debts out of the narrow 
confinements of the law of State succession into the more general context of national 
debts within the perspective of the current debt problem facing the developing 
countries.74 
4 Effects of passing of a State debt 
In Article 34 of the 1983 Conventton the Juridical effects on the respective rights of the 
predecessor State and the successor State are made clear. 
"The passing of State debts entails the extinction of the obligations of the 
predecessor State and the arising of the obligations of the successor State In 
respect of the State debts which pass to the successor State, subject to the 
provisions of the articles in the present part". 
Article 34 only applies to State debts which actually pass to the successor State 'In 
accordance with the provisions of the articles In the present part'.75 
This has a dual effect: 
a. the extinction of the obligations of the predecessor State wlthj respect to the debts 
In question; and 
b. the development of the obligation of the successor State to those debts.76 
This provision seems contrary to the generally accepted principle of law that the 
Identity of the debtor cannot be changed unless the creditor Is in agreement with this 
change.77 
In extension of Article 34, article 36 guarantees the rights of the creditors: 
"A succession of States does not as such affect the rights and obligations of 
creditors". 
This rule Is In accordance with Articles 34-36 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties In which It is allowed to accrue obligations and rights to successor States 'If 
this Is the Intention of the parties to the treaty and the third party consents'.79 
Succession of States does not. In Itself, have the effect of automatically releasing 
the predecessor State from (part of) the State debt once assumed by the successor 
State(s); consent of the creditor, express or tacitly. Is required.79 
The succession of States does not affect, as such, the rights and obligations of 
creditors (the debt-claims do not cease to exist due to a territorial change), but the 
succession of States creates a legal relationship with regard to the obligations only 
74 The principle of equity will b e viewed upon In Chapter 6. 
75 yeart>oo(f/i.C19ei,Vol.ll,part2,p.80. 
76 Menon, P.K.. The succession of State and the problems of state debts, Boston College 
Third World Law Journal. Vol. VI, no. 2,1986, p. 111-141. 
77 Idem. 
76 Idem. p. 121. Consent Is presumed In the case of right must be expressed In the case of 
obligations, art. 35 and 36 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Sinclair, Sir I., The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Manchester 1984, p. 98: "The 
maxim pacta tertils nee nocent nee prosunt Is supported both by general legal principles 
and common sense". 
79 VearbooíríLC 1981, Vol. II, part 2. p. 83. 
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between the predecessor State and the successor State(s), not a novation of the 
obligation by devolution of the debt. 
Since the legal relationship between the debtor State and the creditor (third) State 
Is not affected by the change of territory, the succession of State(s) will not establish a 
direct legal relationship between the successor State(s) and the creditor. Therefore, 
the creditor may not have a right to recourse against the successor State; the 
predecessor State will continue to have its debtor status.80 
The legal relationship between predecessor and successor State Is dictated by 
the terms of the treaty which regulates State succession. In this document, the 
responsibility for (external) debts will be passed on to the successor State, if so 
agreed. Unless the creditor consents to the successor State as the new debtor, by 
way of novation, the relationship with the original debtor, the predecessor State, will 
remain In existence. The predecessor State remains accountable to the creditor for 
Its debts.The date of passing of the State debts Is that of the succession of States, 
unless otherwise agreed.81 Normally, however, it will be subsequent to the succession 
of State, since the acknowledgement of the signature of the predecessor State, 
endorsement by the successor State and, if appropriate, novation by the creditor will 
take some time.62 
ю Idem. p. 81-84. 
М поп. P.K.. op.cff., p. 121-123. 
O'Cormell, DP., toe. ctt.p. 148-149. 
Seldl-Hohenveldern. I., Das Wiener Übereinkommen über Staatennachfolge In 
Vermögen. Archive und Schulden von Staaten; Österreichische Zeltschrift für Öffentliches 
Recht und Volkerrecht, 34,1983, p. 181. 
81 Article 35 Vienna Convention on the succession of States In respect of State property, 
archives and debts. 
82 Menon, P.K., op. clt.. p. 
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THE MAIN LEGAL RULES AND PRINCIPLES AVAILABLE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE 
CASE OF NON-PAYMENT 
Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, It was established that there may be grounds for denouncing 
certain debts. These grounds exist only If the debts in question have not served a 
purpose which has contributed to the development of the country's economy and 
the well-being of its people. The possible debt 'reduction' that is achieved In such a 
way can only be small. The debts which qualify as odious debts or development-
unfriendly debts are not numerous. The main bulk of the debt burden consists of debts 
that are contracted In accordance with the principles of international law. 
This, however, does not alter the fact that the remaining burden of debt draws 
heavily on the country's economy. The result could be a situation In which the 
repayment of the debt and Its Interest, in accordance with the obligations stemming 
from the loan-agreement, might endanger the country's development and Its vital 
Interests. 
Are there any rules, either In the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties or In 
the draft articles on State Responsibility, available to the debtor country In Its relations 
to Its creditor States to suspend its payment In a manner which is in accordance with 
public International law? Do the grave balance of payments problems, due - to a 
great extent - to unfavourable external economic factors, qualify as a supervening 
Impossibility of performance (Art, 61 1969 Vienna Convention) or as a clausula rebus 
sic stantibus (Art. 62 1969 Vienna Convention)? 
If the problems experienced by the debtor country do not live up to the conditions 
set In the 1969 Vienna Convention, Is there a possibility for the debtor State to Invoke a 
rule, derived from the draft articles on State responsibility? Do they qualify as a 
circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of the breach of the contract, resulting 
from the inability to perform the obligations arising out of a loan treaty? 
First the applicable rules of the treaty law will be reviewed (par. 1), then we will 
explore the rules on State responsibility (par. 2) 
1 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Article 62 Is Incorporated In Part V of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
This section, which Is called the Invalidity, Termination and Suspension of Operation of 
Treaties, is concerned with 'the circumstances In which a treaty may. In whole or In 
part, for all parties or for one party alone, cease to have legal effects by reason of 
vices In or relating to the treaty or by reason of unlawful acts committed In the 
execution of the treaty'.] 
1 Sinclair, Sir I., The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 1984. p. 160. 
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1 1 Pacta sunt servanda and the principle of g o o d faith 2 
The principle, pacta sunt servanda. Is a fundamental rule of international law 
According t o some writers, it Is even the cornerstone of international law 3 
'The incorporation of that principle in international legal doctrine a n d its very 
frequent use could only be explained by the need to fight against the rigidity of the 
old c o n c e p t of sovereignty, which no obstacle was admitted The maxim pacta 
sunt servanda had c o m e to limit those powers' 4 
The effect of the pnnclple on treaties Is that 'by virtue of the rule pacta sunt servanda, it 
(a treaty) creates rights. In that It enabled a party to d e m a n d a certain conduct from 
another party, that other party was corespondlngly under an obligation so to conduct 
Itself' 5 The principle has b e e n c o n f o r m e d by judicial p r a c t i c e States have 
recognized it as a fundamental rule of law u 
2 Every treaty In force Is binding upon the parties to It and must be performed In good faith 
CArlicle 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 1969) 
3 Harvard Draft on the Law of Treaties. A JIL 1935, ρ 977 - 992 
Kunz. J L , The meaning and the range of the norm pacta sunt servanda. A JIL . Vol 39, 
1945,p 180-197 
Cheng. В . General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals. 
Stevens & Sons Ltd , London 1953 
Wehberg. Η . Pacta sunt servanda. A JIL. Vol 53.1959, ρ 775 - 7Θ6 
Lavalle, R , About the Alleged Customary Law Nature of the rule pacta sunt servanda, 
Österreichische Zeitschritt für Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht. 33(1982), ρ 9 - 28 
"It Is, Indeed, the sine qua non of the law of treaties, the fundamental rules of which are 
traditionally considered as constituting, together with customary International law one of 
the formal soixces of International law as a whole " (p. 12) 
4 Yearbook ILC1964, Vol I, ρ 162,748th meeting 
5 У агЬо£*/І.С1966, оІІ,р 19, e47th meeting 
6 For a historical overview, read the commentary of the Harvard Draft on treaty law of 1935 
The ILC refers to this detailed analysis In Its commentary to Article 26/55. Yearbook ILC 1964, 
Vol II. ρ 7 etseq 
Kunz, J L , op clt. ρ 180 ef sea 
tt has been Incorporated In International documents Documents In which this principle Is 
referred to are, inter alky 
- Protocol of London, 1871 · 'It Is an essential principle of the law of Nations that no Power 
can liberate Itself form the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations 
thereof, unless with the consent of the Contracting Parties by means of an amicable 
arrangement" (The London Declaration, January 17,1871) 
- Covenant of the League of Nations "The High Contracting Parties. In order to promote 
International cooperation and to acNeve International peace and security by the 
maintenance of Justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations In the 
dealing of organized peoples with one another, agree to this covenant of the League 
of Nations " 
- The Covenant on Treaties adopted at Havana by the Sixth International Conference of 
American States, February 20,1928 "No State can relieve Itself of obligations of a treaty 
or modify Its stipulations except by the agreement, secured through peaceful means, 
of the other contracting parties". (Although this Covenant has only been ratified by a 
few States. It Is still an Indication that the principle Is regarded by States as a 
fundamental rule of law) 
Charter of the United Nations "We. the people of the United Nations determined to 
establish conditions under which Justice and respect for obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of International law can be maintained " 
The organization and Its Members. In pursuit of the Purposes stated In Article 1, shall act In 
accordance with the following Principles . All Members, In order to ensure to all of them 
the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil In good faith the obligations 
assumed by them In accordance with the present Charter" (The Preamble and Article 2 
(2) of the Charter of the United Nations) 
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State pract ice, jurisprudence and doctrine are In full agreement that treaties are 
binding upon the parties. The principle of sanctity of contracts is an essential element 
of economic and financial relations, not only between States, but also between States 
and foreign corporations and/or foreign Individuals. Economic and financial relations 
could not exist without the principle of pacta sunt servanda.7 
As Sir Humphrey Waldock states In his commentary to - then Article 55 - : 
'At this date in history It hardly seems necessary to adduce authority or precedent 
to support or explain the principle of the binding character of treaties, which Is 
enshrined in the preamble to both the Covenant of the League and the Charter of 
the United Nations.8' 
But, as Mr. de Luna points out during the discussion on Article 55, 'although In 
International practice States had always recognized that once they had declared 
their win together with other States they were bound by the declaration, that was not a 
requirement of logic; for why should past will prevail over future will? It was a 
requirement of the principle of good faith, without the observance of which no society 
could exist'.' 
The obligation to observe treaties Is one based on good faith. As was stated In the 
commentary to the final draft text of the International Law Commission 'It was strongly 
of the opinion that a means should be found in the ultimate text of any convention on 
the law of treaties that may result from Its work to emphasize the fundamental nature of 
the obligation to perform treaties In good faith'.10 
Good faith Is Inherent in the principle of pacta sunt servanda and In International law 
as a whole.1 ' This Implies that It Is not sufficient for States to fulfil their treaty obligation to 
the letter and to maintain that their actions do not conflict directly with the terms of the 
7 Mr. Bartos, Yearbook ILC I960, Vol.1, part 2, p.36: "It would be Important to explain In the 
commentary what were the links between that essential principle and the basic general 
rules of public International law, whether those rules were Incorporated In the United 
Nations Charter or In other Inslruments containing Jus cogens. The principle of pacta sunt 
servanda was essential, not only from the standpoint of Ihe free will of the parties and the 
sanctity of treaties, but also from that of stability of everyday relations between States.' 
Wehberg, H.. op.c/f.,p. 786. 
Wally. M.. Panorama du droit International contemporain. Cours general de droit 
International put* : , R.d.C.. 1983 V, p. 187: 
Tout droit des contracts (ou des traités) (le droit Ici règle vraiment ses mécanismes de 
création) est une combination de ces deux éléments, effectuée à la fols en vue de 
garantir la valeur de l'obligation conventionnelle (qui repose sur le consentement des 
parties) et l'authenticité (ainsi que la sincérité) de ce consentement, et d'assurer la 
sécurité Juridique (Ileé à des facteurs aisément et objectivement contestables, ce qui 
n'est pas le cas des Intentions des parties.)' 
β Yearbook ILC 1964, Vol.11, p.7. In the same sense H. Lauterpacht In International law 
Collected Papers of H. Lauterpacht, 2.15 (1975): Whatever Is the nature and origin the rule 
pacta sunt servanda 'confronts States as an objective principle Independent of their will'. 
9 УеагЬоокЯ.С1964. оІ.І.р.29. 
The International Court of Justice, In Its Judgement In the Nuclear Test Case, stated: 
'One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal 
obligations, whatever their source. Is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are 
Inherent In International cooperation. In particular In an age when this co-operation In 
many fields Is becoming Increasingly essential. Just as the very rule of pacta sunt 
servanda In the law of treaties Is based on good faith, so also Is the binding character of 
an International obligation assumed by unilateral declaration'. 
Ю Yearbook ILC 1966, Vol.11, p.211 and Yearbook ILC 1966, Vol.11, p.8: The rule pacta sunt 
servanda Is Itself founded upon good faith and there Is much authority for the proposition 
that the application of treaties Is governed by the principle of good faith'. 
11 Lachs, M., The development and general trends of International law In our time. R.d.C. 
1980IV, 1.169. p. 197. 
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treaty, they are under the obligation, which Is a legal one to refrain from doing 
anything which might Impede the proper execution of the treaty 12 
In short, good faith implies that the parties to a treaty do not only act in accordance 
with the letter of the treaty, but also In accordance with the splnt of the treaty But 
although the principle of good faith prohibits the evasion of an obligation as 
established by common Intention of the parties. It also prohibits a party from exacting 
from the other party advantages which go beyond their common and reasonable 
intention at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, as, for example, by Invoking the 
treaty to cover cases which could not reasonably have been in the contemplation of 
the parties at the time of Its conclusion 1 3 The principle of good faith as it Is 
incorporated In the rule pacta sunt servanda, makes the application of the rule less 
rigid than might seem at first sight 
The question that has to be raised here Is which role does the principle play In the 
Implementation and execution of loan treaties It Is obvious It plays a dominant role in 
the implementation and execution of loan-agreements, since they are treaties in the 
meaning given to the term In International law This means that in principle loan-
agreements should be canted out as agreed between the parties If one of the parties 
wants to be excused from performing its obligations, the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda necessitates that 'the tests Imposed for exoneration must be more severe, 
since the parties have voluntarily assumed specific obligations beyond the call of 
general law, and mutual reliance on each other's bond must be safeguarded as the 
basic guarantee of the treaty's performance 14 If there Is no valid reason for non­
performance by one of the parties, a reason which would provide a legal basis for 
such behaviour, the treaty must be performed In good faith , 5 
In the next paragraphs the legal principles which might be Invoked by a party to 
terminate or suspend the performance of its obligations arising out of the treaty, will be 
reviewed 
1 2 Supervening impossibility of performance 
This paragraph will deal with supervening Impossibility of performance as a ground for 
termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty Article 61 is Incorporated In Part 
V of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969 Convention) , 6 The basis for 
12 Yearbook ILC 1964 Vol I, Sir Humphrey Waldock In the discussion during the 727th meeting 
13 Cheng Β , pp clt p i 18/9 
Yearbook ILC 1966 Vol I, ρ 36, Mr Bartos "The application of the principle pacta sunt 
servanda could not be pushed to the point of absurdity The purpose of the treaty was 
to strengthen public order not to destroy It Consequently treaties must be performed 
within the framework of the International public order constituted by Jus cogens and the 
general principles of law' 
M Lachs,M ,op dt,ρ 191 
15 Idem ρ 198 
16 Article 61 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
1 A party may Invoke the Impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for terminating 
or withdrawing from It The Impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or 
destruction of an object Indispensable for the execution of the treaty If the 
Impossibility Is temporary. It may be Invoked only as a ground for suspending the 
operation of the treaty 
2 Impossibility of performance may not be Invoked by a party as a ground for 
terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty If the 
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the rule, as laid down In this article. Is the general principle of law expressed In the 
maxim 'ad impossibilitatem nemo tenetur'.17 The article deals with the termination of a 
treaty or the suspension of its operation in consequences of the permanent or 
temporary total disappearance or destruction of an object Indispensable for its 
execut ion' .1 8 It deals only with the absolute and objective Impossibility of 
performance.19 
The type of situations which the ILC envisaged would provide the grounds 
mentioned In Article 61 are, for example, 'the submergence of an island, the drying up 
of a river or the destruction of a dam or hydro-electric Installation indispensable for the 
execution of a treaty'.20 
The Impossibility of performance might be a temporary one, and might be 
regarded as a case of force majeure as a Justification for non-performance of a treaty 
obligation. But the ILC stated 'that, when there Is a continuing Impossibility of 
performing recurring obligations of a treaty. It is desirable to recognize, as part of the 
law of treaties, that the operation of a treaty may be suspended temporary1.21 
Sir Humphrey Waldock stated, as a Justification for the distinction between 
permanent and temporary Impossibility of performance, the disappearance or the 
destruction of the original subject matter may be permanent; but It may nevertheless 
be possible to replace the subject-matter. Moreover, Juridically it is the resulting 
Impossibility of performance rather than the destruction or disappearance of the 
subject matter which Is the ground for the termination or suspension of the operation of 
a treaty'.22 
As a rule, permanent impossibility of performance terminates a treaty; temporary 
Impossibility has the effect of suspending It; 'the Commission considered It essential to 
underline that, unless It is clear that the impossibility will be permanent, the right of the 
party must be limited to Invoking It as a ground for suspending the operation of the 
treaty. In other words. It regarded 'suspension of the operation of the treaty' rather than 
'termination' as the desirable course of action and not vice veisa.23 
The Impossibility of performance, whether permanent or temporary, will not have 
an automatic effect on the validity of the treaty. The ILC formulated the article as a 
right to Invoke the Impossibility of performance as a ground for termination or 
Impossibility Is the result of a breach by that party either of a n obl igation under the 
treaty or of any other Intemallonal obligation o w e d to any other party to the treaty. 
17 Snclalr.Srl. . op.cff.. p.191. 
Capotorl l , F.. L'extinction et la suspension des traités. R.d.C. 1971 III. t. 134, p. S27. 
18 Veor txx* ILC1966. Vol.ll. p.255. 
19 Bothe .M.andJ . Brink, op.c/f.. 1986. p. 93. 
Frankenberg,G. and R. Кггі р г. op.clt.. p. 575. 
yearbook ILC 1966. Vol.l. p.71.833rd meeting, Mr. d e Lma. 
Capotortt, F., op.clt. p. 529. He Is of the opinion that the notion of absolute, object ive 
Impossibility Is n o t Justified: 'La nature matériel le d e l'Impossibilité n' implique pas 
nécessairement que soit en Jeu le sort d'un objet physique Indispensable à l'exécution a u 
traité: beaucoup de traités prévolent des comportements qui n'ont aucun relation avec 
de tels objets et qui peuvent néanmoins devenir matériellement Impossibles'. 
2D yearbook ILC 1966.Vol.ll. p.256. 
21 totem, p.256. 
Force majeure will be dealt with as a part of the topic of State Responsibility. Yearbook ILC 
1963. Vol.ll, p.79. 
Capotortl , F., op.clt.. p.531. 
Reuter. P.. Introduction audroltdes traites. Presses Universitaires de France. 1985. p.153. 
22 yearbook ILC 1966. Vol. H . p.38. 
23 Article 61 (1) VCT and Veartjook ILC 1966.Vol.ll. p.256. 
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suspension of the operation of the treaty, subject to the procedural requirements of 
Article 65 of the 1969 Convention.24 
According to the ILC this manner was adopted, because 'disputes may arise as to 
whether a total disappearance or destruction of the subject matter of the treaty has In 
fact occurred, and In the absence of compulsory adjudication it would be 
Inadvisable to adopt, without any qualification, a rule bringing about the automatic 
abrogation of the treaty by operation of law'.25 
Applicability to the debt problem 
A loan treaty has as its subject the obligation of one party to repay the amount of 
money (plus Interest) It has borrowed from the other party. This obligation consists, 
almost always, of repaying the borrowed amount In a certain stipulated currency.26 
If the debtor Is unable to fulfil Its obligation towards Its creditors at the agreed time 
due to a lack of the stipulated currency. Is It possible to regard this as a case of 
supervening Impossibility of performance as described above? 
The problem may occur In two forms. Either the stipulated (hard)currency has been 
taken out of circulation or there Is a lack of the desired currency In the debtor-country. 
The question which arises Is whether the disappearance of a currency constitutes a 
supervening Impossibility of performance, or whether this will only give rise to the 
obligation by the debtor to fulfil Its obligation In another currency. A related question is 
whether a lack of currency qualifies as a supervening Impossibility of performance. 
This Is a situation In which the currency Is still In existence, but the debtor has no ability 
to obtain the required amount. 
a. Disappearance of a currency 
The value of a currency may be changed by the agency of another State than the 
debtor State. A simple change In the value of a currency, however, does not fulfil the 
requirements set by article 61 of the 1969 Convention. It will not give rise to a change of 
the provisions In the loan treaty. A dramatic change In the value of a currency or the 
disappearance of the old currency, like In Argentina In 1985, will, in general, have a 
serious effect upon the obligations still to be performed. In most loan treaties It Is 
understood that In those cases the value of the currency at the time of the conclusion 
Is to be used as a unit of account In order to determine the weight of the obligations of 
the debtor. A dramatic change In the value of the currency, or the disappearance of 
the old currency, will In general mean that the obligations have to be fulfilled, via a 
conversion, In the new value of the currency or In the new currency. 
The PCIJ ruled In such a manner in the Serbian loans-case, in which the amount due 
was stipulated In gold francs, which were no longer a legal tender at the time of 
payment. '... The Court considers that It should be clearly stated that, If payment is to 
be made In gold francs, this Is to be understood in accordance with the Interpretation 
given above, that Is to say that If the franc which Is legal tender at the place fixed for 
payment does not possess the value of the gold-franc as defined by this Judgement, 
24 Which gives the procedure to be followed with respect to Invalidity, termination, 
withdrawal from or suspension of the operation of a treaty. See Infra par. 1.3, Chapter Λ. 
Ζ Yearbook ILC 1966. Vol.ll.p.256. 
7b Mostly dollars, marks or yens. 
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payment must be ef fected by the remittance of a number of francs, the value of 
which corresponds to the value of the gold francs due".2 7 
The fact that the gold franc was unobtainable a n d no longer a legal tender at the 
t ime of payment did not constitute a supervening Impossibility of performance, as 
long as the gold franc was to be regarded as a standard of value. 
"But If the loan contracts be deemed t o refer to the gold franc as a standard of 
value, payment of the equivalent amount of francs, calculated on that basis, could 
still be m a d e . (The fact that the gold francs were no longer obtainable) It could 
hardly be said that for this reason the obligation of the Treaty was discharged In this 
respect on the ground of Impossibility of performance.2 8" 
There Is no impossibility of performance as long as the equivalent In another (hard) 
currency Is still obtainable. The only time the disappearance of a currency could 
possibly constitute an Impossibility of performance is when the parties t o the treaty 
have explicitly stipulated that the only legal tender to the fulfillment of the obligation is 
the stipulated currency. At that t ime, the currency may not be regarded as a unit of 
account and the disappearance clearly constitutes a 'permanent disappearance or 
destruction of an object Indispensable for the execution of the treaty'.2 9 
In the case that the treaty obligations are determined in an artificially composed 
currency unit, does a change In the composition of this currency unit constitute a 
supervening Impossibility of performance? Such a c o m p o s e d currency unit, for 
example, the SDR or ECU, Is m a d e up of different national currencies which are put 
together, according to a certain ratio. In a basket, and constitute a certain value. This 
value may, just as the value of a national currency, be subject to fluctuations, t o value 
adjustments due to economic changes. Just as Is the case with the change In value of 
a national currency, the change in value of the composed currency unit does not 
constitute an impossibility of performance. In cases which cause a dramatic change 
In value the past value has t o be converted Into present value to determine the 
precise weight of the obligation. The disappearance of a composed currency unit will 
not give rise t o the 'destruction of an object Indispensable for the execution of the 
treaty'. The rule, given by the PCIJ In the Serbian loan-case will, undoubtedly, also be 
applicable In such a case. 
b. Lack of the required currency 
This lack of foreign c u r e n c y may stem from either a shortage of exchange reserves 
or from the impossibility of obtaining the required foreign exchanges. The latter case 
occurs mostly In African countries, which suffer from depletion of the financial strength 
of the economy 3 0 ; the former occurs In the Latin American countries, which d o have 
the economic potential to earn foreign currency, but at the moment lack the required 
amount t o repay their loans. The history of the d e b a t e concerning the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties shows us that it was not intended t o Include 
pdyment difficulties as a ground to legally Invoke Article б і . 3 1 
There Is clearly no case of an absolute and objective disappearance of the object 
Indispensable for the execution of the treaty. As has been shown In Chapter 2, and will 
27 PCU. Series A n o . 20, p. 48. 
2B PCU, Series A n o . 20, p. 40. 
» Art. 61 V i e n n a C o n v e n t i o n o n t h e Law of Treaties. 
X L e y e n d e c k e r , L., Auslandsverschuldung und Volkerrecht. Peter L a n g , 1988, p. 174/5, 
31 Idem. p. 179. 
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be shown In Chapter 5, the Inability to comply with treaty obligations by the debtor 
countries due to a lack of foreign currency might give rise to the start of negotiations 
within the Paris Club and the 'London Club' In order to restructure the debtor countries' 
outstanding foreign debts. 
O b die Praxis bereits die Ableitung einer opinio iuris der Staaten erlaubt, daß 
Schuldner in Fällen des Unvermögens ex lege von ihren Verpflichtungen frei 
werden, Ist sehr zweifelhaft'.32 
Article 61 of the 1969 Convention does not play a helpful role in the solution of the 
curent debt problem and does not provide an opportunity for debtor countries to free 
themselves, even temporarily, of their financial obligations towards their creditors. 
1.3 Fundamental change of circumstances 
Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those 
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the 
parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the 
treaty unless: 
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the 
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and 
(b) the effect of the change Is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to 
be performed under the treaty, 
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be Invoked as a ground for 
terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: 
(a) If the treaty establishes a boundary: or 
(b) If the fundamental change Is the result of a breach by the party Invoking It either 
of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to 
any other party to the treaty. 
3. tf, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may Invoke a fundamental change of 
circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also 
Invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty. 
This principle, better known as the doctrine of rebus 5/c stantibus?3, has been and still Is 
regarded as a pitfall by International lawyers. The ILC, however, when dealing with the 
principle in the framework of its deliberation on the Law of Treaties, concluded that 
'the principle, If Its application were carefully delimited and regulated, should find a 
place In the modern law of treaties'.34 The ILC agreed that 'the doctrine (must be) 
formulated as an objective rule of law by which, on grounds of equity and Justice, a 
32 kiem. p. 177. 
33 For reasons of clarity the ILC dec ided that 'In order to emphasize the object ive character 
of the rule. It wou ld be better not use the term 'rebus sic stantibus' either In the text of the 
article or even In the title, and so avoid the doctrinal Implication of lhat tenn'. - Vearboofc 
Ä.C 1966, Vol.11, p. 258 
34 In Its final report on the Law of Treaties the ILC stated that 'despite the strong reservations 
of ten expressed with regard to It. the ev idence of the a c c e p t a n c e of the doctr ine In 
International law Is so considerable that It seems to Indicate a recognit ion of a need for 
this safety valve In the law of treaties'. - Yearbook ILC 1966, Vol.11, p. 25β. 
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fundamental change of circumstances may, under certain conditions, be Invoked by 
a party as a ground for terminating the treaty".35 
The notion of fundamental change of circumstances originated from the civist 
maxim conventio omnls intelllgitur clausula rebus sic stantibus (every contract Is to be 
understood as being based on the presumption of things remaining as they were, that 
Is, at the time of Its conclusion).3 6 Before international courts and arbitral tribunals very 
little references has been m a d e t o the change of circumstances as a cause for 
terminating a treaty.3 7 
The permanent Court of International Justice, while dealing with the Free Zones 
case, recognized the principle of c h a n g e of circumstances as a ground for 
terminating a treaty In covert terms. It stated that: 
'As the French argument fails on the facts, it becomes unnecessary for the Court to 
consider any of the questions of principle which arise In connection with the theory 
of the lapse of treaties by reason of change of circumstances, such as the extent 
to which the theory c a n be regarded as constituting a rule of International law, the 
occasion on which and the method by which effect c a n be given to the theory If 
recognized, and the question whether It would apply t o treaties establishing rights 
such as that which Switzerland derived from the treaties of 1815 and 1Θ16.'38 
But 'It Is beyond doubt that there is no judgement pronounced by an International 
Judicial organ which In principle would dismiss the rebus sic stantibus clause and doubt 
Its justification In International relations'.39 
In his review of the clausula rebus sic stantibus In diplomatic practice, G. Harasztl 
comes to the conclusion t h a t making reference t o a change of circumstances as a 
cause for terminating a treaty was considered lawful, and even though abuses were 
not Infrequent when It came t o apply the clause to an actual case, the rule Itself was 
alive, its existence was not cal led Into doubt, a n d only the legality of Its concrete 
application was called Into doubt'. 4 0 
The ILC stated that State practice 'shows a wide a c c e p t a n c e of the view that a 
fundamental change of circumstances may Justify a d e m a n d for the termination or 
revision of a treaty, but also shows a strong disposition to question the right of a party to 
36 Yearbook //.C19ÓÓ, Vol.11. ρ.25β. 
Harasztl, G., Treaties a n d the fundamental c h a n g e of circumstances. Recueil des Cours, 
1975HI,t.l4ó.p.49. 
Jaln, S.C, Rebus sic stantibus revisited In the light of International Law Commission draft, 
The Supreme Court Journal. J i iy 1966, p.5. 
Vamvoukos, Α.. Termination of Treaties In International Law, the doctrine of rebus sic 
sfanfflbus a n d desuetude, 1985, p. 187. 
Reuter, P..op.clt.. p. 114: 
"... Il est admis aujourd'hui c o m m e une cause autonome..." 
36 Harcisztl,G.,op.c/f.,p.lO 
37 Municipal courts, o n the other h a n d , frequently have h a d the c h a n c e t o deal with the 
principle, since It was Invoked by one of the parties as a contract-terminating ground. 
38 Free Zones of Upper -Savoy a n d the district of Gex. P.C.I.J. 1932, Series A/B no. 46, p. 158. 
39 Harasztl. G..op.clt., p. 38. 
40 Harasztl, G., op.cff.. p. 16. 
For a historical overview see. Inter alia 
- the Harvard Draft, A.J.I.L. 1935; 
- V a n Bogaert, E., le sens d e la clause 'rebus sic stantibus' dans le droit des gens actuel , 
R.G.D.I.P.. 1966, p. 49; 
- Vamvoukos. Α., op.cit: 
- Bederman, D.J., the 1871 London Declaralton, Rebus sic stantibus a n d a prlmltlvlst view 
of the law of nations. A.J.I.L, 1988, no. 1. 
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denounce α treaty unilaterally on this ground'.41 In Its commentary to -then- article 59 
the Commission said that the principle has been Invoked by States, either explicitly or 
by reference to the general principle In order to 'Justify the termination or modification 
of treaty obligations by reason of changed circumstances'.42 
The legal character of the clause has changed over time. Several conflicting 
theories have been advanced by authors on International law in past centuries. The 
earliest one regarded the clause as being tacitly Implied. It Is 'a tacit condition that the 
contracting parties have in mind whenever they conclude a treaty, although they do 
not expressly insert It In the wording of the relevant Instrument'.43 
The problem of fiction, which Is Inherent In the first theory, is solved by the 
supporters of the second theory, which desires 'that the contracting parties should 
expressly provide In the treaty for the application of the clause'. This, however, would 
make the drafting of treaties an extremely difficult process.44 
The ILC has opted for a third theory, which regards the principle as an objective 
one, irrespective of the tacit or express Inclusion of the parties: 
"The Commission noted, however, that the tendency to-day was to regard the 
Implied term as only a fiction by which it was attempted to reconcile the principle of 
the dissolution of treaties In consequences of a fundamental change of 
circumstances with the rule of pacta sunt servanda. In most cases the parties gave 
no thought to the possibilities of a change of circumstances and, If they had done 
so, would probably have provided for It In a different manner. Furthermore, the 
Commission considered the fiction to be an undesirable one since It Increased the 
risk of subjective Interpretations and abuse. For this reason, the Commission 
agreed that the theory of an Implied term must be rejected and the doctrine should 
be formulated as an objective rule of law by which, on grounds of equity and 
Justice, a fundamental change of circumstances may, under certain conditions, 
be Invoked by a party as a ground for terminating the treaty."45 
In paragraph 1 of Article 62 of the 1969 Convention the conditions under which the 
change of circumstances may be Invoked as a ground for termination or suspension 
of a treaty are listed. These conditions are that those circumstances should constitute 
an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty, and that the 
effect of the change should be a radical transformation of the extent of obligations still 
to be performed under the treaty. 
In order to Invoke the clausula rebus sic stantibus properly 
a. the change must be of circumstances existing at the time of the conclusion of the 
treaty; 
b. the change must be a fundamental one; 
с It must also be one not foreseen by the parties; 
d. the existence of those circumstances must have constituted an essential basis of 
the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and 
41 Уво/Ьо<*/£С1966.Уо1.11.р.257. 
42 fctem, p. 257. 
43 Harasztl, G.. op.c/f.,p. 46 
Vamvoukos. Α.. toc. cit.. p. 186. 
44 Harasztl, G.. op.ctt., p. 47 
Vamvoukos, Α., loc.clt. p. 187. 
45 У а*оо(г/І.С1906, оІ.ІІ.р.25в. 
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e. the effect of the change must be radically to transform the scope of the obligations 
still to be performed under the treaty.'16 
Two elements c a n be distinguished, one qualitative and the other quantitative. 
The qualitative element holds that the change must regard the reasons which 
determined the consent given, It has to touch upon the cause of the obligation. The 
quantitative element holds that the change must upset the conditions of the contract, 
it must 'radically transform the extent of the obligations still t o perform under the 
treaty'. 4 7 According to A. Carty, Article 62 appears to state two opposing 'Juridical' 
views a n d ranks them cumulatively: 
"The change of circumstances must go to the basis on which the parties entered 
the treaty a n d radically transform the obligations still to be performed under It. One 
might have thought that, if circumstances going to the basis of the agreement 
have c h a n g e d . It would automatically come t o an end. Similarly, If the obligations 
under a treaty are radically transformed, Is It still the same treaty?"4 8 
These strict - and In Carty's view 'double' conditions - are formulated because the ILC 
was very much afraid a n d aware of the possible abuses, that might occur when 
Invoked by parties In order t o undermine the treaty. In order t o emphasize the 
exceptional nature of the principle, article 62 of the 1969 Convention Is formulated In a 
n e g a t i v e w a y . 4 9 The article does not enumerate the various changes of 
circumstance, but only gives the conditions under which a change may be Invoked t o 
terminate or suspend a treaty.5 0 
Since the Convention was adopted In 1969, the International Court of Justice has had 
the opportunity t o consider the scope of the principle of fundamental change of 
circumstances. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction-case the Court stated: 
"International law admits that a fundamental change of circumstances which 
determined the parties t o a c c e p t a treaty, if It has resulted In a radical 
transformation of the extent of the obligations Imposed by It, may, under certain 
conditions, afford the party a f fected a ground for Invoking the termination or 
suspension of the treaty."5 1 
"One of the basic requirements embodied In that Article Is that the change of 
circumstances must have been a fundamental one."5 2 
As a fundamental change the Court considered 'that the changes of circumstances 
which must be regarded as fundamental or vital are those which Imperil the existence 
or vital development of one of the partles'Cemphasis a d d e d ) . 5 3 This view corresponds 
with the traditional view. 
The Court continued: 
"Moreover, In order that the change of circumstances may give rise t o a ground 
for Invoking the termination of a treaty. It Is also necessary that It should have 
46 У а(Ьоок/ІС196*, оІ.ІІ,р.259. 
47 Reuter, P., toc.ctf., p. 154/5. He distinguishes two principles: In par. 1 of art. 62 1969 Vienna 
Convent ion o n the Law of Treaties: La théorie de la cause e t cel le de l'équilibre 
conlractuel. 
48 Carty, A., The decay of International law? A reappraisal of the limits of legal Imagination In 
htemattona) affairs. 1986, p. 81. 
4? Yearbook ILC 1966. Vol. II. p. 259. 
50 Harasztl,G.,op.c/f..p. 55. 
Jaln.S.C..op.ctt. .p.8. 
51 KX//?eporfs1973.p. 18 and p. 63. 
52 totem, p. 18/9 and p. 63. 
53 totem, p. 19 and p. 64. 
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resulted in α radical transformation of the extent of the obligations still to be 
performed The change must have Increased the burden of the obligations to be 
executed t o the extent of rendering the performance something essentially 
different from that originally undertaken" M 
From this ICJ Judgement It c a n be concluded that the change. In order to be regarded 
as a ground for termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty, must be a 
fundamental one, which causes a substantial Imbalance of obligations 
During t h e discussion in the ILC t h e quest ion arose w h e t h e r g e n e r a l 
(external)circumstances outside the treaty may constitute such a change The ILC 
stated In its report that such general changes could properly be invoked as a ground 
for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty only If their effect was t o alter a 
circumstance constituting an essential basis of the consent of the parties t o the 
t reaty 5 5 This should Include circumstances of the type which would 'Imperii the 
existence or vital developments of one of the parties' 
The Intention of the parties - although the principle Is not based on It juridically. It Is 
an objective rule of law - does play a role In determining whether the rule is applicable 
If It Is clearly established that both or all the parties entered into the treaty on the basis 
and because of the existence of a certain state of affairs of which they envisaged the 
cont inuat ion as fundamenta l t o the treaty obl igat ion, the cessation or radical 
alteration of that state of affairs puts the rule into operation The same applies if the 
c o m m o n expectation of both or all the parties, which moved them to enter Into the 
treaty, fails t o be realized on account of a change of circumstances' ^ 
If the change of circumstances only affects the motives of one party, then, as a 
rule, the principle does not apply This, however, may be different I с they were of 
paramount Importance t o the party In concluding the treaty, and the other party was 
m a d e aware of this fact and recognized the Importance of the assumptions 5 7 
As has been shown In the paragraph dealing with Article 26 of the 1969 Convention, 
the principle of g o o d faith prohibits the evasion of an obligation as established by the 
c o m m o n Intention of the parties But the principle of g o o d faith also prohibits a party 
from exacting from the other party advantages which go beyond their c o m m o n a n d 
reasonable intention at the time of the conclusion of the treaty 5 e The purpose of the 
54 idem ρ 21 and ρ 65 
56 SC Jain,opclt ρ β 
Also R Кпі р г Techniques Juridiques et endettement Revue du Tiers Monde. Vol XXX, 
1984 no 99 ρ 673/4 
'Nous prennons comme point de départ la conviction générale que ni dans le droit 
public Internattonal ni dans les systèmes nationaux de droit civil les contracts doivent ótre 
exécutés a tout prix Un certain nombre de principes limitent la validité absolue des 
obligations contractuelles Le constat est valable en droit public International, par 
example dans le cas d un changement profond de ta situation qui prévalait au moment 
de la signature du contrat L Impossibilité d exécution du contrat peut être tenue pour une 
autre exception elle est certaine lorsque I exécution peut porter atteinte à des Intérêts 
nationaux fondamentaux' 
Harasztl G .opclt ρ 71 
"Since In our construction the rebus sic stantibus clause Is Justified exactly by the 
circumstance that the burdens devolving on the contracting parties from a treaty cannot 
go beyond a certain predictable limit we also have to recognize that no State Is under 
the obligation to accept burdens beyond this limit " 
56 Vamvoukos A . t o c a / , ρ 191 
57 ( d e m p 190 
58 Cheng В o p c f f . p 118 
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rule Is t o u n d o a n Inequitable situation, which has arisen out of c h a n g e d 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s 5 9 
In Article 62 the condition is formulated that the change of circumstances must not 
have been foreseen by the parties For the fundamental change of circumstances to 
apply. It must be ascertained that the change in question was unforeseen as 
distinguished from unforeseeable 
In the past, the application of the principle has often been limited to so-called 
perpetual treaties The ILC, however, bearing In mind the rapid changes that take 
place In our time, decided 'that the rule should not be limited to treaties containing no 
provision regarding their termination, though for obvious reasons it would seldom or 
never have relevance for treaties of limited duration or which are terminable upon 
notice' ю 
Applicability to the current debt-problem 
Since It is the purpose of the rule to undo Inequitable situations which have arisen out of 
changed circumstances, the question occurs whether Article 62 might play a role In 
the current debt problem One might ask whether the changed circumstances, due to 
the economic factors causing the debt problem as mentioned In Chapter 1, fulfil the 
requirements Do these changes, due to economic circumstances, constitute a 
fundamental change, cause a substantial Imbalance of obligations and are these 
circumstances to be regarded as a threat to the existence or vital developments of 
the State 
Before entering Into a more detailed analysis, It is necessary for us to establish 
whether Article 62 Is applicable to loan treaties Loan treaties, after all, are 
characterized by the time-element The creditor complies with its obligations at a 
much earlier time than the debtor Is It possible for the debtor to Invoke Article 62 as a 
ground for suspension or termination of the fulfilment of his obligations, while the 
creditor has long since complied with his? 
In the Fisheries Junsdrction-case the ICJ held 
"Moreover, In the case of a treaty which is In part executed and in part executory, 
In which one of the parties has already benefitted from the executed provisions of 
the treaty. It would be particularly Inadmissible to allow that party to put an end to 
obligations which were accepted under the treaty by way of quid pro quo for the 
provisions which the other party has already executed"6 1 
The conclusion which can be drawn Is that, with regard to loan treaties, a change of 
circumstances may not be invoked as grounds for termination or withdrawal of one of 
the parties to the treaty This point of view Is not shared by all writers, as may be 
Illustrated by the following extract "It has been argued that certain conditions 
underlying a credit agreement have changed so dramatically that the debtor 
cannot be held to strictly to comply with the original agreement Against this 
argument, the Intertemporal character of a creditor relationship has to be recognized 
The parties to the agreement fulfil their obligations at different times Thus, a change In 
the basic economic situation of both the creditor and the debtor as well as the 
9? Jain,SC .opclt ρ 10 
áO Vearboofr/Í.C 1966, Vol II. ρ 259. 
61 ICJ Reports. 1973. par 34 ρ IS 
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general world economic context Is something the parties have to take Into account 
from the beginning".62 
This does not rule out the possibility that one of the parties may suspend the 
operation of the treaty on these grounds. It Is my view that the Court, although it did 
exclude the applicability of Article 62 (1), did not rule out the applicability of Article 62 
as such. The debtor country will still have the opportunity to invoke Article 62 as a valid 
ground for suspending tine operation of the loan-treaty. 
Although the use of Article 62(3) of the 1969 Convention cannot be ruled out on the 
basis of the nature of the loan-agreement. It must still be determined whether the 
economic changes which have occurred In recent history will constitute the 
fundamental changes as defined for the Invocation of the notion of fundamental 
change of circumstances as a legal ground for suspension of the operation of the 
treaty. 
The changes which are our point of discussion here are changes of an economic 
nature. They are the rise In the price of oil, the rise in interest rates, the rise in the value 
of the dollar, the deterioration of the world market and the fall in the prices of primary 
commodities. 
Do these changes constitute a fundamental departure from the agreement, or are 
they only a change In the nature of the agreement brought about by time, and, as 
such, do they come within the meaning of Article 62 or not?6 3 In other words, do 
general changes, outside the treaty give rise to the use of the clausula rebus sic 
stantibus! 
According to the ILC. 'such general changes could properly be Invoked as a 
ground for termination or withdrawing from a treaty only If their effect was to alter a 
circumstance constituting an essential basis of the consent of the parties to the 
treaty.'64Although not mentioned, they may also be used as a ground for suspension, 
which is a less far-reaching starting point to contribute to the solution of the current 
debt problem. 
The use of economic circumstances as changes which give rise to the Invocation 
of the clausula rebus sic stantibus Is not undisputed. Some writers consider economic 
changes a factor which has to be taken Into account when the parties conclude the 
agreement, and will never give a legal backing to the use of rebus sic stantibus.65 
The changes can be foreseen. 
"A contract providing for variable Interest rates or a contract providing for 
payments in foreign currency in time of floating exchange rates cannot be 
considered unenforceable If such variations Indeed occur".66 
Others, however, say that these changes are brought about by the measures taken 
by national governments whose behaviour the debtor countries could not influence. 
The changes were not brought about by market-forces, but were instigated by 
ffi Bothe. M. and J. Brink, op. cit.. p. 92/93, aiso Haln, H.J., Hague-Zagreb Essays 7 p. 17. 
63 In 19Θ2, an International arbitral tribunal In the case Kuwait versus Aminoli stated that the 
case Is not one of a fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) within the 
meaning of Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It Is not a case of a 
change Involving a departure from a contract, but of a change in the nature of the 
contract Itself, brought about by time, and the acquiescence or conduct of the Parties.' 
Arbitration Tribunal: Award In the matter of an arbitration between Kuwait and the 
American Independent oil company (AmlnolD March 24.1982. ILM 1982. p. 1024. 
M Veofboofi ILC 1966, Vol. II. p. 259. 
65 Leyendecker, L, op. cit.. p. 150-170. Hahn, HJ., Hague-Zagreb Essays 7, p. 172, M. Bothe, J. 
Brink, op. dt. p. 92/93. 
66 Bothe. M. a n d J. Brink, op. cit.. p. 93. 
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national policies.67This unilateral act ion, undertaken by national governments, was 
Intended to Improve the national economic and financial environment. But Its effects 
upon the International financial and trade climate are clearly visible.68 I am of the 
opinion that the following line of argument is the correct one: 
"While normally the state Is entitled at Its discretion to regulate Its monetary affairs, 
there comes a point when the exercise of such discretion so unreasonably or 
grossly offends the alien's right to fair and equitable treatment... that international 
law will Intervene".69 
Due to economic changes, the foreign debt has increased substantially In value and 
one may wonder whether the scope of the obligations still to be performed under the 
treaty have not been radically transformed and whether the fulfilment of these 
obligations, under these circumstances, d o not imperil the existence or vital 
development of the debtor State. 
Analogous to the rule of Article 61 , as can be found In the Serbian Loans-Case 
which prescribed that a radical change In the value of the currency means a 
conversion of the obligation into the new value of the currency or the new currency, 
the scope of the obligations still to be performed by the debtor may be revaluated In 
the light of the new economic factors In order to reinstall the financial equilibrium that 
existed at the very start of the agreement, but that has disappeared due to the radical 
change In economic circumstances. 
In order to achieve such a revaluation the debtor country could Invoke the clausula 
rebus sic stantibus. The clausula rebus sic stantibus then obliges the parties to 
reassess their agreement.70 
"Plutôt que de dire que le changement fondamental de circonstances entraîne de 
piano caducité du traité, il serait plus conforme â la vérité de dire qu'il entraîne, 
pour les parties Intéressées de obligation de négociés'.71 
In this way, the treaty can be preserved, albeit In a modified form, and the debtor can 
fulfil its 'original' obligations. The main difference between the possibility for 
renegotiating the treaty created by Article 62 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties and the possibility offered by the Paris Club, Is that the latter requires an 
actual default In payments.72 The clausula rebus sic stantibus offers a debtor country, 
in view of the forthcoming problems with payments, caused by the economic 
changes, a handle to trigger off changes In the treaty before payment arrears occur. 
2 Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
In the previous paragraph, I dealt with situations In which the suspension of payment of 
the principle of an International debt or the suspension of the payment of the Interest 
can be considered as a legitimate way of suspending the operating of a treaty. In this 
paragraph, I will deal with situations In which suspension or termination of payment of 
67 See Chapter 1. 
ίβ P. Sarçevlc calls this behaviour an 'Indirect taking of foreign property'. Sarçevlc, P., Two 
approaches to the debt problem. Foreign debts In the present and a new International 
economic order, ed. D.Chr. Dicke, p. 144. 
(Я M a m . F A . Legal aspects of money. 1982, p. 477. 
70 Vanvoukos, Α.. op. cit.. p. 199: 'A third legal effect of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus Is 
that It gives a party a legal right to demand the revision of a treaty'. 
71 Reuter, P.. op. cit.. par. 276. 
72 The renegotiation process In the Paris СІііэ will be described In Chapter 5. 
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Interest or the principle on an International debt Is considered as a breach of an 
International obligation, an International wrongful act which could entail the 
International responsibility of that State.73 
As Article 3 of the draft articles on State responsibility states: 
"There Is an International wrongful act of a State when: 
a. conduct constitutes an action or omission attributable to the State under 
International law, and 
b. that conduct constitutes a breach of an International obligation of the State."74 
The suspension of payment or the non-payment on the agreed date of the Interest or 
principle on an International debt can be classified as a breach of an International 
obligation. In those cases In which Articles 61 and 62 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties are not applicable. 
The question which Immediately comes to mind Is whether there might be 
circumstances which will preclude the wrongfulness of the conduct of the State or the 
responsibility of the State, In other words, circumstances to which the debtor counties 
may refer to Justify the non-payment. 
In Chapter 5 of the draft articles on State Responsibility the - then - Special 
Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Ago, dealt with 'circumstances precluding wrongfulness'. 
This chapter is Intended to define those cases In which, despite the apparent 
fulfilment of the two conditions for the existence of an International wrongful act. Its 
existence cannot be inferred owing to the presence of a circumstance which stands 
In the way of such Inference'.75 
What Is the effect of the presence of these circumstances; do they preclude the 
wrongfulness of the conduct or do they preclude the responsibility of the State for a 
wrongful act? In the view of the ILC, the true effect of the presence of circumstances Is 
not, at least in the normal case, to preclude responsibility that would otherwise result 
from an act wrongful In Itself, but rather to preclude the characterization of the 
conduct of the State in either one of these cases as wrongful'.76 
The effect of circumstances is to preclude the wrongfulness of the act, and not to 
preclude the responsibility resulting from an act that is still wrongful.77 
73 Since 1969 the International Law Commission (ILC) has been considering the topic of State 
Responsibility arising out of Illicit Acts. The principles underlying the draft may be stated as 
follows: 
- the subject deals with the International responsibility of States for their wrongful act. The 
approach Is a general one. It does not deal with any specific aspect of State 
responsibility; 
- the subject does not deal with the 'primary' rules establishing State responsibility. It 
deals with the 'secondary' rules: namely, the analysis and consequences of a breach 
of an International obligation by an act or conduct attributable to a State; 
- the first part of the draft has concentrated on the origin of the responsibility of a State. 
(S.P. Jagota, State Responsibility; circumstances precluding wrongfulness, N.Y.I.L. 1985. p. 
250/1). 
74 For the attrtbutablllty of acts of an organ of the State to the State, see Chapter 3. 
75 Vea*ookÄ.C1979.Vol.ll.pcirt2.p.l06.par.l. 
76 Yearbook ILC 1979. Vol.11, part 1, p.27, par. 49. presented as the view of the Commission as 
expressed In the commentary to article 1. 
"77 Throughout the drafting of the articles, the Commission has made clear Its conviction 
that a distinction must be drawn between the Idea of 'wrongfulness'. Indicating the fact 
certain conduct by a State conflicts with an obligation Imposed on that State by a 
'primary ' rule of International law. and the Idea of 'responsibility'. Indicating the legal 
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It may be concluded that ' the act of the State In question cannot be characterized 
as wrongful for the g o o d reason that , because of the presence of certain 
circumstances, the State committing the act was not under an international obligation 
in that case to act otherwise'.78 The circumstances which are usually considered to 
have this effect - the enumeration Is not Intended to be exhaustive79 - are consent, 
countermeasures In respect of an Internationally wrongful act , force majeure and 
fortuitous event, distress, state of necessity and self-defense. 
2.1 Circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
Circumstances precluding wrongfulness can be divided Into two categories: 
a. circumstances In which the acts of the other State are of relevance to the acts of 
the State committing the breach of an International obligation (Article 29 - consent, 
Article 30 -countermeasures in respect of an International wrongful act , and Article 
34 - self-defence.) 
b. circumstances in which the acts of the other State, whose rights are Infringed upon, 
have no significance (Article 31 - force majeure and fortuitous event. Article 32 -
distress, and Article 33 - state of necessity).80 
Circumstances precluding wrongfulness which might be of relevance to the debt 
problem are consent, force majeure and fortuitous event and state of necessity. We 
will deal with them In the following paragraphs. Countermeasures In respect of an 
International wrongful act, self-defense and distress cannot be called upon easily as a 
Justification for non-payment by the debtor country. 
2.2 Consent 
Article 29 of the draft articles on State Responsibility deals with the first circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness: consent.81 
consequences which another ("secondary") rule of law attaches to the act of the states 
constituted by such conduct". - YearbooklLC 1979. Vol. Il,part2,p.l07,par. 3. 
78 yeoibook/i.C1979.Vol.ll,part2,p.l08,pc»-.9. 
As Slmma states: "rendering definitively or temporari ly Inoperative the International 
ob l igat ion In respect of wh ich a b reach is a l l eged ' ; B. Slmma. Grundf ragen der 
Staaten Verantwortlichkeit In der Arbeit der International Law Commission, Archiv des 
Völkerrechts, 19Θ6 (24.Band. 4.Heft), р.ЗвІ. 
79 Yearbook ILC 19вО, о).ІІ. part 2, p.61, par. 29 - Commentaty to Article 34: 
"... the Commission wishes to stress that the circumstances deal t with In this chapter are 
those which "generally" arise In this connection. Consequently, the chapter does not 
seek to make a list of circumstances It enumerates absolutely exhaustive, the 
Commission Is sufficiently aware of the evolving nature of International law to believe that 
a circumstance which Is not today held to have the effect of precluding the wrongfulness 
of an act of a State not In conformity with an International obligation, may have lhat effect 
In the future. At all events, the Commission wishes to point out that Chapter V Is not to be 
construed as closing the door on that possibility". 
Ю B. Simmajoc.clt.. p.381. 
Θ1 Article 29 of the draft articles on State Responsibility: 
1. The consent validly given by a State to the commission by another State of a 
specified act not In conformity with an obligation of the latter State towards the former 
State preclude the wrongfulness of the act In relation to that State to the extent that the 
act remains within the Hmlts of that consent. 
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In order to produce the effect of precluding wrongfulness 'the consent of the State 
must be valid In international law, clearly established, really expressed (which 
precludes merely presumed consent), internationally attributable to the State and 
anterior to the commission of the act to which It refers Moreover, consent can be 
invoked as precluding wrongfulness of an act by another State only within the limits 
with respect to its scope and duration which the State expressing the consent 
intends e2 
To determine whether the consent given by the State can be considered to be 
valid, a general rule, the principles which apply to the determination of the validity of 
treaties, must be applied.83 The consent may be given tacitly or Implicitly, provided 
that It Is always clearly established M It must be expressed, it may never be presumed 
Presumed here means' that the State would have consented to the act in question if It 
had been possible to request consent' So consent Is not really given by the State e5 
The consent given must be ottnbutabie to the State 86 It must be given prior to the 
commission of the act to preclude the wrongfulness of the act. If it is given after the 
commission of the act 'It will simply be a waiver of the right to assert responsibility and 
the claims arising therefrom'e7 In case of a continuing act, the wrongfulness of the act 
will only be removed from the time the consent Is given 8e Consent cannot preclude 
wrongfulness of a State's conduct If Its obligation arises out of a peremptory norm of 
general International law 89 
Applicability to the debt problem 
The wrongfulness of the conduct of the debtor State, which in this case consists of 
suspension of payment of either the Interest or the principle on an international loan, to 
the creditor State is precluded If the latter State gave its consent to such an act 
An example Is the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of 11 November 
1912 In the Russian Indemnity case between Russia and Turkey Under the Treaty of 27 
January (8 February) 1879 Turkey was obliged to pay an Indemnity to Russia In 
reparation for damages suffered by Russia during the Russo-Turkish war As Turkey 
was not able to pay the full amount at once. It spread the payment over a period of 
more than 20 years During that penod Turkey never paid Interest, and although Russia 
once - In 1891 - requested payment of interest over the principal sum, the creditor 
government never made any reservation to the Interest until 1902 upon the completion 
of the payments Turkey refused to pay the Interest 
The Permanent Court of Arbitration, to which the dispute, was submitted, took the 
view that 
2 Paragraph 1 does not apply If the obligation arises out of a peremptory norm of 
general International law For the purposes of the present draft articles, a peremptory 
norm of general International law Is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
International community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation Is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
International law having the same character 
82 Veafboc*Ä.C1979 Vol I l .pc i i t2 ,p 112,par 11 
83 fctem.p 112, par 12 
M Idem ρ 112 par 13 
85 fctem.pm ρ 14 
86 For t h e p r o b l e m of attrlbutabll lty, see Chapter 3 
87 Vearboolc/LC1979.VoU.part2p 113 p a r l ó 
86 Idem, ρ 113, par 16 
89 fctem.p 115.рсж 2 1 . 
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"In principle, the Imperial Ottoman Government was under an obligation to the 
Imperial Russian government for the payment of moratory compensation as from 
31 December 1890/12 January 1891, the date of receipt of a demand for the 
payment that was explicit and In due form. 
However, Inasmuch as the rights of the Imperial Russian Government under that 
demand for payment had In fact been extinguished as a result of the subsequent 
waiver by Its Ambassador In Constantinople, the Imperial Ottoman Government Is 
now under no obligation to pay Interest to It according to the dates on which 
payment of the Indemnity was effectuated. -90 
The Court ruled, that the otherwise unlawful ac t of Turkey, which would have 
constituted a breach of an International obligation, was rendered lawful by the 
consent given by the Russian ambassador, as an organ of the Russian State.91 
In the present day context consent can play a role in handling the debt problem. 
The debtor country could. If It finds Itself In financial difficulties, ask the creditor 
countries consent to suspension of payment. It could even ask for a termination of the 
loan agreement, but that does not seem a viable proposition. Since consent only 
takes away the wrongfulness of the conduct of the debtor state towards a creditor, 
which has given Its consent, the debtor must obtain the consent of all his creditors, or 
at least the consent of as many creditors as Is necessary to provide temporary relief 
for Its balance of payments problems. 
2.3 Force majeure 
In the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Article 31 deals with force majeure a n d 
fortuitous events as circumstances precluding wrongfulness. 
Article 31 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility runs as follows: 
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not In conformity with an obligation of that 
State towards another State Is precluded If the act was due to an Irresistible force or 
to an unforeseen external event beyond its control which made it materially 
Impossible for the State to act In conformity with that obligation. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the State In question has contr ibuted to the 
occurrence of the situation of material Impossibility. 
The concept of force majeure has been limited to cases In which the organ that took 
act ion was p laced In a situation of absolute and material Impossibility of act ing 
otherwise without Incurring very grave danger to Its own existence or to persons 
p laced under its responsibility'.92 
Contrary to article 29 (consent), one of the main features of force majeure Is the 
'Irrelevance of prior conduct of the State against which the act to be Justified by 
Invoking the circumstances covered by the present article was committed'.93 
90 United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XI. p.446. (Translation In report 
ILC to General Assembly, YearbookILC1979, Vd.l l . part 2, p.l 11, par.9) 
91 /dem. p. I l l , par. 9. 
92 /earbook Ä.C1979, Vd. l , p. 185. 
<B yearbook 1С 1979, Vol.11, part 2, p.122. par. 2 and p.124, par. 7. 
(fì 
The following elements In Article 31 are essential 
a the act of the State was due to an irresistible force or an unforeseen external event 
beyond Its control. 
b this made It materially impossible for the State to act in conformity with its obligation 
or to know that Its conduct was not in conformity with its obligation, and 
с the State did not contribute to the occurrence of the situation of material 
Impossibility ">4 
In Its commentary to Article 31 the Commission states that the irresistible force must, in 
the case In point, be a constraint which the State was unable to avoid or to oppose by 
Its own means' The unforeseen and external event 'must be one to the occurrence of 
which the State has remained a stranger"K In other words, the State must have no real 
possibility of escaping the effects of such force or event9 6 
External does not mean external to the State - the event can be a natural one or 
one which Is the result of a human action -, It means beyond a State's control ^ The 
event must be beyond the control of the State, It must be an act which occurs and 
produces Its effects without the State being able to do anything which might rectify the 
event or might avert its consequences 
The adverb 'materially which precedes the word impossible' emphasizes that It Is 
not sufficient for the Irresistible force or the unforeseen event to have made It very 
difficult for the State to act In conformity with the obligation or to know that its conduct 
was In breach of the obligation, the State must not have had any option In this regard 
There must have been a 'casual link between the Irresistible force and the unforeseen 
external event and the material impossibility' experienced by the State This Is 
expressed by the words this made It', which precede material Impossibility' 9 8 In the 
case of a continuing act, the wrongfulness is only precluded In relation to that part of 
the act, which takes place dunng the time the situation of force majeure or fortuitous 
event subsists " 
In paragraph 2 the principle that one may not profit from one s own Illegal act Is 
expressed In cases where a factual set of circumstances Is Invoked by the State as a 
Justification for the non-performance of an obligation, these circumstances may not 
be taken Into consideration if they are the result of a breach of an international 
obligation by that same state , 0 0 So 'If the State contnbutes in any way - intentionally or 
through negligence - to the occurrence of the situation of material Impossibility 
created by force majeure or fortuitous event, the wrongfulness of the act committed 
by the State Is not precluded, even in the presence of other factors genuinely beyond 
its control' Ю' 
The Commission has drafted Article 31 In such a manner as to eliminate all 
participation of the will, the will either of the State or of the organ acting for the State , 0 2 
« Yearbook ILC1979. Voi II part 2. ρ 132, par 36 
96 Idem ρ 133 par 40 
% idem, ρ 132 par 36 
97 year tx>ofc/ ÍC1979.Vol l . l569t t imeet1ng.p l85/6,mr R Ago 
<Я yeo/boo<f/iC1979,Vol l l ,part2,p ІЗЗ.рог 40 
99 Idem ρ 132 par 38 
100 Idem.p 132.par 38 
Riphagen. W , State Responsibility New Théories of Obligations In Interstate Relatlons.The 
structure and process of International law, ed i ted by R St J M a c d o n a l d / D M Johnston. 
p605 
101 Yearbook ILC 1979. Vol II. part 2 ρ 133. par 40 
102 yearbooif/ l .C1978.Vol l l .part l-StuclybytheSecretar lat(A/CN4/315)-p73,par 26 
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From the survey of State pract ice, intematlonai decisions and doct r ine 1 0 3 , the 
Commission drew the conclusion 'that in International law ... there Is a well established 
and unanimously recognized principle that an act of a State not In conformity with 
what would otherwise be required of it by an International obligation does not 
constitute an international wrongful act of that State If, as a result of a situation of force 
majeure or fortuitous event, the State was In a position of material Impossibility of 
act ing otherwise or of realizing that Is was not act ing in conformity with the 
obligation.104 
When a party intents to prove that there existed a real situation of force majeure. 
material impossibility, the legal effects of that situation are not contested, but rather 
the appreciation of factual situation being Invoked as constituting a case of force 
majeure or fortuitous event.105 
Appllcabillfy to the debt problem 
Force majeure as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness of an act of a State not In 
conformity with the requirement of an International obligation Incumbent on that State 
has often been invoked In cases In which the State failed to pay Its d e b t s . m 
Since the scope of force majeure . as described In Article 31, has been narrowed 
to cases In which the organ that took the action was placed In a situation of absolute 
and material Impossibility of acting otherwise without Incurring very grave danger to Its 
own existence or to persons placed under Its responsibility, some of the situations 
concerned have to be qualified rather as a situation constituting a state of necessity 
(as described In Article 33)107, than as a situation of force majeure. However, situations 
of material Impossibility to perform an International obligation due to external factors 
beyond the control of the State having the obligation, may occur In cases of 
payments of debts.108 
The Permanent Court of International Justice gave Its Judgement In 1929 In two cases 
concerning International loans. In which the defence pleaded force majeure. The 
Case concerning the payment In gold of the Brazilian federal loans contracted In 
France and the Case concerning the payment of various Serbian loans Issued In 
France.109 
The first case arose as a result of a dispute between Brazil and France, on behalf of 
the bondholders, which centred on whether the service of various Brazilian loans 
should be effected on the basis of the gold franc or the paper franc. The Brazilian 
Government stated that 'as a result of subsequent Institution of the forced currency 
regime under which the paper franc continues to have the same status as legal 
tender for the payment of debts in currency, the debtor Is In a situation in which It Is 
Impossible to obtain the gold francs needed for the service of the contracts from the 
Issuing bank'.110 But the French Government contested this. It stated that 'Brazil 
Barboza, J., Necessity (revisited); essays In International Law In honour of Judge Manfred 
Lachs, edited by J. Makarczyk. p.32. 
103 Based on the Study by the Secretariat (A/CN.4/315) and the eight report of the Special 
Rapporteur on State Responslblllly. yearbook ILC1979, Vol.11, part 1. 
1« yeart30ofc£C1979.Vo).ll,part2.p. 132.paf.36. 
106 Idem. p. 125. par. 1. 
It» YeariiooklLC 1979, Vol.11. pcrt2, p. 127, par. 21-24. 
Ю7 See Infra par.2.4 
ice Idem. p. 128, 'para. 22. 
10» P.C.I. J. Series A. Nos. 20/21 (Judgement 15). 
110 P.C./.J. Series С.Г4о. 16-IV.p. 153. 
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undertook to service the three loans In gold This undertaking must be executed, 
Brazil must pay, In currency that Is legal tender at the place of payment, an amount 
corresponding In value to what It owes In gold . In Pans, neither French law nor the 
decisions of French courts prohibits such payment The two laws, one of which 
established the forced currency of the Bank of France notes within the national 
territory, while the other prohibited dealings In national gold and silver currencies, have 
in no way impaired the principle of the gold clause inserted In contracts having an 
International character' ' ' ' 
In Its Judgement the Court decided that there was no circumstance constituting 
force majeure The economic dislocation caused by the Great War has not. In legal 
principle, released the Brazilian Government from its obligations As for the gold 
payments, there Is no Impossibility because of Inability to obtain gold coins, If the 
promise be regarded as one for the payment of gold value The equivalent in gold 
value Is obtainable' ^ 2 
The Case concerning the payment of various Serbian loans issued in France 
concerned a dispute between the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government and the French 
holders of certain Serbian Loans The dispute arose with respect to the monetary basis 
on which payment of the principle and Interest of those loans was to be effected The 
French government, on behalf of the French bondholders, argued that this should be 
the value of gold francs, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government argued that it should be 
paper francs The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government made an appeal to the notion of 
force majeure It referred to the grave economic crisis and the dislocation which 
occurred as a result of the First World War, and It referred to the forced currency 
regime In France 
The Court ruled as followed -
'Force majeure - It cannot be maintained that the war itself, despite its grave 
economic consequences, affected the legal obligations of the contracts 
between the Serbian Government and the French bondholders The economic 
dislocations caused by the war did not release the debtor State, although they 
may present equities which doubtless will receive appropriate consideration In Its 
negotiations 
It Is contested that under the operation of the forced currency regime of France 
payment In gold franco, that Is, In specie, became impossible But If the loan 
contract deemed to refer to the gold franc as a standard of value, payments of the 
equivalent amount of francs, calculated on that basis could still be made" ' 1 3 
In both cases the Court did not consider the war, nor the difficulties In relation to the 
payment of the debt, due to grave economic circumstances, to constitute 
circumstances of force majeure If it had been stipulated in the loans that the payment 
should be made In gold francs, in specie, than there would have been a case of force 
majeure 
Both the Court and the French Government recognized the validity of the argument 
'that the existence of a circumstance making the performance of the obligation 
"absolutely Impossible" precluded the wrongfulness of conduct not In conformity with 
in fctem ρ 186 
112 PCIJ SertesA Nos 20/21 (Judgement 15),ρ 120 
113 PCIJ Series A Nos 20/21 (Judgement no. 14) ρ 39 - 40 
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the requirements of that obligation' They, however, did not consider the present 
situation to constitute such a circumstance ' ] 4 
According to the junsprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice, only 
an "absolute Impossibility to perform constitutes a valid ground for Invoking the 
defence of force majeure' Does the current difficult situation of the developing 
countries Justify an appeal to force majeure'* Does it constitute an unforeseen event 
beyond the country s control, which have made It materially Impossible for the State 
to act In conformity with Its obligation? The unforeseen event beyond the control of 
the country could be caused by economic factors or by an 'act of God" The 
analogy with the clausula rebus sic stantibus forces itself upon us Does the entena of 
unforeseen event Imply a subjective or an objective element? 
"Daher muß geklärt werden, ob das Element der Vorhersehbarheit bei der höheren 
Gewalt nur an die tatsächlichen Erwartungen der Partelen anknüpft - so wie das für 
die clausula befürwortet worden ist - oder ob das Kriterium jedenfalls in Grenzen 
objektiviert werden kann Die ILC neigt zur zweiten möglichkeit, sie versteht den von 
Ihr verwandten Begriff 'unforeseen event" so, daß "the occurence must have 
been neither foreseen nor of an easily foreseeable kind" Damit kämen auch 
Ereignisse, deren Eintritt objektiv nahelag, für die Herbeifürung einer Situation höher 
Gewalt nicht in Betracht Für dieses Ergebnis sprich auch der Nomnzweck einer 
Regelung der höheren Gewalt, welcher nur auf Umstände ziehen kann, die wirklich 
Überraschend kommen Anders als etwa bei der auf der Vertraglichen Willen der 
Partelen absielenden clausula muß sich die Unvorhersehbarkelt bei der höheren 
Gewalt an objektiven Kriterien onentieren"115 
Economic factors are by definition subject to change, they might either Improve or 
worsen, but they seldom remain the same In contrast with the clausula rebus sic 
stantibus, which takes the expectations which form the essential basis of the consent 
of the parties to be bound to the treaty Into consideration, the notion of force majeure 
does not take account of the subjective expectations of the parties Only the 
objectified expectations play a role In the process of determining whether there is a 
case of force majeure In general, economic factors will not qualify as unforeseen 
events. In the sense of Article 31. 
"Acts of God" are by their nature unforeseen and beyond the control of the 
country A crop failure due to a natural disaster might well give rise to the plea of force 
majeure It can cause the disappearance of the export product on which the country 
relies to earn Its foreign currency, the currency It needs to fulfil its obligations towards Its 
creditors If, like most countries In Africa, the country has to depend on one export 
product only, and the product has (temporarily) disappeared by an act of God, a 
country may well plead force majeure It will then be excused from performing Its 
obligations as long as the devastating effects of the disasters continue to be feit 
This brings us to the second condition of force majeure, the material Impossibility 
which a country may experience to act In conformity with Its obligations Does the lack 
of foreign currency due to a change In economic circumstances constitute an 
absolute Impossibility to perform? Following the reasoning which the ICJ set out In the 
Serbian and the Brazilian loans cases, we must come to the conclusion that 
impossibility to perform due to economic circumstances will hardly ever classify as 
force majeure, but is to be considered falling within the category of state of necessity 
With regard to the present day debt-crisis, the balance of payment difficulties of the 
Ж У а/Ьос*Я.С1979. оІІІ.рсігЛ p55,par 119 
115 Leyendecker, L ,op clt.p 206/207 
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developing countries do not qualify as force majeure Most countries still have foreign 
currency at their disposal, but they have decided to use the funds for other purposes, 
for example, the maintenance of public services, the well being of their people, etc 
Their inability to fulfil their obligations now stems from a consciously made decision 
and does not fulfil the requirements sets by the International Law Commission for force 
majeure This holds true, even If the decision has been reached owing to the force of 
circumstances 
Absolute Impossibility to pay due to economic factors might occur In the case of 
small States, which depend to a great extent upon the trade of one product 
(monoculture) or upon the public assistance of other countries to survive A relatively 
small alteration In these circumstances might cause enormous economic problems 
In these countries An absolute Impossibility to pay might then arise, but only If the 
State does not have any other possibility at Its disposal to raise the required amount of 
foreign currency ' 1 6 
In conclusion It can be said that force majeure, as formulated in Article 31, does not 
nowadays apply to a situation of balance of payment difficulties Since In most cases 
the State still has some means of payment, but decides, for good reasons, to 
appropnate the funds In another way, there Is not an absolute impossibility to pay, but 
a relative impossibility This, however, does not fall within the definition of force 
majeure, but might constitute a case of state of necessity 
2 4 State of necessity 
Like the concept of fundamental change of circumstances, state of necessity Is 
regarded as a pitfall by practitioners in international law But. like fundamental change 
of circumstances, it Is a very old notion In International law 
The ILC Commission Justified the Inclusion of state of necessity In the draft articles as 
follows 
"The notion of state of necessity Is too deeply rooted In general legal thinking for 
silence on the subject to be considered a sufficient reason for regarding the notion 
as totally Inapplicable In International law, and In any case, there would be no 
Justification for regarding It as totally so. The fact that abuses are feared - abuses 
which are avoidable If detailed and carefully worded provisions are adopted - is 
no reason to bar the legitimate operation of a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of conduct by a State in cases in which the utility of this ground is 
generally acknowledged In other words, the great majority of the Commission 
came to the view that any possibility of the notion of state of necessity being 
applied where It is really dangerous must certainly be prevented, but that this 
should not be so in cases where It is and will continue to be a 'safety valve' by 
means of which States can escape the Inevitable harmful consequences of trying 
at all cost to comply with the requirements of rules of law •'17 
It represents a logical limit to the application of the law ' , 8 
State of necessity fills the gap which has been left because of the narrow 
Interpretation of force majeure . In the sense of absolute or material' Impossibility 
116 Leyendecker, L , op clt ,p 211 
117 /earbook ILC. Vol II, part 2, ρ 49 par 31 
Bar boza, J .op clt .ρ 29 
11Θ Barbo za, J , op clt, ρ 28 
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State of necessity Implies a 'relative' Impossibility t o comply with an International 
obligation incumbent on the State.1 ^ 
The alleged situation of extreme peril does not have t o take the form of a threat to 
the life of individuals whose conduct Is attributed t o the State, but has t o represent a 
grave danger t o the existence of the State itself. Its political or economic survival, the 
continued functioning of Its essential services, the maintenance of internal p e a c e , the 
survival of a sector of Its population, the preservation of the environment of Its territory 
or part thereof, etc... 1 2 0 
The term 'state of necessity' Is used by the Commission to denote the situation of a 
State whose sole means of safeguarding an essential interest threatened by a grave 
a n d Imminent peril is t o adopt conduct not In conformity with what is required of it by a n 
International obligation.1 2 1 
In case of state of necessity, the conduct, not In conformity with what is required of 
the State by an International obligation. Is a d o p t e d In order to protect the State, or a 
fundamenta l Interest of the State, from a grave danger. This c o n d u c t has an 
undoubtedly intentional character; It Is c o n d u c t del iberately a n d knowingly 
undertaken, that Is not in conformity with an International obligation.1 2 2 
As In the case of force majeure and fortuitous event, the prior conduct of the State 
against which the act to be Justified has been commit ted, Is Irrelevant. The State 
against which the conduct is undertaken Is an Innocent State.1 2 3 
Article 33 has been drafted in a negative formulation to Indicate that the Invocation 
of this Article, like Article 62 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Is an 
except ion. 1 2 4 
"Necessity was a de facto situation in which a State, bound by an International 
obligation t o another State, refused to fulfil that obligation because by doing so it 
would Injure one of Its vital Interests."125 
119 YeaibooklLC 1980. Vol.1.16141h meeting, mr. P. Reuter, p.164, par.23. 
12D Addendum to the Eight Report on State Responsibility, Yearbook ILC 1980, Vol. II, part I, 
p.14, par. 2 and yearbook ILC 1980, Vol. П. part 2, p. 35, par. 3. 
The concept of State of necessity and self-preservation have sometimes been regarded 
In International law as Identical. This b, according to Special Rapporteur Ago, not correct: 
"... the concept of self-preservation can only be used to explain actions taken with a view 
to averting an extreme danger threatening the very existence of the State, whereas, 
according to the opinion that predominates today, the concept of Stale of necessity can 
be Invoked above all to preclude the wrongfulness of conduct adopted In certain 
conditions In order to protect an essential Interest of the State without Its existence being 
any way threatened. 
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htematlonal law In honour of Judge Manfred Lachs, ed. by J.Makarczyk, p. 236. 
123 yearbook/LC1980, Vol. 1,16121hmeeting,Mr.Ago.p. 154,par.40. 
124 yearbook ILC 1980, Vol.11, part 2, p.51,par.4 
Jagota , S.P., op.clt.. p.267. 
Salmon, J J.A., loc.clt.p.2M. 
125 yearbook Я.С 1980. Vol.1.16121h meeting. Mf.Ago.p.l54.pcir.41. 
Barboza. J., op.clt.. p.29 et seq. 
Salmon, J J Α., loc.clt.. p.240 
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Applicability to the debt problem 
A state of necessity, which precludes the wrongfulness of an action taken by a State, 
has to meet very strict conditions. The alleged situation must be of an absolutely 
exceptional nature. It does not have to be limited to a situation which endangers the 
existence of the State, but It should be one which Involves an 'essential' Interest of the 
State. The threat to the Interest of the State must be extremely grave, the occurrence 
of the situatton must be beyond the control of the State, and the conduct adopted 
must be the only means to avert this grave and imminent peril. The conduct adopted 
must be Indispensable In totality. Any action In excess of what is strictly necessary for 
that purpose Is Ipso facto a wrongful act. We can therefore distinguish five elements In 
these conditions: essential Interest, grave and Imminent peril, beyond the control of 
the State, exclusivity of the adopted conduct, and necessity.126 
a. essential Interest 
According to the ILC In Its commentary to Article 33, 'the extent to which a given 
Interest is "essential" naturally depends on all the circumstances In which the State Is 
placed In different specific situations; the extent must therefore be Judged In the light 
of the particular case into which the interest enters, rather than be predetermined In 
the abstract'.127 
The pivotal point Is the fact that a shortage of money may endanger the execution 
of essential tasks by the government. The Implementation of these tasks requires 
money, sometimes hard currency. These essential Interests are, among other things, 
the water supply, electricity supply, and maintenance of the Infrastructure (schools, 
hospitals, etc.). They Include tasks which fall explicitly within the State's responsibility to 
secure a certain level of public services. A State cannot be expected to give 
preference to the essential Interests of Its creditors over the Interests of its population 
In such an extreme situation J 2 8 
If a State comes to a point where it must choose between honouring the Interests of 
Its creditors or the essential Interests of Its population, It might choose to spent the little 
money It still has on the maintenance of basic public services. The protection of Its 
population's standard of living Is one of the first tasks of a government. In such extreme 
circumstances. It is Justified that a State allows the Interests of Its population prevail 
over the Interests of its creditors. Each particular case will have to be considered 
separately with a view to ascertaining whether It meets the condition that the situation 
Imposes a threat to an essential Interest. 
126 Yearbook ILC 1980. Vol.11, part 1, ρ. 19/20 par. 12 -15. 
A/C.6/35/SR. 59. par. 30 : - all conditions should b e met. 
Salmon, J.J.A., loc.clt.. p, 244 : mentions three conditions. 
127 yeort3oo(f/i.C1980.Vol.ll.partl.p.l9.par.12 
yearbook ILC 1980, Vol. II, part 2, p. 49.par. 32. 
Yearbook ILC 1980 Vol.1,1612th meeting, Mr. Ago,p.l54, par. 43.16131h meeting, p. 155, par. 
6,16141h meeting. Mr. Reuter,p.l64.par.26. 
Discussion In Sixth Committee : A/C.6/35/SR. 4950535455,57,59. 
128 In some cases the Interests of creditors are appraised In an extreme way .This could lead 
to situations such as that which arose In Romania In 1989. The country did not have a 
foreign debt, but the price the population had to pay was far too high: abject poverty 
among the population and a breakdown of almost all public services. 
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b. grave and Imminent peril 
The peril, as the ILC Commission points out in Its commentary to Article 33. must be 
extremely grave. It 'must have been a threat to the Interest at the actual time'.]29 
The current debt problems must disrupt the functioning of the State. The shortage 
of money must pose a grave and Imminent peril. The realization of essential interests 
must be hampered, or must be under threat. This condition indicates that the time-
element Is decisive. There should be a critical situation In which the problems which 
pose a threat to the essential Interests of the State do actually arise. Article 33 does not 
provide for future situations. It Is not possible to apply Article 33 In cases In which It is 
foreseen that in future, due to heavy debt servicing, problems will arise which will 
interfere with the proper execution of essential tasks by the State. 
c. beyond the control of the State 
The State 'must not Itself have provoked, either deliberately or by negligence, the 
occurrence of the State of necessity1.,30 In other words. It must not have contributed to 
the occurrence of the situation. During the discussion In the ILC Commission, this - very 
complex - condition was stressed. It is so complex because, as has been formulated 
by J.J.A.Salmon: 
' La négligence contributoire de l'Etat enfin suscite aussi des questions car dans 
très nombreuses hypothèses l'Etat qui invoque l'état de nécessité a eu une part 
Importante sinon determinate dans la naissance des conditolns de fait créant 
l'état de nécessité. Que l'on pense par example à une situation économique 
calmlteuse. Ella sera toujours plus ou moins le fruit d'une politique économique 
choisi par l'Etat en cause.-131 
To what extent does the requirement apply that a State should not have contributed 
to the emergence of the situation which endangers the essential Interests of the State? 
The financial difficulties which have occurred are brought about, apart from by 
external factors, by the economic and financial policies pursued by the State. In my 
opinion this criterion should not be Interpreted too strictly. An appeal to article 33 
should not be dismissed on the ground that the State has contributed to the 
emergence of the situation simply because it carried out a certain economic and 
financial policy. What is crucial Is that the present situation has not been brought 
about deliberately by the State and that the State demonstrates or has demonstrated 
the willingness to pursue a sound economic and financial policy. This willingness could 
be expressed In, for example, a stand-by agreement, which the State has entered 
Into with the International Monetary Fund. A reason for granting the plea of state of 
necessity In these circumstances Is the possible endangerment of the execution of 
the new economic and financial policy. If the State were be forced to comply with Its 
financial obligations towards its creditors, there would be no funds available to 
Implement the new economic policy, which was tailored to revitalise the economy. In 
1» yeo/boc*//.C1980.Vol.ll,part2,p.49,por.33 
This part of the draft has been crltlzlsed rather heavily. Inter alia Yearbook ILC 1980, Vol.1. 
1614th meellng, Mr. Reuter, p.164, par. 26 and 1615th meellng. Mr. Sahovlc, p. 169, paf.9 
Salmon, J.J.A., toc.ctt..p.251 et seq. 
130 У о Ф о о к И.С1980. Vol.11, part 2. p.50,par.34. 
131 Salmon. J.J.A.. Jbc.c/f..p.262 et seq. 
Yeaibook ILC 1980. Vol.1,16171h meeting. Mr. Yankov, p.173, par. 3. 
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α sense, the creditors would undermine the future credibility of the debtor if they were 
to insist upon payment in these extreme circumstances. 
d. exclusivity 
The conduct adopted by the State must have been the only means of averting the 
danger. As the ILC Commission states In its commentary, the adoption by that State of 
conduct not in conformity with an international obligation binding It to another State 
must definitely have been Its only means of warding off the extremely grave and 
Imminent peril which it apprehended. In other words, the peril must not have been 
escapable by any other means, even more costly ones, that could be adopted In 
compliance with International оЫ^о^о^' . 1 3 2 
In short there should not be another opportunity for the State to acquire money. This 
does not Imply, however, that the State Is compelled to sell vital State properties, such 
as railways, schools and hospitals. It has been suggested that a State could 
overcome Its shortage of money by raising taxes. This Is only a viable way out In 
cases In which the debts are nominated In the currency of the State or In cases where 
the own currency is fully convertible. One of the main features of the present debt crisis 
Is the fact that the debtors have a shortage of hard currency. 
e. necessity 
"And the State must not go beyond what was strictly necessary to safeguard that 
Interest. Any excess, either In proportion or In time, must be regarded as wrongful. 
As soon as such action was no longer "necessary", no excuse of necessity could 
justify it."133 
It Is crucial to determine whether a plea of State of necessity Implies a freeze on all 
debts or only a freeze on certain debts. Is It possible for a State to specify which debts 
constitute a direct threat towards the essential Interests of the State and which debts 
do not? In my opinion, it Is not possible to make such a division. The debt problem of a 
country has been shaped by an accumulation of debts. The total sum of payment on 
principle and Interest are at the root of its financial difficulties.134 
The emergence of a state of necessity does Justify a moratorium on all the external 
debts of a State during the period In which the extreme situation exists. However, to 
allow the state of necessity as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. It is obligatory 
all five conditions are met. 
A defence appeal of force majeur has frequently been made before either the 
Permanent Court of International Justice or the International Court of Justice and other 
international tribunals In cases where financial difficulties were a cause for non-
fulfilment of obligations entered Into. Now, due to the changes In the notions of both 
force majeure and state of necessity, such appeals would not be made on the 
grounds of force majeure, but of state of necessity. 
132 аіЬоок ILC 1980. Vol.11, p a r t 2. ρ 49, par. 33 a n d A/C.6/35/SR. 45 a n d 5 2 . 
133 Yearbook ILC 1980. Vol.l, 1612th m e e t i n g . Mr. A g o , p. 154, par. 44. 
Salmon. J J Α., bc.clt.. p.245. 
134 As will be discussed In Chapter 5, the figure of preferential creditor Is not known In public 
International law. The equal treatment of all creditors Is one of the basic principles of the 
renegotiation process within the Paris Club and the 'London' Club. An exception has been 
made with regard to debts owned to the IMF and Worldbank. 
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"The notion of state of necessity Is... often Invoked ... to justify conduct engaged In 
to safeguard, If not the state Itself, at least some of its vital Interests: ... preventing 
the State's bankruptcy by deferring payments of its debts . . . "J 3 5 
Although It has been generally accepted that state of necessity could play a role In 
financial difficulties, there Is still some opposition to the Idea: 
"It (a State, edv.) would not be In such a situation If mere financial obligations were 
Involved, for It was always possible to cope with the situation by means other than 
emergency measures... Such cases should be settled by the parties concerned In 
the light of prevailing circumstances, which could Initiate the effects of the 
emergency act ion taken,- there would, however, be no reason to preclude the 
wrongfulness of such action. If a developing country was unable to repay a loan, 
an arrangement could be made to facil itate the servicing of the debt or to 
reschedule the debt."136 
During the deliberations in the Commission, Mr. Pinto also made It clear that he did not 
regard the notion of state of necessity as a useful instrument for the developing 
countries. It would only work In a counter productive way since other countries would 
refuse loans to the developing countries at a later stage.137 
However, as was clearly stated by the special Rapporteur, It is not a case of 
unwillingness to pay, but of imminent peril which Justifies a plea of "state of necessity". 
If we look at the Jurisprudence, we can distinguish a clear line. In the Russian Indemnity 
case both parties agreed that a State's obligation to implement a treaty 'could give 
ground If the very existence, - or,«rather, the economic existence - of the State was 
Imperiled by performance of that obligation.138 The principle Itself had not been 
contested before the Permanent Court of Justice. 
In the Société Commercial de Belgique Case the defence, the Greek counci l , 
stated, before the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1939, that: "In this case In 
wh ich payment of t he deb t endangers economic life or jeopardises the 
administration, the Goverment Is ... authorized to suspend or even to reduce the 
service of debt".1 3 9 The Counsel of the Belgium Government did not contest this 
principle, but challenged Its validity In this particular case. 
In preparation for the 1930 Codification Conference, a questionnaire was submitted 
to the participants to which the South African government replied the following: 
"A State could not. for example, be expected to close Its schools, universities and 
courts, disband its police force and neglect Its public services to such an extend 
as to expose its community to chaos and anarchy, merely to provide the money 
where with to meet its foreign moneylenders."140 
The principle of applicability of State of necessity with regard to financial difficulties 
seems to be excepted, although a few exceptions remain. The main difficulty, 
however, is to determine whether a situation exists In which the fulfilment of financial 
obligations will threaten the very existence of the State, or will threaten, at least, some 
of Its vital Interests. 
State of necessity may be Invoked legitimately by the debtor State as a 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness If the situation fulfils the above mentioned 
requirements. The fact that the debt servicing places debtor States In such a situation 
135 VearbooJcÄ.C1979.Vol.l l.paitl.p.48. 
136 Mr. Ushakov. YearbookILCWSO.VoU. p. 165. 
137 Mr. Rnto , Yearbook LC1980. Vol. I, p. 178. 
138 YeaitoooklLC 1980. Vol. I,p. 157. 
139 Veart)oc*lC1980,Vol.ll,partl,p.25. 
1« YeatbooklLC 1980. Vol. I,p. 157. 
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that they are no longer able to conduct their essential tasks and therefore endangers 
the well-being of Its people. Justifies the choice of the debtor State to use its scarce 
hard currency for goods and services that will be of benefit for Its people. In spite of the 
fact that there is hard currency available for the debtor State, there is no duty for the 
debtor to comply with Its obligations at all costs. 
Although the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility are only applicable to the relationship between debtor 
State and creditor State, the principles under scrutiny in this chapter are Incorporated 
In most national law systems. One can expect that those principles might also have an 
Influence upon the relationship of the debtor State and Its commercial creditors. 
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UNILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MEASURES BY DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 
Introduction 
If α State Is confronted with debt-servicing problems this will reveal itself in its Inability to 
comply with its repayments obligations. A debtor country does not have the required 
foreign currency at Its disposal to repay Its credltor(s) at the agreed time. 
A debtor State in default has several options to solve Its problems with Its debtors. It 
can either act unilaterally or it can act In cooperation with its creditors. If a State resorts 
to unilateral measures this generally means a total or partial blocking of the flow of 
foreign currency leaving the country. If a debtor country decides to solve Its financial 
difficulties with the help of Its creditors, it has to maken an appeal for renegotiation of its 
debts within either the Paris Club or the 'London Club'. These renegotiations might lead 
either to a rescheduling, a restructuring, or a refinancing of the debts, or to a 
combination of these forms. Another option that might be taken by the participants of 
the negotiation process could be the (partial) writing-down of the debt. 
In reality not all renegotiations will succeed or bring about the desired results in the 
eyes of the debtor country. In such a case, the debtor has the opportunity to take one­
sided measures, such as (temporary) suspension of repayment, relating the amount 
to be repaid to export revenues, or even refusing repayment altogether. 
How are such measures to be classified; do they have a legal basis? Can the 
creditor take steps against an unwilling debtor, a debtor In arrears? 
The Hague Convention, the so-called Drago Porter Convention of 1907 on limitation 
of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts, excluded the 
possibility of bombing or invading the debtor country In order to recover the debt. ! Nor 
was It possible any longer for the creditor to appoint a receiver In bankruptcy to 
supervise the finances of a country.2 
During the Interbellum it became practice to solve the problems between a debtor 
and creditor country by way of renegotiations, which were embodied In treaties. In 
1939, the League of Nations proposed the creation of an International tribunal for debts 
(Tribunal International des Emprunts). This was planned as an Institutional framework 
within which the participants had the opportunity to negotiate. This tribunal never 
came Into existence, due to the outburst of the Second World War.3 
After WW II It became common practice to renegotiate debts. The question 
remains, however, whether there is any other option open to the creditor besides the 
1 Schwarzenberger. G.. State bankruptcy and International law; International law and Its 
sources. Liber Amlcorum Maarten Bos, ed. by W.P. Heere, Kluwer 19Θ9, p. 141. 
He mentions three exceptions to this principle of the non-use of force: 
- refusal of an offer of arbitration or neglect to reply; 
- preventing of a compromise from being agreed on; and 
- after completion of an aibllratlon. fallire to submit to the award. 
2 This was done In 1875 by the major creditor countries In the case of Egypt. 
Terray. J., Sovereign restructuring under cMI law; IFLR. Aug. 1984, p. 23. 
3 Carreau, С , Le rééchelonnement de la dette extérieure des Etats, J.D.I.. 1985, p. 8. 
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renegotiation of debts Is there a possibility for the creditor to take unilateral action? 
Does the creditor, in particularly a commercial creditor, have the opportunity to bring 
the case before a national court In order to enforce the compliance of an unwilling 
debtor with its financial obligation? To what extent is the fact that the debtor Is a 
sovereign State of any relevance? Are the legal concepts. Inherent in the sovereign 
character of the debtor, of sovereign Immunity and the act of State insurmountable 
obstacles'' 
At present, the most feasible solution seems to be one In which all parties 
concerned strive for a remedy which will revive the debtor country's economy and at 
the same time ensure the resumption of the repayment of the Interest and the 
principle amount 
What are the alms for the parties? "For the debtor-country, the mam goals In the 
renegotiations are not only to obtain a grace period and then a restructuring of 
existing external debts, but also to receive new credits - fresh money1 - indispensable 
for maintaining or restoring the country's International liquidity Fresh money Is the 
strongest motivation for the country to conduct fast and effective renegotiations"A 
The creditor participates In the process of debt renegotiation because of the 
expectation that repayment of the principle and the Interest will be more probable in 
the case of an evenly distributed burden of debt repayment upon the debtor 
The request for debt renegotiation is put by the debtor-country to the Pans Club in 
the case of official debts, and to the London Club' in the case of private debts The 
request for debt renegotiations is only put to the Pans Club by the debtor country at the 
time when actual arrears in pa/ment have occurred 5 
The creditor cannot call a debtor State to the negotiation-tables nor can the 
creditor declare a debtor State bankrupt6 Respect for the sovereignty of a State Is a 
hindrance for the creditor Before the renegotiations commence the creditors usually 
requests the debtor to enter Into a stand-by arrangement with the International 
Monetary Fund, in which conditions for economic policies, aimed at restoring the 
economy of the debtor country, are laid down Normally only after an agreement has 
been reached with its official creditor In the Pans Club will a debtor turn to Its 
commercial creditors, the 'London Club', In order to request a renegotiation of Its 
commercial debts 
1 Unilateral measures taken by the debtor State to regulate the outflow of foreign 
currency 
A State with debt-servicing difficulties may formally default upon Its debt-servicing 
obligations, which is a requirement for the renegotiation of the external debt of a 
country within the Pans Club, or It may resort to unilateral action 
4 Horn, Ν , The crisis of International lending and legal aspects of crisis management, 
Adaptation and renegotiation of contacts In International trade and finance, edited by N 
Hom ρ 299 
Also Р ідп у. G . Aspects Juridiques de la réorganisation des créances bancaires sur des 
emprunteurs étatiques. Journal de Droit des Affaires International \Л<№Ь. ρ 352 
5 This requirement has been Introduced because the official creditors need to be 
convinced that there Is absolutely no possibility for the debtor State to make repayments 
As a second reason can be submitted the fact that the creditors still remain of the opinion 
that renegotiation of sloan must be regarded as an exceptional situation 
6 Carreau,Ό .op cit.ρ 20. 
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This unilateral action will focus upon the protection of the financial Interest and the 
foreign reserve position of the country. The measures taken are designed t o regulate 
the flow of foreign currency leaving the country. Restrictions upon these transactions 
will be declared by w a y of exchange control measures. The basis for the lawful 
declaration of these measures is to be found In the principle of monetary sovereignty 
which is part of the sovereignty of each country. These measures allow a State not 
only t o frustrate the execution of its own loans-contracts, but also to intervene in the 
contracts It has with commercial banks and In the contracts its nationals have 
concluded with foreign nationals. 
Interstate loans require little comment. International law does not permit a State to 
hide behind Its own national laws to Justify the breach of a treaty. Such a breach will 
give rise t o State responsibility, except when It Is due to a circumstance which 
precludes wrongfulness.7 
In the case of other kinds of contracts, commercial state contracts and private 
contracts. It is necessary to Investigate whether the exercise of monetary sovereignty 
will have a legally valid effect upon them, that Is, whether the measures taken to 
control foreign exchange reserves are a valid ground for non-performance of the 
legal obligations arising out of such contracts. 
1.1 The Act of State doctrine 
There are three ways In which a State can protect Its foreign exchange reserves: by 
temporary suspension of payments (par. 1.2); by reduction of payment t o a certain 
percentage of its export revenues (par. 1.3); a n d , by permanent suspension of 
payments (repudiation, par. 1.4). These measures amount t o a restriction of the 
outflow of foreign currency, to an exchange control.8 
Exchange control regulations a n d the management of the flow of money within 
a n d out of the country are Instruments which the State had at Its disposal to manage Its 
currency, although these measure are subject to the approval of the IMF.' 
"Control of national currency and of foreign exchange Is a necessary attribute of 
sovereignty." , 0 
This Implies that the enactment of exchange control regulations by the authorities of 
debtor countries should be considered as an action within the Act of State doctrine, 
provided that the conditions for the application of this doctrine are satisfied. ' 1 
"Every State is bound to respect the Independence of every other sovereign State, 
and the courts of one country will not sit In Judgement of acts of another done within 
Its own territory. Redress as grievance by reason of such act must be obtained 
through the means open to be availed by sovereign powers as between 
themselves".,2 
7 See Chapter 4. 
8 Sllard. S.A.. Exchange controls and external Indebtedness: are the Bretton Woods 
concepts still workable? A perspective from the International Monetary Fund; Houston 
Journal of Intemationol Law. Vol. 7,1984, no. 1., p. 60. 
9 Decision no. 5392 - (77/63), April 29,1977. 
Ю Naamloze Vennootschap Suiker-Fabriek v. Chose Natl Bank of New York, 1953. 
11 Gold. J., Exchange control: Act of State, public policy. The IMF's Articles of Agreement, 
and other complications: Houston Journal of International Law. Vol. 7,1984, no. 1, p. 22. 
12 Undeitilllv. Fernandez. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).p. 254. 
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The Judgement of 1897 forms the basis of the Act of State doctrine in the United States, 
which is regarded as the birthplace of the modern Act of State doctrine.13 The 
characteristics of the doctrine, as laid down In this judgement, are the limitation to acts 
conducted on Its own territory and the referral of the plaintiff to the Executive to solve 
the problem via diplomatic channels. The basis for this Judgement, the attitude 
towards an Act of State, lies In 'International comity and expediency'.14 
The foreign government's acts, conducted within Its own territory, remained, until 
the Second World War, sacrosanct In the eyes of the American Judges. This, of 
course, led to judgements which were unfair.,5 The Sabbatino case In 1964 marked the 
end of the rigid standpoint of the American judiciary on the Act of State doctrine. The 
question, as posed In this case, was whether the American judge was allowed to 
Judge the legality of the Cuban nationalisation acts against the rules of public 
International law. Did the Act of State doctrine prevent him from putting the acts of a 
foreign government to the test? 
The Supreme Court came to the following ruling: 
"Rather than laying down or reaffirming an Inflexible and all-encompassing rule In 
this case, we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a 
taking of property within Its own territory by a foreign sovereign, extant and 
recognized by this country at the time of suit. In the absence of a treaty or other 
unambiguous agreement, regarding controlling legal principles, even if the 
complaint alleges that the taking violates customar/ International law". 
The application of public international law has not been excluded beforehand, but It Is 
obvious that the Judiciary will not take the lead In such an approach.16 
Contrary to this point-of-vlew, abstention unless agreed to by the Executive was the 
public reaction. It amounted to the Hlnkenlooper Amendment, which stipulated that a 
Judge In the United States of America was not allowed to dismiss a case In which the 
plaintiff contests the validity of an act of a foreign government. Only if the President of 
the United States of America has explicitly given notice that the application of the Act 
of State doctrine is required. Is the Judge not allowed to test whether the foreign 
government's act is consistent with the rules of public international law. The 
Hlckenlooper Amendment Is a reaction to the Sabbatino-case, and since It is tailor-
made for nationalisation-cases, we might ask whether this amendment Is valid for 
other governmental acts than the taking of foreign property.17 
The question has arisen whether unilateral measures taken by the debtor State to 
regulate the outflow of foreign currency could be seen as taking of foreign property. If 
so, at least In the U.S.A., the courts would be able to Judge the acts of the foreign 
governments. This follows from the Hlckenlooper Amendment. In the case Wesf v. 
Multlbanco Comermex. S.A. the court dismissed the pledge that the Imposition of 
exchange controls amounted to taking of foreign property In violation of international 
law.1 8 Such behaviour is in conformity with international law, and in this case, the 
13 Fllnterman, С , Act of State doctrine, p. 12. 
14 Wem, p. 12-17. 
15 Bersteln-case: "... Even though we assume that a German court would have held the 
transfer unlawful at the time It was made that would be Irrelevant. We have repeatedly 
declared ... that a court of the Forum will not undertake to pass on the validity under the 
municipal law of another State of the acts of officials of that State, purporting to act as 
such'. 
16 Fllnterman, C o p . cit., p. 23 et seq. 
17 Idem. p. 26 et seq. 
18 West v. Multlbanco Comermex. S.A.. U.S. Court of Appeals, 91h Clr., January 6.1987; French 
v. Banco National de Cuba, 1973. 
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measures were non-dlscrimlnatory In nature. The court also a t t a c h e d value to the fact 
that the legal department of the IMF had supported the position of the government 
that the exchange control measures were consistent with the Articles of Agreement of 
the IMF.19 
The conclusion which c a n be drawn from the Sabbatino case, the Hlckenlooper 
Amendment a n d the reactions t o it Is 'that the American Judge only permits a limited 
International law exception t o the Act of State doctrine. The Judge cannot test the act 
of a foreign government against a rule of public International law, If such a rule is written 
or If general consensus exists with respect to the rule'.2 0 
The A c t of State doctr ine, as d e v e l o p p e d In the United States, has three 
characteristics. It should concern 'an act of a foreign State by which that State has 
exercised Its Jurisdiction to give effect t o Its public interest'; the act has to have effect 
within the territory of the foreign State, which Is a consequence of the respect due t o 
the sovereignty which the State enjoys within its own territory; a n d thirdly, an Act of 
State may be put to the test of International public law, as long as It Is embodied In a 
'treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles', the 
International law e x c e p t i o n . 2 1 The question arises whether exchange control 
measures In general a n d their manifestations d o qualify as an Act of State which has 
t o be respected by foreign courts. 
1.2 Foreign Exchange Controls 
A State which has run Into payments arrears on Its foreign debt Is In shortage of foreign 
exchange, foreign currency. It will be forced to set priorities with regard to the 
spending of Its money. Payments on contracts for the import of primary commodities 
and food will be favoured; contracts of private persons are most likely to be hit by the 
restrictions put upon the outflow of foreign currency. 
If a State turns to the IMF, which is a prerequisite for debt renegotiations with Its 
creditors. It will be requested to pursue a restrictive monetary policy. It will then be 
difficult for private debtors to obtain Internally the money necessary to comply with 
their financial obligations. The consequences, arising out of the policy of economic 
adjustment, do not have a legal Impact upon the relationship between the private 
debtors and their creditors.22 
This may be different If the State Imposes a (temporary) moratorium or otherwise 
restricts payments by way of the implementation of exchange controls.23 In the 
Articles of Agreement of the IMF exchange controls are recognized as tools of 
national law and policy, that may contribute to the restoration of a balanced balance 
of payments.24 
19 Kahale III, G. & Plzzuro. J., Mexican exchange control case dismissed, /FU? March 1987, p. 
27. 
2D Idem, p. 35. 
21 Idem. p. 29-33. 
22 Leyendecker, L, op. cit.. p. 110. 
23 A c c o r d i n g t o F. Albino, the defaul t that t h e n occurs has or iginated from the country's 
Inability t o g e n e r a t e foreign currency. Under International law this Is typically a force 
majeure. As has b e e n discussed In Chapter 4. this might not b e the right characterization, 
but tt-Js does not rule out the f a c t that If the default of the debtor Is caused by the Inability 
of Its country to generate the foreign currency It needs. It may have a legal Impact u p o n 
the debtor-creditor relationship. АІЫпо, F.. Brazil says. 'No more', I.F.L.R.. June 1987, p. 22. 
& Idem, p. 54. 
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But α member may not Impose restrictions on the making of payments and 
transfers for current international transactions, without the approval of the Fund 2 5 
There are limits to this requirement 
a It applies only to payments and transfers for International transactions, 
b It applies only to current transactions; 
с It applies to payments and transfers for transactions, not to the transactions 
themselves, 
d it applies to the making, not to the receipt, of payments; 
e It applies only to restrictions Imposed by a member-country 2Ò 
The payments must be between a resident and a non-resident. Article VIII, Section 2 
(b) does not apply to internal payments And It must concern current transactions as 
defined In art XXX, and not capital transactions.27 
The payments of principle and Interest on foreign loans do fall within the scope of 
Article XXX (d) and are current transactions Thus a member may impose exchange 
controls, with the approval of the Fund The Fund has declared that 'the guiding 
principle in ascertaining whether a measure Is a restriction on payments and transfers 
for current transactions under Article VIII, section 2, Is whether It Involves a direct 
governmental limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such 28 
If exchange control regulations are In conformity with the Fund's Articles of 
Agreement, an exchange contract which Is contrary to such controls will be 
unenforceable In the territories of any member.29 
Is a loan contract between a debtor and his commercial creditor, governed by 
private law. an exchange contract? What Is meant by currency "involved", and 
which point of time is important with regard to the lawful application of the exchange 
control regulations, the making or the performance of the contract? 
"An exchange contract Is a contract providing either for a payment or transfer of 
foreign exchange, or for an International payment or transfer (I e , a payment 
between a resident and a non-resident, or a transfer of funds from one country to 
another)" 30 
25 Article VIII. Section 2 (a). 
Ά Glanvltl. F . The International Monetary Fund and external debt. RdC 1989-111. ρ 270-272 
27 Article XXX (d) 'Payments for current transactions means payments which are not for Ihe 
purpose of transferring capital and Include, without limitation 
(1) all payments due In connection with foreign trade, other current business Including 
services, and normal short term banking and credit facilities, 
(2) payments due as interest on loans and as net Income from other Investments, 
(3) payments of moderate amounts for amortization of loans or for depreciation of direct 
Investment and 
(4) moderate remittances for family living expenses 
The Fund may, after consultation with the members concerned, determine whether 
certain specific transactions are to be considered current transactions or capital 
transactions" 
ЗВ Dedslonno 1034-(60/27) June 1,19Ó0 
The concept of restriction In Article Vili, section 2 (a) Is Independent of the motivation that 
has prompted the members to take the measure 
Glanvlll.F,op ctt.p 272 
29 Article VIII. section 2 (b) "Exchange contracts which Involve the currency of any member 
and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained 
or Imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable In the territories of 
any member' 
3D Glanvlll. F. op cit. ρ 275 
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This definition c a n be interpreted In a narrow way, as 'contracts for the exchange of 
one currency for another', as has been done by the British and New York courts, and in 
a broader way, as Including 'all contracts giving rise to International payments, such 
as sales, loans, etc.', as has been done by other courts and which is In concurrence 
with the Fund's Interpretation.3 1 
The narrow interpretation Is t o o restricted In the view of the IMF. Economic 
transactions which Influence the balance of payment or af fect the exchange 
resources of a country are regarded as exchange contracts. 3 2 The payment of the 
principle or Interest on a loan Is to be seen as an exchange contract. 
The currency 'Involved' c a n also be Interpreted in t w o ways. The narrow 
Interpretation, the currency Is the subject matter of the obligation flowing from the 
contract, would mean that a country is unable t o put restrictions on the use of foreign 
currency resources, since It Is mostly not Its own currency that is used In the 
International transactions. This Interpretation would frustrate the purpose of Article VIII, 
section 2 (b), which is to protect the external resources of a member. 3 3 The broader 
Interpretation, the currency 'Involved' Is the currency of the member in which there Is 
an effect on the balance of payments or on exchange resources.34 
Is the date on which the loan contract Is made or the date of performance of the 
loan c o n t r a c t crucial for the enforcement of e x c h a n g e control regulations? 
According t o most authors, the time of performance is the time to assess whether the 
condit ions of the c o n t r a c t are contrary t o the exchange control regulations, 
consistent with the regulations of the Articles of Agreement which are in force. This Is In 
a c c o r d a n c e with the purpose of Article VIII, section 2 (b), which is the temporary 
protection of foreign exchange resources and the balance of payments. If the time of 
making of the contract would be decisive, the measures currently taken to protect the 
country's reserves and balance of payments would be disregarded.3 5 
In Its decision no. 3153-(70/95) of October 26, 1970, the IMF d e c i d e d that 'undue 
delays In the availability or use of exchange for current international transactions that 
result from a governmental limitation give rise to payments arrears and are payments 
restrictions under article VIII, sec. 2 (a)...' 
31 "These restrictions are not limited to restrictions on exchange of currencies, but Include 
restrictions on payments for sales and other current transactions. These are exchange 
control regulations In the sense of Art. VIII, sec. 2 (b) and It may be concluded that the 
word 'exchange' In 'exchange contracts' has the same broad meaning as In 'exchange 
control regulations'. 
Glanvltl,F.,op.cff.,p.277. 
32 'They can affect exchange resources because they represent an addition to or 
diminution of the assets or liabilities of a country In the sense that ultimately they could 
Increase, reduce, or forgo an Increase In the reserves of the monetary authorities of a 
country'. 
G o l d . J.. The Fund Agreement tn the courts X, p. 79. 
33 Glanvitl. F.. op. cit., p. 277. 
34 'It has been the practice to speak of the' currency that Is Involved, but a balance of 
payments Is a statement of the transactions of a country with other coLntries'. 
Gold, J., Fund Agreement In courts X. p. 79/80. 
36 Gold, J.. Fund Agreements In the Courts. 1962. p. 62-66. 
Glanvitl. F.. op. cit.. p. 277/278. 
Contrary F.A. Молл In the Legal Aspects of Money. 4th edition. 1982, p. 378: In his view, 
Article VIII, section 2 (b) supports his view that the time of the making Is the relevant point In 
time. He states that Article VIII, section 2 (b) Is meant to avoid evasion of exchange 
regulations, which Is possible only at the time of conclusion of the contract (draft of the 
article), and that the text clearly states 'contracts which ... are contrary', which Implies 
that contracts which at the date of their conclusion are consistent with, but during their 
Ives become contrary to the regulations, cannot be caught by such a text. 
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If exchange controls, which are Imposed by the debtor State, comply with the 
requirements of Article VIII, section 2 (a), what will be the effect on the law of the 
contract? Does this Imply that the Act of State doctrine has been eliminated? In the 
Sabbatino case it was stated that the Act of State doctrine does not apply when a 
treaty or other unambiguous agreement Is applicable. The Fund's Articles of 
Agreement are a treaty, and. It could be concluded. Article VIII, section 2 (a) 
overrides the national law of the States who are member of the IMF.36 
The question is whether Article VIII, section 2 (a) Itself binds the national courts and 
whether the Interpretation given by the IMF or the Interpretation given by the court Itself 
Is decisive.37 The exchange contract which Is contrary to the exchange control 
regulations Is unenforceable. This does not mean that such an exchange contract Is 
Invalid; It means 'that judicial or administrative authorities will refrain from enforcing an 
exchange contract and will refrain whether or not a party has relied on the exchange 
control regulations'. It means that the Judicial or administrative authorities of other 
member countries will not render assistance to the party who seeks enforcement of 
such a contract.38 
In the case of Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., before the U.S. Court of Appeals It was 
argued that the Act of State doctrine should not be applied to the imposition of the 
exchange controls Imposed by the government because of the existence of a 
treaty, the IMF Agreement, which governed this act. The Court, however, dismissed 
this reasoning. It questioned whether the IMF Agreement is an 'unambiguous 
agreement' as referred to In the Sabbatino case.39 
In the Judgements of various courts there Is a distinct lack of consistency In the 
scope and meaning of Article VIII and its Impact on the Act of State doctrine. In par. 7 
of this chapter an attempt will be made to map the different attitudes. 
1.3 Moratorium 
If a State Imposes a moratorium on the payment of principal and Interest, it unilaterally 
alters the conditions of a loan agreement or loan contract. The Introduction of 
exchange control regulations, which is what a moratorium amounts to. Is an act of 
national legislation. 
In Its relations with Its State creditors, the debtor State cannot appeal to Its national 
legislation. International public law does not permit a State to hide behind its own laws 
In Its relations with other State. In general, therefore, the Imposition of a (temporary) 
suspension of payment is unlawful and will Incur State responsibility, unless, of course, 
one of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness, as summed up In Chapter 4, Is 
applicable. 
With regard to the non-fulfilment of the claims of Its commercial creditors, the State 
Is allowed a larger latitude than in Its relations with Its State creditors.40 In its relations with 
36 Ebenroth, CT., Banking on the act of state, p. 44. 
37 O'Connell. D.P.. International law. Vol. II, 2nd ed. , p. 1022. 
38 Gold, J., Fund Agreement In the courts. 1962. p. 61-2. 
A note written by J. Gold as a reaction to F.A. Mann's book, the Legal Aspects of Money, 
In which Mann states that unenforceability Is to be seen as Invalidity of the contract. And 
an Invalid contract cannot be made valid, but an unenforceable contract may become 
enforceable again. 
3? Callejo v. Bancomer. S.A.. U.S. Court of Appeals, 5th Clr., July 8,1985. 
4D Leyendecker, L., op.clt., p. 100. 
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commercial creditors the law of the contract is national law. In the proper law of the 
contract a State may be permitted t o unilaterally alter its performance. If this Is 
required by the "public interest".4 ' 
A moratorium imposed by a debtor State Is a manifestation of its monetary 
sovereignty. Such an act Is t o be regarded as an Act of State as long as it Is Imposed 
Indiscriminately, which means it touches upon all relations with foreign commercial 
creditors, and Is not arbitrary. 
To what extent this Act of State plays a part In the relationship between private 
debtors a n d private creditors will be discussed In par. 7. Does a private debtor have 
the possibility t o refer t o the national regulation, which is the cause of his Inability to 
comply with his obligations towards his creditors, before a foreign court? Is a 
moratorium regarded as an Act of State outside the territory of the State Imposing 
such measures? 
1.4 Limitation of the debt sen/Icing to a certain percentage of the export revenues 
On the 28th of July 19Θ5, President Garcia of Peru declared that his country would limit Its 
payments of its foreign debt to 10 % of its export revenues. Just like the moratorium, the 
unilateral limitation of debt-servicing to a percentage of the export revenue. Is 
unlawful In International public law. A State can only Impose this measure validly If 
there are circumstances which preclude the apparent wrongfulness of such an act. 
In Its relations with its State creditors a State can only appeal to Its self-imposed 
limitation on the payment of a foreign debt if the measure Is enforced due to 
overriding economic circumstances, which qualify as a state of necessity. The 
conditions of a state of necessity, as outlined In Chapter 4, must be met. The limitation 
of debt-servicing, which Is a form of exchange control. Is an Act of the State based 
upon monetary sovereignty. To what extent this may serve as a defence for the State 
In a lawsuit with its foreign creditors before a foreign court will be dealt with In par. 7, as 
will the possibilities for a private debtor to appeal to the national exchange control 
regulations. 
1.5 Repudiation 
The total repudiation of foreign debts by a State hardly ever occurs, it has only ever 
happened during a revolution, such as the overthrow of the Tsarist Regime in 1917. 
Even In situations such as these it has not been accepted as concurrent with the rules 
of public International law by most countries. In Chapter 3,1 stated that there should be, 
under certain circumstances, a possibility for a government which has ousted a 
former regime, to renounce certain debts. This Is nog a case of total repudiation, but 
of partial repudiation. 
Total repudiation of the foreign debt would be an act contrary to the rules of public 
International law. It Is hard to imagine that any of the circumstances mentioned In 
Chapter 3 or 4 would suffice as grounds for total repudiation. Repudiation of all foreign 
debts cannot be regarded as an act which falls within the limits of the ordinary 
exercise of monetary sovereignty by a State. It Is an Act of State, but It Is hard to 
41 fctem.p. lo i . 
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devise any rule of public International law which would legalise such behaviour. 
Repudiation gives rise to State responsibility. 
In the long term, total repudiation of foreign debts will have grave economic 
consequences, which will annul the short term economic benefits It achieves: 
"Debt repudiation may result In credit cut-off and other reprisals, resulting In terrible 
social and economic costs to the debtor nations. Debt repudiation therefore Is not 
in the interest of either creditor or nations or muttllateral financial institutions".42 
1.6 Conclusions with regard to unilateral measures taken by the debtor State to 
regulate the outflow of foreign currency 
Over the years several States have attempted to control the outflow of foreign 
exchange in various ways. These exchange control measures are expressions of the 
monetary sovereignty of the State. In general, they take the form of exchange 
regulations, moratoria on payments or a limitation of the debt-servicing to a 
percentage of the export revenues. 
Debtor States are forced to take these measures due to a lack of foreign reserves! 
They will have to set priorities with regard to spending their limited resources. This might 
be regarded as a state of necessity, a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of 
the breach of a loan-agreement, as discussed In Chapter 4. The debtor State can 
invoke this as a defense against Its official creditors. 
What effect do these measures have In the State's relationship with Its commercial 
creditors? Exchange control regulations are classified as an Act of State, since they 
are an expression of the monetary sovereignty of the State. If these regulations are In 
accordance with Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, the debtor country 
may Invoke this in a Judicial proceeding before a foreign court of a State member of 
the IMF. The court should, according to Article VIII, recognize the validity of these acts 
and is not allowed to give a ruling which would result In a Judgement that runs counter 
to these measures. 
Whether the courts do recognize these measures, taken In accordance with 
Article VIII, Is, however, questionable.43 
2 Unilateral action by the commercial creditor and State immunity 
2.1 Immunity from jurisdiction 
'Par in parem not habet Imperium' - one shall not exercise authority over one's equal. 
In other words. States are, In principle, not subject to each others Jurisdiction. The 
notion of State immunity has gradually evolved from an absolute sovereign Immunity 
to a relative state immunity.44 
42 Halle-Marian. Y., Legal and other Justifications for writing-off the debts of the poor third 
world countries: the case of Africa south of the Sahara, J.W.T.L. Vol.24 no. l , p.60 
A3 see Infra par. 5. 
44 In first Instance the doctrine of foreign state Immunity grew out of the personal Immunity 
enjoyed by Heads of State, but nowadays Immunity Is no longer derived from the 
sovereign. It Is now linked with the State. I think It Is therefore better to refer to relative state 
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Absolute Immunity implies that a State is, under all circumstances, indemnified 
from the c o m p e t e n c e of a foreign judge a n d from the judicial enforcement 
apparatus, irrespective of the nature of its acts Due to the f a c t that an Increasing 
amount of States (or State enterprises) frequently engage in International trade, a shift 
Is noticeable from the notion of absolute t o relative immunity For absolute Immunity 
would amount t o the fact that a State, contrary to Its commercial counterpart, would 
not be obl iged to fulfil Its contractual obligations outside its territory The commercial 
counterpart would have no judicial means t o enforce observance The notion of 
relative Immunity distinguishes between the acts of the State as a State, the acta lure 
Imperil a n d the commercial acts engaged In by the State, the acta lure gestiones 4 5 
When a State participates In international trade on equal terms as other commercial 
participants there is no reason t o bestow immunity upon it 
Nowadays, a State c a n be held t o Its contractual obligations by Its commercial 
counterpart However, immunity will be granted to the State if it has a c t e d as a State, In 
the case of an acta lure Imperii This Is a consequence of a State s sovereignty In the 
context of loan-agreement or commercial loan contracts, I will deal briefly with three 
codifications In the field of State immunity First t w o national acts, the American 
Foreign Sovereign Immunrty Act of 1976 and the English State Immunity Act of 197Θ, will 
be reviewed I have chosen these t w o because in commercial loan contracts the law 
of the State of New York is often designated as the appl icable law, English law Is 
otherwise designated as the appl icable law (London a major financial centre, the 
applicable law ) Secondly the ILC draft on State Immunity, as an attempt t o codify the 
existing rules on state Immunity Internationally will be discussed 4 6 In pract ice, the 
exception of State immunity does not pose a unsurmountable obstacle, since In most 
commercial loan contracts the sovereign has to abstain from the defence based on 
Immunity from jurisdiction This takes the shape of a waiver The above laws a n d 
convention d o recognize the possibility of validly abstaining, beforehand, from the 
exception before a foreign court 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act. 1976 
In the past, sovereign Immunity was always granted as soon as a foreign State was a 
party In a dispute before a court of the United States This was based upon a rule which 
was expressed in the Schooner Exchange ν McFaddon Case In 1812 4 7 
Immunity Instead of relative sovereign Immunity This Is In line with the names given to 
recent codification In the field of state Immunity 
45 The main problem of course Is to determine whether a n a c t of a foreign State Is to b e 
regarded as a governmental a c t or a commercial a c t 
There are t w o tests 
- the purpose of the act can be examined or 
- the nature of the act can be examined 
In general the nature test Is used most often at the moment to determine whether an 
act of a State Is commercial or not If only the purpose of the act Is used as a criterion the 
danger exists that the notion of relative Immunity would appear to be an empty shell After 
all many commercial acts performed by the State will be carried out In order to service 
an Interest of that State and are thus to be regarded as a public act of the State 
46 The Draft Articles have b e e n submitted to the General Assembly 
47 "One sovereign b e i n g In no respect a m e n a b l e to another, a n d b e i n g b o u n d by 
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nat ion, by placing 
himself or Its sovereign rights within the Jurisdiction of another c a n b e supposed to enter a 
foreign territory only under an express l icence or In the c o n f i d e n c e that the Immunities 
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The famous Tate Letter from 1952 softened this notion of absolute immunity 4 8 But a 
distinction between acta iure imperii and ocfa lure gestionis, which was made by the 
Foreign Office of the US government, was often more Inspired by reasons of political 
character than by reasons of a purely legal nature ю The FSIA reaffirms the trend, set 
by the Tate Letter, of restrictive state Immunity, the starting point Is that there is 
Immunity for foreign states before United States courts, but there are several 
exceptions to this Immunity 5° Whether or not a State can adduce validly the defence 
of state immunity Is to be decided by the court which has to rule upon the merits of the 
case ^ 
As stated above, the immunity from Jurisdiction Is not granted to a State when the 
act under consideration Is a 'commercial activity carried on In the United States by a 
foreign State'5 2 In § 1603 (d) the nature test, rather than the purpose test, Is chosen to 
determine the character of the act of the foreign State 
As discussed in Chapter 3, within International law, an Act of State has to be 
attributable to a State Is the conclusion of a loan contract with a commercial bank by 
a State to be considered as a governmental/public act or as a commercial activity? 
The FSIA does not explicitly characterize loan contracts as either a commercial or a 
non-commercial activity by a State But nowadays It Is quite certain that when a State 
enters Into a loan contract with a commercial bank this Is a commercial activity If it is 
concerned with borrowing or lending of money .. and similar activities of the kind 
belonging to his Independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are 
reserved by Implication and will be extended to him" 
48 "Immunity only In those restricted Instances In w h i c h the acts of a friendly foreign State 
were of a public or sovereign nature rather than being simply private or c o m m e r c i a r 
49 The Foreign Sovereign Immunity A c t (FSIA) has as o n e of Its alms "to r e d u c e foreign 
pol icy Implications of sovereign Immunity determinations a n d assure litigants that such 
crucial decisions are m a d e on purely legal grounds, a n aim that was to b e accompl ished 
by transferring responsibility for such a decision from t h e execut ive b r a n c h t o the 
Judiciary" 
50 The s c o p e of state Immunity Is from local Jurisdiction, n o t f rom legal responsibility, 
Delaume G R A Ä . V d 71 (1977),ρ 400 
In the Restatement of the Law TNrd of 1986 In section 401 the theory of restrictive Immunity 
Is presented as a general i t i e of International law "Under International law, a State or state 
Instrumentality Is Immune from the Jurisdiction of the courts of another State e x c e p t with 
respect t o claims arising out of activities of the kind that m a y b e carr ied o n by private 
persons" 
51 The Immunity rule applies, according to § 1603 (a) and (b) to 
0) the central government of a foreign State. 
01) Its polit ical subdivisions, a n d Its agencies a n d Instrumentalities w h i c h are def ined as 
any entity 
(1) which Is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
(2) which Is an organ of a foreign State or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of 
whose shares or other ownership Interest Is owned by a foreign State or political 
subdivision thereof and 
(3) which Is neither a citizen of a State of the United States nor created under the laws of 
any third country 
52 According to § 1603 
(d) A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a 
particular commercial transaction or act The commercial character of an activity 
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular 
transaction or act, rather than by reference to Its purpose 
(e) A "commercial activity carried on In the United States by a foreign State" means 
commercial activity carried on by such State and having substantial contact with the 
United States 
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that are carried by natural or judicial persons'.53 In § 1603 (e), the required sufficient 
nexus between the United States and the act of the foreign State Is presented as a 
prerequisite for the jurisdiction of any court in the United States In such matters.5 4 The 
requirement of a sufficient nexus is a rule of due process. 
As an example of a transaction that has a substantial link with the United States the 
fol lowing Is regarded: "... a n indebtedness Incurred by a foreign State which 
negotiates or executes a loan agreement in the United States, or which receives 
financing from a private or public lending Institution tocated In the United States".55 In 
order to fulfil the requirement of direct effect as stated In clause 3 of § 1603 (a) (2) It is 
sufficient that the financial loss arising from the commercial transaction upon which 
the claim before the court Is based, is felt In the United States.56 
Similarly, If a loan contract between a State and a commercial creditor, which is a 
commercial activity according to FSIA, stipulates that the proper law of the contract is 
the law of one of the American States, or that situs of the debt is in the United States, the 
requirements of sufficient nexus will be fulfilled. Since most commercia l debts 
e n g a g e d In by International banks stipulate the law of the State of New York as the 
proper law or New York as the situs of the debt, U.S. Courts will have, according t o the 
rules of the FSIA, jurisdiction with regard to disputes arising out of such loans treaties. 
State Immunity Act, 1978 
Similar to the FSIA, the SIA has as its point of departure the rule that, in principle, a 
foreign State brought before one of Its (U.K.) courts Is entitled t o immunity from 
53 Restatement of the Law Third. 1986, p. 402. In the reporters' notes It Is s tated t h a t 
'commercia l activity also Includes governmental loans or borrowings, w h e n m a d e 
through the commercial market'. 
The definition of a 'commercial activity' Is also def ined by the American Bar Association 
as Including "commercial activity Includes any promise to p a y m a d e by a foreign State, 
only d e b t security Issued by a foreign State a n d any guarantee by a foreign State or 
promise to p a y m a d e by another party". 
This proposal Is Incorporated In a proposed a m e n d m e n t (S. 1071 - Senate Bill by Senator 
Charles Mc С Mathlas of Maryland) to a d d this as subsection (f) to 28 U.S.C. § 1603. 
Troobott, P.D.. Foreign State Immunity... fl.d.C .1986 V, p. 310 and p. 373/4. 
54 In the Restatement of the Law Third of 1986 In section 453 the cases are listed In which the 
courts of the United States may exercise Jurisdiction. They may exercise Jurisdiction over 
claims against a foreign State arising out of 
(a) a commercial activity carried on In the United States; 
(b) an act performed In the United States In connection with a commercial activity 
carried on outside the United States; or 
(c) an act performed outside the United States In connection with a commercial activity 
carried on outside the United States If the act causes a direct effect In the United 
States. 
In order for a commercial bank to sue a foreign State before a court In the United State It 
has to prove three things: 
- the other party Is a State; 
- the activity Is to b e regarded as commercial.· a n d 
- the activ ity has a sufficient link with the court, which has b e e n c a l l e d u p o n for 
Judgement. 
56 Delaume, G.R., op. cit.. (1977). p. 407. 
54 Troobott, P.D., op. cit.. p. 348/9. 
Fe. Callejo v. Вапсот г. S.A.: 
"The Court of Appeals held that there was a direct effect In the United States because the 
plaintiffs were In the USA a n d , significantly, the effects o n them In the United States were 
foreseeable to the d e f e n d a n t (I.e. Mexico, edv) In view of the bank's long-standing 
couree of deal ing with Its United States customers". 
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Jurisdiction. An Important exception Is made with regard to the commercial activity, 
section 3.57 Contrary to the FSIA the SIA In section 3 (3) (b) explictly recognizes that 
loans and other transaction for the provision of finance, including guarantees, have a 
commercial character. They are to be regarded as commercial transactions. 
With regard to the connection between the act and the United Kingdom, no 
apparent nexus Is required by the SIA with regard to commercial transactions. Any 
breach of commercial transaction can be brought before a court In the U.K.; no 
special jurisdictional link Is needed. However, a 'sufficient nexus' Is required In the 
case of contract obligations. These have to be performed, at least partly, in the United 
Kingdom.58 
If a loan contract, which Is regarded as a commercial activity, has a link with the 
United Kingdom, either because the proper law of the contract is the national law of 
the U.K. or because the contract has to be performed in the U.K., the courts In the U.K. 
will have jurisdiction. 
Draft articles on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their property 
The International Law Commission adopted In 1991, In second reading, a set of rules 
with regard to the Jurisdictional Immunity of States and their property. This draft code, 
which has been submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations, recognizes 
the general rule of state Immunity, and has listed the exceptions to this rule. It also 
acknowledged the 'commercial transaction' exception.5 9 As a commercial 
57 (D 'A State Is not immune as respects proceedings relating t o -
(a) a commercial transaction entered Into by the State; or 
(b) an obligation of the State which by virtue of a contract (whether a commercial 
transaction or not) falls to be performed wholly or partiy In the United Kingdom. 
C2) ... 
(3) In this section "commercial actton" means -
(a) any contract for the supply of goods or services; 
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and any guarantee or 
Indemnity In respect of any such transaction or of any other financial obligation; and 
(c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial. Industrial, financial, 
professional or similar character) Into which a State enters or In which It engages 
otherwise than In the exercise of sovereign authority; (...) 
58 Schreuer. Ch.H., State Immunity: some recent developments (1988), p. 35. 
Trooboft, P.D., op.clt;. 
Rahlntoda v. H.E.M. the Ntzan of Hyderabad. (Lord Denning) 
'If the dispute concerns, for Instance, the commercial transactions of a foreign 
government (whether carried on by Its own department or agencies or by setting up 
separate legal entitles), and It arises properly within the territorial Jurisdiction of our courts, 
there will be no ground for granting Immunity.1 (p. 319) 
Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan: 
Ί mean that the dispute should be concerned with property actually situated within the 
Jurisdiction of our court or with commercial transactions having a most dose connection 
with England such that, by the presence of parties or the nature of the dispute. It Is more 
properly cognizable here than elsewhere', (p. 321) 
59 Article 10: 
1. If a State engages In a commercial transaction with a foreign natural or Juridical 
person and. by virtue of the applicable rules of private International law, differences 
relating to the commercial transaction fall within the Jurisdiction of a court of another 
State, the State cannot Invoke Immunity from that Jurisdiction In a proceeding arising 
out of that commercial transaction. 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply: 
(a) In the case of a commercial transaction between States; or 
(b) If the parties to the commercial transaction have expressly agreed otherwise. 
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transaction are regarded contracts concerning the sales of goods or the supply of 
services, but also a contract for a loan or other transaction of a financial nature ^ The 
acknowledgement of the commercial transaction exception, which Is central t o the 
restrictive theory of state immunity, must be regarded as a major accomplishment of 
the International Law Commission Many countries, mostly (former)soclalist a n d 
developing countries, still pay tribute to the notion of absolute state Immunity The 
compromlsory character of the article on commercial transaction Is evident In the 
definition In Article 2 ( 2 ) 6 1 
The ILC draft articles do not explicitly require a territorial link, a special nexus Article 
10 simply refers to the relevant rules of private International law which will determine 
whether the forums Jurisdiction Is legitimately exercised The rules of private 
International law with regard to the establishment of Jurisdiction of the courts require 
some degree of territorial nexus or direct effect 6 2 
2 2 Immunity from execution and attachment 
The waiver of state Immunity from jurisdiction Is a standard clause In most commercial 
contracts, but does this automatically Include a waiver of state Immunity from 
3. The Immunity from Jurisdiction enjoyed by a State shall not be affected with regard to 
a proceeding which relates to a commercial transaction engaged In by a State 
enterprise or other entity established by the State which has an Independent legal 
personality and Is capable of 
(a) suing or being sued and 
(b) acquiring owning or possessing and disposing of property Including property which 
the State has authorized It to operate or manage 
dO Article 2 
1(c) "Commercial transactions' means 
0) any commercial contract or transaction for the sale or purchase of goods or the 
supply of services 
01) any contract for a loan or other transaction of a financial nature Including any 
obligation of guarantee In respect of any such loan or of Indemnity In respect of any 
such transaction 
(III) any other contract or transaction whether of a commercial Industrial, trading or 
professional nature but not Including a contract of employment of persons 
in order to determine whether a contract Is of a commercial nature the draft does not 
choose for the nature test above the purpose test or vice versa It recommends the use 
of the nature test first to decide whether a contract Is of a commercial nature and If so the 
purpose test should be used to give the principle of Immunity a second chance 
61 Wheaterly Lowe L The International Law Commission s Draft Articles on Jurisdictional 
Immunity of States and their property The Commercial Contract Exception Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law Vol 27(1989 no 3) ρ 673 
"Under this formulation which makes the purpose of the contract relevant depending 
upon the practice of the particular state party a determination of whether a contract Is 
commercial may well come down to whether the contract was made by a State 
adhering to the absolute or restrictive theory of Immunity The draft articles position 
seems to allow a State adhering to the absolute theory of Immunity to ratify the articles 
and the commercial contract exception therein and then to avoid application of the 
exception by declaring that In Us practice the transaction at Issue has a sovereign 
purpose 
Article 2 
2 In determining whether a contract or transaction Is a "commercial transaction" under 
paragraph 1 (c) reference should be made primarily to the nature of the contract or 
transaction but Its purpose should also be taken Into account If In the practice of the 
State which is party to It that purpose Is relevant to determining the non-commercial 
character of the contract' 
(2 Idem ρ 670 
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execution? As α rule, the waiver of state Immunity from Jurisdiction does not Imply a 
waiver of Jurisdiction from execution.The withholding of Immunity from execution 
obviously has a more controversial character. The enforcement of actual measures 
of execution has far more drastic Implications for the relations between States, and is 
more likely to be a sensitive Issue for a foreign State.63 On the other hand, if the creditor 
knows beforehand that the enforcement of a Judgement will be stopped by immunity 
from execution in all cases, the whole procedure of court-proceedings may be 
regarded as a farce, and the protectton given to the private party in a dispute with a 
foreign state over a commercial contract will be nullified. Although in most national 
and international rules immunity from execution Is more protected, there are a few 
exceptions. 
Foreign State Immunity Act (1976) 
This Act contains the general rule of Immunity from execution. However, property 
used for commercial activity is exempt from this rule, and execution Is also possible 
against property which is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the 
claim was based.44 
The FSIA requires, in the case of the execution on a Judgement against a State, that 
there must be a link between the commercial activity upon which the claim was 
based and the property used for a commercial activity and which permits the setting 
aside of the state immunity from execution.65 The property of a foreign State can be 
divided In two categories, property Immune from execution. I.e. property designated 
for sovereign or official functions, and property not immune from execution, i.e. 
property intended for commercial purposes.66 
But what criteria are used In order to determine the commercial use of the 
property? As with the determination of the character of the commercial activity for the 
immunity from jurisdiction, the nature of the activity Is the point of reference, not the 
purpose of the activity which Is conducted with the property. In most cases, the 
property In question will be a bank account held by the foreign State in the forum State. 
If a bank account is used solely for non-commercial purposes It will be immune from 
execution.67 
In the opinion of the District Court 'a reading of the Act which exempted mixed 
accounts would create a loophole, for any property could be made immune by using 
It, at one time or another, for some minor public purpose'. But, the Court goes on, this 
would not cause a problem for a foreign State, since 'segregation of public purpose 
funds from commercial activity funds' Is always an option which the State Is free to 
take. This option, of course, will broaden the scope of State Immunity from execution. 
Amendments to the FSIA are being discussed In order to limit the Immunity from 
execution. It proposes to abandon the required link between the property and the 
commercial activity which Is the cause of the action, but It excludes expressly the 
property of a foreign State used for maintaining a diplomatic or consular mission and 
63 Schreuer, Ch.H., op. cit.. p. 126. 
Trooboff, P.D., op. cit., p. 363. 
M Schreuer, Ch.H., op. cit.. p. 130. 
66 Trooboff, P.D., op. cit., p. 365. 
to Schreuer. Ch.H.. op. cit.. p. 143. 
67 Trooboff. P.D., op. cit.. p. 366/367, with reference to a case before the District court against 
the Republic of Tanzania (Birch Stripping Cooperat ion v. Embassy of the United Republic 
of Tanzania). 
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the residence of the chief of mission This will include any bank account designed for 
these purposes 6 8 
State Immunity Act (1978) 
The a p p r o a c h taken by the SIA is that It permits enforcement of a Judgement In 
respect of property which is for the time being in use or intended use for commercial 
purposes In order t o determine the character of the property, whether for 
commercial use of nor, w e must turn again to section 3 (3) With regard to bank 
accounts the House of Lords decided in the Alcorn Case that execution on a bank 
account would not be permitted unless It can be shown by the judgement creditor 
that the bank account was earmarked by the foreign State solely (save for de.mlmmus 
exceptions) for being drawn on t o settle liabilities Incurred in c o m m e r c i a l 
t ransact ions 6 9 This means that the term commercial activity does not cover 
expenses of the day-to-day running of the diplomatic mission 
Enforcement of judgement on State bank accounts will be very difficult, because 
the burden of proof of the commercial earmark of certain funds is on the creditor 1 Q 
Draft Articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their properties 
According t o the Commentary t o Article 21 of the draft articles, immunity from 
execution may be viewed as 'the last fortress, the last bastion of State Immunity' ^ 
These draft articles d o permit exceptions to the basic rule of absolute Immunity from 
execution Execution of State property is permitted if it is specifically In use or 
Intended for use by the State for commercial (non-governmental) purposes and has 
a connection with the object of the c l a i m , or has been al located or earmarked by 
the State for the satisfaction of the claim which is the object of that proceedings 7 2 
State property has to be Interpreted as property owned by the State or property In 
Its possession or control 7 3 The property has t o be in use for commercial (non­
governmental) purposes at the time of the proceedings In Article 23, certain goods 
are, at all times, excluded from execution These are, I a , property which Is In use for 
the maintaining of the diplomatic mission A general waiver of Immunity from 
execution would not be sufficient t o allow execution on the property mentioned In 
Article 23 It must be mentioned expressly7Λ 
The conclusion may be drawn that State immunity from execution tends, although 
receding, more t o the notion of absolute Immunity that Immunity from Jurisdiction Most 
western national laws adhere t o some sort of relative c o n c e p t of immunity from 
execution Most developing countries and (formeOsocialist countries still recognize 
the absolute theory of state Immunity from execution The Draft Articles on State 
Immunity include the absolute theory on immunity from execution with a few 
exceptions, in order to allow for the signing of as many countries as possible 
Since, of ten, a foreign State hardly has any properties in a foreign country, 
attachment t o an embassy account is the only recourse against the foreign State a 
68 Trooboff Ρ D o p clt ρ 374/375 
« A l c o r n Ltd ν Republic of C o l o m b i a (1984) 
70 Schreuer C h H op clt ρ 154 
71 УвотЬоо1г/(.С198о Vol II p a r t l w o ρ 17 
72 Art 21 Draft Articles o n State Immunity 
73 C o m m e n t a r / t o Art 21 У снЬоо<(//.С1980 Vol II p a r t l w o ρ 18 
74 C o m m e n t a r y t o Art 23 yearboo/f/i.C1986 Vol II part t w o ρ 19/20 
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creditor has. Attachment to an embassy account which Is used for diplomatic 
purposes Is not possible. Embassy accounts which are not used for diplomatic 
purposes are not immune from attachment. On the one hand, it might be difficult to 
separate the diplomatic use and the commercial use which is being made of the 
embassy account; on the other hand. It does not seem desirable that foreign States 
have the opportunity to shirk their legal obligations by pleading Immunity of these 
accounts.75 
It seems défendable, also In view of national legislation and current Jurisprudence, 
to allow attachment to embassy accounts. The restriction which would be Imposed 
upon this rule Is that It should not concern moneys which are earmarked for diplomatic 
use. In case the embassy account is used for both diplomatic and commercial 
purposes, attachment Is défendable. Attachment does not hinder the use of the 
account; it Implies only that part of the account, the amount which Is claimed by the 
creditor. Is not for use. Another option would be to postpone the attachment for a short 
period of time, to enable the foreign State to replenish the account In order not to 
hinder the diplomatic activities of the foreign State.76 This, however, does not seem a 
viable solution. The reason for the debtor State not to comply with Its obligations 
arising out of the loan contract with Its commercial creditor Is a lack of the required 
currency. 
2.3 Conclusion with regard to unilateral measures taken by the creditor 
The commercial creditor does have the possibility of suing a debtor State in court, 
which does not comply with the obligations arising out of the loan contact, for a court. 
This will have to be the court which has Jurisdiction on the basis of the applicable law, 
the law of the contract. The debtor State will not, If the Judge considers the loan 
contract to be a commercial transaction, be able to Invoke the exception of state 
Immunity. This exception will not be acknowledged by the court. 
If the court rules In favour of the commercial creditor. It will then have a Judgement 
which he will try to execute against the debtor State. If the debtor State does not want 
to comply with the ruling, attachment to goods or bank accounts will be the only way 
left for the creditor. As has been shown In the previous paragraph, this Is possible In a 
limited way. The creditor can only appropriate goods or moneys which are not for 
public purposes. A more practical obstacle which the creditor has to face Is the fact 
that a debtor State may not have sufficient goods or moneys In the country In which 
the court proceedings have taken place, and In which the Judgement has 
executionary power, to satisfy the obligations arising from the Judgement. The creditor 
could then try to Implement the judgement in the debtor State itself. The Judgement, 
however, will then first have to recognized by the competent court, before the 
attachment can be validly carried out. It is very much the question whether the 
creditor will succeed. 
75 Van Houte. H., Naar п beslag o p rekeningen v a n ambassades?. Über Amlcorum Eli© 
van Bogaert. p. 302. 
76 fctem, p. 302. 
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3 The Allied Bank and the Libra Bank cases The Act of State as a defence 
Judgement was given almost simultaneously In two cases, concerning default by 
Costa Rlcan Banks on international loans due to governmental restrictions Allied Bank 
International ν Banco Credito de Cartago and Libra Bank Ltd ν Banco National de 
Costa Rico Both cases were brought before districts courts in the Southern District of 
the State New York Opinions were delivered In 1983 by the courts and In the Allied Bank 
case, the Court of Appeals ruled in 1984, and 1985 
31 The Allied Bank case 
The factual background of the Allied Bank and the Libra Bank case Is the same They 
both concern Costa Rican Banks In 1981, the government of Costa Rico announced 
that It had grave difficulties servicing its external debts It was not able to fulfil its 
financial obligations towards its creditors This situation Incurred a shortage of foreign 
exchange reserves Restrictions upon foreign exchange transactions were Imposed 
by the government Debtors had to file a request with the Central Bank for the transfer 
of foreign currency Transactions were so tied that the Central Bank did not give Its 
consent to transactions which concerned private debtors When Costa Rico entered 
Into renegotiations with its creditors at the end of 1981, a total ban on the export of 
foreign currencies was imposed, at least for the time of the renegotiation process The 
Costa Rican banks were then In the position that they could not comply with their 
obligations towards the creditor bank Default was Imminent Allied filed suit on behalf 
of the members of the syndicate on February 4,198277 
In the Sabbatino case rt was made clear that the Act of State doctrine should be 
considered in all cases in which the validity of governmental actions of a foreign State 
are called Into question 7 8 
The District Court held that It held Jurisdiction over the defendants, although they 
were owned by the Costa Rlcan government and pleaded sovereign Immunity, 
because in the underlying agreement It was stated that the debts were to be paid In 
New York and that the law of the contract was the law of the State of New York As a 
second ground for refusal to grant immunity It pointed to section 1605 (a) (2) of the FSIA· 
the claims were based on the commercial acts of a foreign government and the 
execution of the promissory notes, upon which the action Is based, was a 
commercial activity within the meaning of the Statute 7 9 
It then turned to the Act of State doctrine The court's ruling stated 
The crucial factor which has been shown to exist In the Instant case Is that the 
conduct of the Costa Rican government which prevented payment of the notes 
was public In nature, rather than commercial, and Its purpose was to serve 
governmental function The action of the Central Bank of Costa Rica and the 
President and the Finance Mmlstery of that country were undertaken In response to 
a serious national economic crisis A Judgement In favour of Allied in this case 
would constitute a judicial determination that defendants must make payments 
contrary to the directives of their governments This puts the judicial branch of the 
United States at odds wrth policies laid down by a foreign government (and) risks 
77 Ebenroth Cl .op clt ρ 45-49 
78 Bhandari J S . e m Vol 33-1990 ρ 404/5 
79 US Distr ictCourtSDNY.July ,1983 А Ж оІ 78(1984) ρ 441 
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embarrassment to the relations between the executive branch of the United State 
and the government of Costa Rica" w 
The Court relied upon the Act of State doctrine. It treated this defense as 'an 
automatic ground for dismissal. It did not analyze how the doctnne was to be 
applied ^ The court based its opinion upon the separation of powers and the political 
question, upon its concern that the Executive Branch would be embarrassed if the 
court were to rule otherwise in a case where the acts of a foreign government put to 
trial8 2 
The Court failed to consider whether the exchange controls. If they were validly 
taken, would constitute a defense which would stand before a foreign court Since the 
proper law of the contract was the law of New York, this would mean that the 
exchange controls would be a valid defense under that law That Implied that the 
exchange control regulation taken by the Costa Rlcan government would have extra­
territorial effect 
Due to the fact that the District Court did not analyze the Act of State doctnne 
properly. Allied appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuite 3 On April 23, 1984 the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Courts dismissal 
The Court held that regardless of the act of State doctnne, the actions of the Costa 
Rlcan Government were consistent with U S law and policy and were therefore 
entitled to recognition on the basis of comity β4 The Court did not touch upon the Act 
of State doctnne, but Instead based its arguments for dismissal of the plaintiffs claim 
on comity β5 
Comity contrary to the Act of State doctrine. If applicable, does require 
examination of the nature of the act of a foreign government and of its congruity with 
the law and policies of the United States Comity does have a broader range than the 
Act of State doctnne, it may even cover acts of a foreign government which have 
their effect outside its own territory β* 
Although the Court did not base Its decision upon the Act of State doctrine. It 
expressed Its support for the territorial limitation of the doctrine It, however, did not 
deem It necessary to determine the situs of the debt on the basis of the applicability of 
the notion of comity Allied appealed for a rehearing of the case by the U S Court of 
Appeals, 2nd CIr This time the U S government filed a brief amicus сипае, In which It 
disputed the court s conclusion that the acts of the Costa Rican government were 
consistent with the law and policies of the United States87 
In Its letter, the government stated that It supported the efforts the Costa Rlcan 
government was presently making to solve their current debt problem, seeking 
renegotiation of its debts with its creditors, but It considered the unilateral action 
80 Idem ρ 442 q u o t a t i o n f r o m t h e J u d g e m e n t 
81 Ebenroth CT op eft ρ 52 
82 Idem ρ 52 
83 Hahn Η J Zahiungsmoratorlum außerhalb der Verbotsstaates 1st kein 'Ac t of State", 
Zeitschritt für das gesamte Kredletwesen Vo l 38(1985) ρ 893) 
84 US Court of Appeal 2 n d a r April 23 1984 A Ä V o l 78(1984) ρ 899 
86 Comity "the recognition which one nation allows within Its terrltoiy to the legislative, 
executive or Judicial act of another nation having due regard both to International duly 
and convenience and to the rights of Its own citizens or of persons who are under the 
protection of Its laws- Bhandarl J S GYIL Vol 33-1990 ρ 394 
86 R e s t a t e m e n t ( s e c o n d ) of Foreign Retatlons Law of t h e United States § 43 
87 A JIL Vol 79 (1985) on Allied Bank International ν Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago 
Us Court of Appeals 2nd CIr, March 18 1985 ρ 733 
100 
CHAPTER 5 
undertaken by the Costa Rican government, the exchange control legislation, to be 
inconsistent with U S policy 8 8 
On the basis of this letter, the Court dismissed Its previous ruling as Incorrect The 
court now faced the Issue of the Act of State doctrine It observed that the Act of State 
doctrine did not bar an Inquiry Into the validity of actions undertaken by a government 
which had extraterritorial effects The applicability of the doctrine depended upon the 
situs of the debt The situs of the debt for the Act of State doctrine was to be 
determined by the complete fruition test "Under this test. If the foreign sovereign did 
not have physical control' over the debt at the time of the expropriation attempts. 
then the taking did nog come to complete fruition in the foreign territory" β' 
In the underlying agreement it was stipulated that the place of payment of the debt 
was to be New York The Court also noted the fact that appellants were a New York 
based bank It therefore concluded that the situs of the debt was New York, and that 
the expropriation undertaking by the Costa Rican government did not come to 
complete fruition In Its own territory It recognized the Interest of the Costa Rican 
government in the debt but did not think that this interest in the contract gave the 
government sufficient Jurisdiction over the debt For the purposes of the Act of State 
doctrine this would not be sufficient to locate the debt in the territory of the Costa Rican 
government 
"Since, as the court had previously concluded, the Costa Rican government's 
unilateral attempt to repudiate private commercial obligations was Inconsistent 
with U S law and policy, the court refused to recognize the extraterritorial effect of 
the Costa Rican government's decree"9 0 
3 2 The Ubra Bank case 
The District Court of the Southern District of New York decided on July 6 and August 12, 
19Θ3 on the case brought before between Libra Bank Limited and Banco Nacional de 
Costa Rica The case revolved around to arguments the application of the Act of 
State doctnne and the IMF Articles of Agreement ^ 
The court stated that the Act of State doctrine did not bar inquiry into the validity of 
the Costa Rican government's actions It defined the Act of State doctrine along the 
lines of the Sabbatino Case "Unless the expropriation occurred within the foreign 
State, this court is free to Inquire into the validity of the acts of the foreign nation ' n 
The Court stated that the Act of State doctrine was to be applied It referred to the 
ruling In the case Republic of Iraq ν First National City Bank "We concluded In 
Republic of Iraq that we will no give effect to a foreign state s confiscation, without 
compensation, of obligations which it cannot enforce on its own if the seizure Is 
Inconsistent with the laws and policies of New York"93 
It concluded that the property concerned is plaintiffs' legal rights to repayment of 
the debt owed by the defendant Since It was agreed that payment should take 
place in New York and Banco Nacional had consented to New York jurisdlctton. It was 
88 fctem ρ 733 
m Bhandari .JS.opc/f ρ 409 
40 AJIL V o l 79(1985) ρ 734/5 
91 Ebenrotti, С Τ. op cit.ρ 62 
92 AJÍ. Vol 78 (1984) ρ 444 a n d Ebenroth С Τ , o p clt ρ 62 
<Β Repubflc o f Iraq ν Rist N a t i o n a l City Bank (353 F 2 n d 47 (2nd a r 1965) c e r t d e n t e d , 382 U S 
1027 (1966)). A JIL Vol 78(1984) ρ 444 a n d Ebenroth. С Τ , o p d t . ρ 62 
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obvious to the Court that the property concerned was located in New York, the situs of 
the debt was In New York. This Implied that the Act of State doctrine did not bar Inquiry 
by the court Into the acts of the Costa Rican government.94 
The court rejected Banco Naclonal's argument that the currency controls did not 
confiscate property, but merely prevented defendant from repayment. The position 
taken by the court, that the enactment of currency controls and the inability of the 
banks to make payment constituted a confiscation or expropriation. Is contrary to the 
position taken by the Court of Appeals of New York In 1968 In the case French v. Banco 
Nacional de Cuba, In which It stated that a currency regulation Is not an 
expropriation.'5 
But, because the District Court relied heavily on the reasoning In the Sabbatino 
case, it had to conclude that the regulations were expropriatory In nature, although In 
the language of the Costa Rlcan decree. Instituting the exchange controls, nothing 
indicated that an expropriation or taking of foreign property was the underlying 
purpose.96 
Banco Nacional, after the dismissal of the Act of State doctrine argument, moved 
for reargument 'contending that the non-enforcement of the loan agreement Is 
consistent with the United States laws and policies in the form of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement'.97 
Banco Nacional based Itself on Article VIII, section 2 (b) which provides that 
'exchange contracts which Involve the currency of any member which are contrary 
to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or Imposed 
consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable In the territories of any 
member', 
The District Court dismissed this argument. It based Itself on the fact that the loan 
agreement was not an exchange contract, as mentioned In Article VIII, section 2 (a), 
that the Intervening changes In foreign currency legislations rendering a contract 
unenforceable are not within the scope of the particular section of the Articles of 
Agreements, and that Banco Nacional failed to demonstrate that the currency 
regulations were consistent with the Agreement.98 
3.3 Conclusions 
From these two cases, we may draw the conclusion that In principle the U.S. Courts will 
not recognize exchange control measures taken by a government as a defence. In 
the Allied case the measures taken by the Costa Rlcan government were not to be 
considered as taking of foreign property, the Hickenlooper Amendment was not 
applicable. The Act of State doctrine was dismissed as a defence by the Court of 
Appeals (In second instance) on the ground of the sinus of the debt and the 
Incompatibility of the governmental actions with the laws and policies of the United 
States. 
Contrary to the District Court's ruling in the Allied Bank case around the same time, 
the District Court In the Libra Bank case decided that the Act of State doctrine did not 
« Ebenroth. CT., op. cit.. p. 66. 
чб Idem. p. 67. 
96 totem, p. 66. 
97 totem, p. 68. 
че totem, p. 68. 
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bar the Inquiry Into the exchange control measures It v iewed the measures as 
expropriation, however, and as such they did not permit the defence of Act of State, 
since the situs of the debt was outside the territory of the expropriating State 
In the Libra Bank case Article VIII, section 2 (b) of the Articles of Agreement was put 
forward as a defence (In the Allied Bank case It was not brought up by the defence) 
The court, however, pursued the narrow Interpretation of exchange contract It was 
also put forward that the defendant had submitted no authority for the view that a 
contract, valid and enforceable when made, may be rendered unenforceable by 
exchange control regulations adopted subsequently " 
This view of the U S court is contrary to the interpretations of the IMF and 'the refusal 
to apply Art VIII, section 2 (b) to exchange control regulations that affect executory 
contracts In existence when the regulations are Imposed would ignore the economic 
difficulties that make the regulations necessary , 0 0 The court also refused to 
acknowledge the IMF Agreement as an 'unambiguous agreement as referred to In 
Sabbatino This Is consistent with the views expressed earlier In the Callejo Case 
It Is obvious that the courts in the U S are reluctant to recognize exchange control 
regulations taken by foreign governments Unless the debts are situated In the territory 
of the State taking the measures, the U S courts will not give extra-terntonal effect to 
such measures There might be an exception to this rule, the policy pursued by the 
foreign government agrees with the views of the U S government So It is advisable for 
a defending State to appeal to the notion of comity Unless the IMF clearly states the 
right Interpretation of Article VIII, section 2 (a) and (b), which It has refused to do so until 
now, it Is obvious that the U S courts will not consider foreign loans as exchange 
contracts If the courts In the U S are reluctant to recognize exchange control 
regulations taken by the debtor State In case the State has to appear before It and 
defends Itself with the notion of the Act of State, it will probably be even harder for a 
private debtor National legislation of the State of the debtor will not be recognized by 
the Judge If the law of the State of the debtor is not the law of the contract The 
exchange control regulations will not have any influence on the loan contract and the 
obligations arising out of it This puts the pnvate debtor In an awkward situation, to 
honour the contract means infringing Its own national laws, to comply with the 
exchange control regulations means Infringement of the ruling of the court 
4 Debt renegotiations 
41 Debts to be renegotiated 
Debt renegotiations can be conducted bilaterally or multilaterally Bilateral 
renegotiations are determined by the law on which parties have decided, multilateral 
renegotiations ask for solutions In the legal spectrum which surpass the traditional law 
of contract 'O' 
W Gold, J , The Fund Agreement In the courts XIX ρ 192/193 
100 Idem ρ 193 
101 Focsaneau, L opclt ρ 322 and 323 
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In case of official debts, such as those dealt with In the Paris Club, both In bilateral 
and in multilateral renegotiations the law of the contract Is International public law. As a 
rule, most debt renegotiations take place In a multilateral context. 1 0 2 
The first phase In the process of debt renegotiations Is the determination of the 
scope of the public debt of the debtor country. Which debts are t o be regarded as 
official State debts? As has been shown In Chapter 3, a State c a n commit itself directly 
or Indirectly I.e. by way of a guaranteed State debt. The problem with regard to the 
determination of the scope of the official State debt is the fact that the exact amount 
Is, in most cases, not known t o the government. 
There are two reasons for this. First, most debts are not contracted by the central 
government Itself, but by State organs, which have financial autonomy. A State has t o 
collect data concerning these debts engaged In by State organs. There Is hardly ever 
a central list available at the onset of the renegotiations. Second, the structure a n d 
nature of the different debts the State has make it very difficult to decide which debts 
have t o be (and c a n be) included In the renegotiation process.1 0 3 
Some debts are excluded from the renegotiation process for economic or legal 
reasons. These excluded debts are 'credits otherwise falling within the definition of the 
debt subject t o restructure but which for reasons relating to the nature of the debt or 
the identity of the payee, are exempted from the restructuring'.1 0 4 For example, the 
ICE "... generally creditors avoid the bilateral approach, the expectation having been 
deceived more often than not that negotiations with Individual States might entail more 
advantageous results at least for some donor nations. Today, multilateral restructuring 
prevails by far. It Is designed to sustain existing loan agreements, while amending their 
terms of servicing ... Renegotiations of existing loans, therefore, as a rule paves the way 
for the provision of 'fresh money' In the form of new foreign currency credits'. 
Hahn, J.H., op.clt., Hague-Zagreb Essays 7 (1987), p. 19. 
103 Pelgney. G.,op. ctt.,p. 347. 
l(M Within the renegotiations In the Paris Club we can distinguish the following excluded 
debts: 
a short-term debts; 
b. late Interest charges (since 1984 there have been three exceptions In which the late 
Interest charges have been rescheduled); 
с all principle and Interest due under previous agreements (before 1982 It was excluded 
altogether. In the period 1983-1984 It was rescheduled In half of the reschedulings (8 out 
of 17) and since 1985 It has become more and more exceptional to reschedule 
principle and Interest due under previous agreements); 
d. at the request of the debtor country the exclusion of private debts owed to, or 
guaranteed by, the official creditor. 
There are two reasons for the exclusion of these debts from the renegotiation process: 
1. the exclusion can simplify the rescheduling process. It might be very difficult to Identify 
eligible private debts. 
2. the exclusion of the private debt can contribute to a faster reintroduction of 
creditworthiness, there Is no general exclusion of private debts In the Paris Club 
renegotiations; 
e. Interest payments, there Is an Increased tendency to exclude these from the 
rescheduling process; 
f. debts contracted by blnatlonal entitles or guaranteed by a third party (this might be a 
non-resident corporation or a government other than that of the debtor or creditor). 
Burke Dillon, K. and G. Oliveros, Recent experience with multilateral official debt 
rescheduling. Washington D.C., 1987, p. 5-9. 
Carreau, D., op. cit.. p. 14. He distinguishes four general categories of excluded debts 
from the Paris Club renegotiations: "dettes ä l'égard des organisations 
Intergovernmentales, dettes à tres court terme, dettes commerciales, et dettes 
obligatoires. 
Walker, M.A. and L.C. Buchhelt. op.clt.. p. 461. 
Debts which can, for these economic or legal reasons, be excluded from the 
renegotiations are: 
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creditor Is α private entity, other than a financial Institution, or It is an International 
organization with limited, revolving funds, such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank and the regional development banks, or the character of the debt might 
not permit renegotiations, e g short term debts, or debts are excluded from the 
negotiations, because this was stipulated in the initial treaty In order for a debt t o be 
renegotiated in the Pans Club the official capacity of the creditor is of importance, not 
the capacity of the d e b t o r 1 0 5 
4 2 ßos/c rutes In the renegotiation procedure 
In the course of time several principles have developed that have set the framework 
of the renegotiation process These principles are both applicable to the 
proceedings within the Paris Club and the 'London Club The first of these principles Is 
'la clause d Initiative A renegotiation procedure can only be initiated by the debtor 
State Secondly there is the condition of equal treatment of the creditor This Implies 
that the debtor Is not allowed to favour one creditor over another Thirdly there Is the 
principle that each case will be treated separately, the case-by-case approach, by 
the creditors The fourth principle which has emerged during the course of time Is the 
principle of conditionahty The creditors request the debtor to enter into a stand-by 
arrangement with the IMF, to which certain conditions are attached 
α ' ία clause d initiative'™6 
As a rule, a debt renegotiation can only be requested by the debtor country. The 
sovereignty of the debtor state prevents creditors requesting this In both the 
renegotiations with its official as well as with its commercial creditors As to the 
commercial creditors, the sheer number of creditors also prevents them from starting 
the renegotiation between the creditors and the debtor-country A renegotiation of 
outstanding monetary obligations is only initiated after a default by the debtor on Its 
present obligations At that time the creditors do not have any reasonable 
expectation that the debtor will be able to resume the service of Its debts In the near 
future , 0 7 
a loans made guaranteed or Insured by foreign government agencies (Including 
export credit agencies), 
b short-term trade credits 
с loans made by supra-national or multilateral organizations 
d debts payable to entitles other than banks or financial Institutions, 
privately-placed securities 
f publicly-Issued bands floating rate certificates of deposit and notes, 
g lease obligations with respect to or financing secured by tangible personal property; 
h loans which are the subject of Interest make-up obligations of subsidies provided by 
official agencies and 
I spot and forward exchange and precious metal contracts 
Also Horn N , op clt ρ 300 
106 Carreau.D.op clt ρ 19 
106 Ccrreau,D .op clt ρ 23 
107 Pelgney, G , op clt. ρ 339/40 He points out that this procedure Is contrary to what one 
may expect It would be more logical to start these renegotiations at the time the 
problems ahead are foreseen 
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b. Equal treatment of creditors 
A principle rule in the debt-renegotiation process Is the equal treatment of the 
creditors. This equal treatment principle means that the debtor Is not allowed to favour 
one creditor above another. The debtor Is required to adopt this 'non-dlscrlmlnatory' 
attitude In his dealings with both his official and his commercial creditors. He Is required 
to treat them alike.108 
This equal treatment can be ensured by Including various legal Instruments In the 
agreements, such as a comparable treatment clause, sharing clauses, negative 
pledge - and pari passu convenants.109 Nowadays, It Is possible for creditors to 
choose different Instruments in the same agreement to ensure equal treatment. What 
Is the status of the equal treatment principle? 
"The principle of equality has no legal impact on debtor-creditor relations and 
certainly does not override contractual arrangements embodied In a loan 
agreement. It Is simply an expression of policy directed at debtors and creditors 
when renegotiated."110 
I am of the opinion that this view is not valid; the equal treatment principle Is a legally 
valid clause. The principle of equal treatment only has an Impact on the renegotiated 
loans. It does not affect loans which are excluded from the renegotiations. 
с Case-by-case approach by the creditors 
Creditors conduct the process on a case-by-case basis. Although many problems 
will be similar for most - If not all - debtor countries, creditors prefer to deal with each 
debtor country alone In order to be able to tailor the agreement to the specific 
requirement of the debtor. Critics have put forward that the real reason for this case-
by-case approach Is the creditors' fear of the emergence of a debtor countries-
cartel. Such a cartel, it is felt, would be able to press more forcefully for favourable 
concessions from the creditors. The creditors would then be put Into a position In 
which they would be forced to take the interests and demands of the debtor countries 
more Into consideration. Now, It Is argued by the critics, the creditors are In a position In 
which they can put their interests first, each separate debtor is not able to exert much 
pressure singlehandedly.111 
d. Condltionality 
Before entering into renegotiations with either Its official and/or private creditors, the 
debtor state is required, in most cases, to enter Into a stand-by arrangement with the 
IMF. This stand-by arrangement, which will be discussed more extensively In a later 
108 Carreau, D., op. cit., p. 23/4. 
Burke Dillon, K. and G. Oliveros, op. cit.. p. 17: equal treatment with regard to all 
credltorgroups (official creditors participating In the Paris Club, non participating official 
creditors, commercial banks and non guaranteed private suppliers) except the 
multilateral lending Institutions, who enjoy a preferential status long since recognized by 
the other creditors. 
it» Buchhelt, L.C., Changing techniques of sovereign debt restructuring; IFLR November 1987, 
p. 35/9. 
110 Stockmayer. Α., Excluding project loans from sovereign rescheduling; IFLR March 1987, p. 
27. 
111 Pelgney, G., op. cit.. p. 339/40. 
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paragraph. Is an economic recovery programme It aims at restoring the economy of 
the debtor State with the help of the commercial and the official creditor and the IMF 
Over the years the Fund has played an Increasingly central role in the rescheduling 
process It has used its influence for the benefit of the debtor State, by way of assisting 
the sovereign to obtain an adequate level of new financing from the banks and from 
the official creditors The Fund has the practice of making Its financial assistance 
conditional on the adoption by the sovereign borrower of an economic stabilization 
programme 1 1 2 This arrangement Is regarded, by the creditors, as a prerequisite for 
successful negotiations The conditlonality as Imposed by the IMF is subject to 
criticism from the debtor States 
4 3 Types of debt renegotiations 
Debt renegotiations which are carried on In the Pans Club are, as a rule, concluded 
within two days This Is due to the fact that the results of the negotiations are laid down 
In the Agreed Minutes, which are the basis upon which the individual creditor country 
develops the terms of the renegotiated loan treaty with the debtor country The 
Agreed Minutes are not the legal basis of the renegotiated debt, they only provide the 
guidelines for the subsequent individual negotiations The comparable treatment 
clause ensures equal treatment of all creditors by the debtor In his dealings with 
them ' 1 3 The renegotiations of the actual debts are conducted bilaterally 
The renegotiation of the debts wrthm the London Club take a much longer period 
of time Because of the large amount of participants and the enormous amount of 
debt contracts, speedy negotiations are Impossible As a rule, the commercial banks 
organize a Steering Committee which conducts the negotiations After an 
agreement has been reached with the debtor State, the proposed deal is put to the 
individual banks, which then have the nght to either agree or disagree with the attained 
result Since it Is the aim of the negotiations conducted within the London Club to 
renegotiate most, if not all, commercial debts, great pressure has been exerted upon 
dissenting commercial banks 1 ы 
Both in the Paris Club and In the London' Club the aim is in economic terms, 'the 
deferment of mature monetary obligations in order to secure their repayment 
altogether with Interest at a later date than the original one or under a timetable 
envisaging a general postponement of success remittances , 1 5 The legal aim from 
the sovereign debtors point of view Is a modification of the loan agreements 'by 
renegotiating the penod of validity, interest, and the particulars of redemption, or the 
revocation of funds granted in conjunction with new lending on different terms 1 1 6 
112 Rea G F. Restructuring sovereign debt - will there be new International law and 
Institutions American Society of International Law (A S IL) proceedings of the 77th 
amual meeting 1983 ρ 313-315 
AS IL proceedings of the 78th annual meeting 1984 ρ 303 
Focsaneau L op clt ρ 323 
Bothe M and J Brink op clt ρ 103 
113 Bothe M and J Brink op clt ρ 102-106 
Hahn Η J op clt ρ 20/1 
114 Pelgney G op clt ρ 341 
115 Hahn Η J . op clt ρ 18/9 
116 Hahn Η J ídem 
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From the creditors' perspective the legal effect amounts to 'the renunciation of a 
present right to exercise legal remedies for non-payment and the deferral of the 
repayment of their loans'. ' , 7 
The process of renegotiations of debts can be divided Into three categories:118 
- rescheduling of the debt; 
- restructuring of the debt; 
- refinancing of the debt. 
4.4 Debf rescheduling 
A debt rescheduling agreement Is an agreement between the debtor country and Its 
creditors) In which the date of payment of sums overdue or due are postponed to a 
later date. ' 1 9 A rescheduling Includes the following data. It specifies the type of debt, 
the amount of rescheduled payments due, the consolidation period, the repayment 
period, and. If appropriate, the Interest rates due on the rescheduled amounts.120 
The objective of such an agreement is 'to rearrange the burden of the debt so that 
the debtor can resume debt servicing on a more viable and orderly basis'.'21 
The element of time Is the most outstanding feature In the debt rescheduling 
agreement: 'the present or Impeding Insolvency of the debtor is prevailed by 
delaying the date of actual payment'122; and 'the legal character of the debt Is 
changed, for example a short-term debt has been converted Into a mid-term, and a 
mid-term debt Into a long term debt. The currency has been extended'.1 2 3 The 
rescheduling agreement does not replace the original loan treaty or contract. The 
original agreement remains In force, except for the points covered by the 
rescheduling agreement. It Is a modification of the original treaty or contract.124 The 
rescheduling, therefore, consists only of the postponement of the date of maturity of 
the rescheduled debts; there are no changes In the other provisions of the original 
agreement. 
4.5 Debt restructuring 
In some cases or for some debts the simple postponement of maturities or the delay 
of payments may not be a viable solution. More Is needed. In the debt restructuring 
agreement the time-element too plays an Important role the payment of Interest and 
principle are postponed), but It also has characteristics which surpass the deferment 
of payment of mature monetary obligations; It Involves the modification of loan 
117 Walker, MA. and L.C. Buchhelt. op. cit.. p. 462. 
118 Focsaneau, L., op. clt. p. 324. 
119 Р ідп у, G., pp. cit.. p. 343. 
120 Morrlssette, F., Le problème de la dette des pays en développement. The Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law 1981, Vol. XIX, p. 87/8. 
121 Rea, G.F., op. cit.. p. 312. 
122 Bothe, M. and J. Brink, op. cit.. p. 104/5. 
123 Focsaneau, L, op. cit., p. 325. 
124 Often one finds at the beginning of each paragraph of the rescheduling agreement the 
phrase: "Without Infringing the rights of the parties under the appropriate Governing 
Instrument'. 
Pelgney, G., op. cit.. p. 344. 
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agreements by renegotiation of the period of validity. Interest, and the particulars of 
redemption, or the revocation of funds granted in conjunction with new lending on 
different term , 2 5 
In general, the following features are to be found in a debt restruction agreement 
" - principal maturities falling due within specified time periods are rescheduled, 
- Interest on commercial bank loans must (so the lender insists) remain current, 
- trade and interbank lines are maintained at specified minimum levels pursuant to 
formal or Informal arrangements, 
- f inancing gaps of t h e debtor country In the early years fol lowing the 
announcement of a debt moratorium are covered through a combination of new 
money' loans from commercial banks a n d additional assistance from official 
resources, and 
- economic discipline is Instilled through the acceptance by the debtor government 
of an IMF sponsored adjustment and stabilization program" 1 2 6 
Contrary to the debt rescheduling agreement, the debt restructuring agreement Is a 
new agreement which replaces the original one 
46 Debt refinancing 
In most cases of over-Indebtedness and default, a rescheduling or restructuring alone 
Is not sufficient to enable a debtor to start paying its arrears and to remain current on 
interest and principal One of the alms of the renegotiation process, though. Is to 
restore the creditworthiness of the debtor country For this, 'fresh money' is needed In 
most cases Thus, as a rule, rescheduling and/or restructuring agreements are 
accompanied by refinancing agreements 
A debt refinancing agreement Is an agreement which contains new loans These 
loans are to be used by the debtor country for the payment of maturities due or due In 
a certain stipulated time period 1 2 7 The major problem regarding the raising of 'fresh 
money' Is to Interest commercial banks to lend more money to a debtor which has not 
proved to be very creditworthy Unwilling banks will defend their unwillingness by 
stating that they do not regard It as a sound banking practice to lend a borrower more 
money Just to enable him to pay interest on existing d e b t s , 2 8 It may safely be said that 
all commercial banks regard these new money loans as an unpleasant feature of the 
debt crisis Participation by all members of the syndicate cannot be compelled by 
legal means Participation must be ensured b y w a y of moral persuasion , 2 9 
Apart from the problem of persuading banks Into participation, there is the difficulty 
of determining the level of participation of each m e m b e r , 3 0 With regard to the 
renegotiations a problem arises concerning the comparability of treatment between 
official creditors and banks The two groups of creditors operate in different fields, they 
125 Hahn H J o p clt ρ 1Θ/9 
126 Buchhelt 1С .op c l t , ρ 36 
127 Р ідп у, G , o p c l t . p 343 
128 Buchhelt, L С Unseating free riders, IFLR sept 198Ç, ρ 14 
129 In order to appease banks forced to lend new money several options have been 
created Banks, now, have a choice with respect to the manner of supplying the new 
money See Buchhelt. LС . op clt.p 36-39 
130 Pelgney,G,op cff.p 346 
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have different aims, and a different approach to the financial needs of the creditor 
"Typically, Paris Club creditors reschedule part or both principal and interest falling 
due during the consolidation period By contrast, banks have almost without 
exception rescheduled varying percentages of principles only Banks, however, in 
many cases contributed to the financing of a debtor's adjustment program by 
agreeing to provide a specified amount of new credits, official creditore consider that 
such new money constitutes action comparable to the rescheduling of Interest by 
the Pans Club - 1 3 1 
The three types of debt renegotiation, as a rule, appear together In most debt 
renegotiation agreements The reason why a creditor prefers one kind to another is 
often determined by Its own preferences The debtor country will request debt relief, 
whether that is in the form of a rescheduling or of a restructuring, both mostly 
accompanied by new money, does not really matter The mam aim of the debtor 
country Is to buy time and money to rebuild its own economy, and that will determine 
the criteria with which It will judge whether a debt renegotiation has brought about the 
desired result or not 
4 7 Objections to the present renegotiation process by the sovereign debtors 
The debt renegotiation process as It has developed during the past decades has a 
few drawbacks for the sovereign debtors The first is the point of time for requesting a 
renegotiation It may seem reasonable that creditors would first like to have certainty 
concerning the debtor's Inability to pursue the repayment of principal and Interest, but 
for the debtor country it might be better to begin renegotiations at a point where there 
still Is a possibility to remain current with payment and to be able to anticipate upon 
future payment difficulties The procedure now pursued is an example of the saying 
"Its too late to lock the stable door after the horse has bolted" 
The second criticism concerns the short term approach taken by the creditors 
Most debt renegotiations are for a one or two year period From a creditors' point of 
view this Is very understandable, a creditor would like to stay In control But from the 
debtors viewpoint this method is unnecessarily time-consuming and hinders the long 
term development of Its economy The short term nature of the renegotiations makes 
It very difficult for the debtor country to address Its structural long term economic 
development To remain current upon payments after the renegotiations. In which 
payments are only delayed for a relatively short term, does not give the debtor 
country enough breathing space The deferment of payments does not mean that 
the level of external debt Is lower It simply means that It is frozen from the date of Its 
moratorium and that it increases as additional money Is borrowed This, in the end, will 
result in a higher debt burden than the debtor country had at the start of the crisis 1 3 2 
In a way, the official creditors have devised a rescheduling mechanism which 
partly meets the criticism on the short term character of the renegotiations They 
Introduced the possibility of a multi-year rescheduling agreement (myra), which deals 
with maturities falling due over a penod of several years The principle aim of a myra Is 
to facilitate a return to normal debtor-creditor relationship by debtor countries that 
131 Вик Dillon К and G Oliveros, op clt ρ 188 
132 Buchhelt LC op clt ρ 35/6 
Bogdanowlcz Bindert Ch A , Restructuring sovereign debt the perspective of the 
sovereign debtor A S IL 1983 ρ 325 
110 
CHAPTER 5 
have made significant progress In their domestic a n d external adjustment factors'. 1 3 3 
If the debtor files a request t o be eligible for a myra, certain conditions must be met. 
The debtor country must already have proven that it is Implementing structural 
adjustment policies a n d the debtor country must consent t o a declining percentage 
of rescheduled debt during the myra remaining In force. 1 3 4 
The procedures evolved In the Paris Club did not hinder the emergence of these 
myra's. They allow these multi-year reschedulings to be consented to by the official 
creditors at an Initial meeting. They do not hinder the automatic rescheduling over 
several years, without further deliberations between creditors and debtor country. 
Often certain conditions are attached to a myra which must be met In order to trigger 
off the next phase of the multi-year rescheduling agreement.135 Although the myra's 
have obvious advantages for both debtor countries and creditors, such as a long 
term approach to the economic development of the debtor country and allowing the 
creditor to know to what It has committed Itself for several years, they have not been 
used very often.1 3 6 
4.8 Debt forgiveness 
The renegotiation process might give some financial breathing space to the debtor 
country; it does not, however, diminish the total debt burden of the country. These 
solutions to the current debt crisis do not take Into account the fact that many Third 
World economies - mostly African - are In ruin and that, due to the development of the 
world economy. Improvement Is not likely for a long period of time to come.1 3 7 
There Is not yet any sign of recovery of the prices of primary commodities and so no 
sign of a possible rise in the volume of export for the poorest countries. 
If these countries are forced to go on In the manner they have done for the last 
decades, constantly renegotiating their foreign debts, inevitably the process will 
come to a grinding halt. It Is obvious that the poorer countries will not be able to meet 
their ever-increasing burden of foreign debt. Debtor countries may then be forced to 
take more severe steps. They have several choices: either to repudiate all debts, to 
sell all State-owned enterprises, or to continue to borrow In order to meet their financial 
obligations. These options all have their obvious drawbacks. 
Repudiation of all debts Is likely to anger the creditors, who will then shut off any 
further flow of credits. This approach will not diminish the debt burden. It might cause 
some temporary relief, due to the non-payment of interest and principal. In the end, 
however, it will hinder future attempts of the debtor country to regain access to the 
credit-market. This conduct will Isolate the debtor In the International community. 
For a State to sell State-owned enterprises or property to foreign buyers does not 
seem a viable solution. It is known that such enterprises hardly ever operate on a 
profit-making basis. A large scale sale of State-owned property and enterprises might 
133 Dillon. K.B.. C M . Watson, G.R. KlncakJ a n d C h . P u c k a h a t t k o m , Recent d e v e l o p m e n t s In 
external d e b t restructuring (1965). p. 23. 
134 Dillon, K.B., C M . Watson, a.o., o p . cit.. p. 24. 
135 Dillon. K.B.. C M . Watson, α.ο.,ορ. cit.. p. 23. 
134 Dillon. K.B. a n d G.OIIveros. o p . cit.. p. 14: 
- Ecuador 1985 
- Cô te d'Ivoire 1986 
- Yugoslavia 1986. 
137 Hal le-Marlam. Y., Legal a n d other justifications for writing-off the debts o f poor third wor ld 
countries: the case of Afr ica South of the Sahara, J.W.T.L. Vol. 24, no. 1 (1990). p. 60. 
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also create a situation in which foreigners have a very large Influence on the running of 
the economy of the country. 
To continue to borrow in order to pay Interest and principal does not help to relieve 
the present debt burden. Such conduct only Increases the debt burden, and leads, 
for the poorer Third World countries, to an evenmore unpayable mountain of debt.138 
The only viable solution for countries which are In such a hopeless situation is to 
request debt forgiveness by their creditors. Debt forgiveness implies that the creditor 
releases the debtor from its commitment to fulfil Its obligations stemming from the loan 
treaty or loan contract. It is a unilateral act committed by the creditor. The consent of 
the creditor is the relevant legal act. The will of the debtor does not play a role, 
although In general it is the debtor who requests such a deed. 
A State creditor will, in general, convert the loan Into a grant to the debtor country. 
A commercial creditor may be less willing to forgive the debtor Its debts. Commercial 
banks are Institutions which have as one of their alms to make profit. They are more 
apt to present the debt reduction In the form of, for example, buy-backs In the debt 
market, debt-of-equity swaps and debt-for-debt swaps. 
5 Conditionality 
Apart from the parties directly concerned, the debtor country and Its creditors, there Is 
a third party Involved in the renegotiation process, the International Monetary Fund. It 
acts as an honest broker. It helps to formulate an adjustment program Incorporating 
the performance criteria for debtor countries' withdrawals under the upper credit 
tranches. It provides IMF resources under stand-by or extended arrangements. It also 
acts as a catalyst In raising external finance from commercial banks.139 
In most debt renegotiations the creditors request the debtor country to enter Into a 
stand-by arrangement with the IMF. This stand-by arrangement Is considered to be a 
'seal of approval'. It can be regarded as a prerequisite for entering Into - successful -
negotiations In both the Paris Club and the 'London' Club. Such a stand-by 
arrangement contains an economic recovery program for the debtor country. The 
progress which the debtor country Is making In the Implementation of this program Is 
monitored by way of performance criteria which are set in the arrangement. This Is 
called the conditionality of a stand-by arrangement. The term conditionality thus 
refers to the policies the Fund expects a member to follow In order to be able to use 
the Fund's General Resources.140 The original Articles of Agreement did not contain a 
reference to conditionality. In the sense of the conditional use of general resources. 
Article V, section 3 stated that 'a member shall be entitled to buy the currency of 
another member from the Fund in exchange for Its own currency subject to the 
following conditions'. These conditions were applicable both to conditional as well as 
unconditional use of the Fund's general resources. Article V, section 3 (a) however did 
have the requirement of usage of the Fund's general resources In accordance with, 
and consistent with, the provisions of the underlying agreement.141 The first 
138 Idem. p. 60. 
139 Hudes. K., Coordination of Paris and London Club reschedulings: International Borrowing, 
Negotiations and Restructuring International Debt Transactions, editor D.D. Bradlow, p. 453. 
143 Gold, J., Conditionality, Pamphlet Series no. 31, IMF 1979. p. 1. 
Dentera, E.M.G.. International law and development, ed. by P. de Waart, P. Peters and E. 
Dentéis, Martlnus MJhoff Publishers, 1988. p. 236. 
141 Gold, J., pp. cit.. no. 31. p. 1 and 3. 
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Amendment of the article Introduced the requirement for the Fund 'to have policies on 
the use of Its resources'. This Article V, section 3 (c) a n d (d), however, did not 
prescribe what those policies should be or what the policies followed by the members 
ought t o be In order t o use the general resources In a c c o r d a n c e with the purposes 
laid d o w n In the Articles of Agreement. 1 4 2 The second Amendment of the articles 
e n a b l e d t he Fund to have special policies for special b a l a n c e of payments 
problems. These policies should also Involve conditlonality. For the first t ime the 
Articles of Agreement make a reference t o stand-by and similar arrangements. 
Article V, section 3 (a) runs as follows: 
"The Fund shall a d o p t policies on the use of Its general resources. Including 
policies on stand-by or similar arrangements, and may adopt special policies for 
special ba lance of payments problems, that will assist members t o solve their 
balance of payments problems In a manner consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use of 
the general resources of the Fund". 
There are t w o kinds of conditlonality which the IMF applies in its relations with its 
members. As stated In Chapter 2, the credit tranche policy is the basic policy. This 
policy Is based on low conditlonality. It involves merely establishment that a country 
has a balance of payments need (a deficit) coupled with a declaration, which the 
Fund does not ordinarily chal lenge, that It is taking measures t o resolve its deficit. 
Special policies, such as those mentioned in Article V, section 3 (a), means policies 
other than a credit tranche policy. These policies are based on high conditionallty. "It 
Involves the country's design of a specific set of measures to eliminate its deficit. Fund 
agreement that the program will be adequate for that purpose, a n d the country's 
commitment to Implement that program". , 4 3 
The stand-by arrangements are always a manifestation of high conditionallty. Low 
conditlonality only plays a role In the credit tranche policies. There are four aspects to 
the notion of (high) conditionallty: 
a. a member must be prepared to pursue policies which are designed to overcome 
Its balance of payments problems; 
b. these policies must be consistent with the purpose of the Fund as stated in the 
Articles of Agreement; 
c. these policies must enable a member to overcome its difficulties within a 
moderate period of time; 
d. these policies must also contribute to the augmentation of the member's 
monetary reserve position In order to enable it to repurchase its currency from the 
Fund In accordance with the principle of a temporary use of the - in principle 
revolving - resources of the Fund. w 
142 Gold,J.,op. c/f.,no.31,p.8. 
143 Gold, J., op. cff.,no. 31, p. 11. 
Gold, J., Financial Assistance by the International Monetary Fund, law and practice, 
Pamphlet Series, no. 29. IMF 1979, p. 2. 
Williamson. J.. The lending policies of the International Monetary Fund. Institute for 
International Economics; Policy analysis In International economics, no. 1,1982, p. 11/12. 
Ш Gold,J.,op. cff.,no.29,p. 19/20. 
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These views, which have developed since 1968 within the IMF, are comprised In the 
decision taken by the Executive Board on March 2, 1979, entitled "Use of the Fund's 
General Resources and Stand-by Arrangements".145 
This decision (Its paragraphs are usually referred to as 'guidelines'), will be the basis 
for this paragraph concerning the policies of the Fund regarding condltionallty as 
Incorporated In the stand-by arrangements which the debtor countries are required to 
engage in before being able to renegotiate their debts with either official creditors or 
commercial creditors. High conditionality Is applied In the case of payments 
concerning the upper credit tranches, the supplementary financing policies, and the 
extended facility.146 
5.1 Why condltionallty? 
Conditionality Is used by the Fund in order to ensure the proper use of Its general 
resources in accordance with Its purposes. In Article I (V) one of the purposes of the 
Fund Is formulated as follows: 
"to give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them 
with an opportunity to correct maladjustments In the balance of payments without 
resorting to measures destructive of national and international prosperity". 
Within this context condltionallty Is based 'on an assessment of the need for 
adjustment which, taking Into account the financing available from the Fund and from 
other external sources to determine the extent and the rhythm of the regional 
adjustment efforts'. ,47 In the Articles of Agreement there is no absolute standard of 
conditionality; nor Is a list of Items making up the requirements for condltionallty 
given.M e 
5.2 Stand-by documents 
The policy of conditionality, as drafted by the debtor State In close consultation with 
the Fund, is worded In the stand-by arrangement. In this arrangement certain policies 
are laid down, which are an expression of the Intentions of the debtor country 
concerning the course it will follow In the near future with regard to Its economic and 
financial policies. These policies are the 'safeguards' as required by Article I (V) of the 
Articles of Agreement for the use of the general resources of the Fund.,49 
145 Gold, J., pp. cff..no.31.p. 15. 
Мб Gold, J., pp. eft., no. 31, p. 14. 
147 S a x e n a . R.B. a n d H.R. Bakshl, IMF C o n d l t i o n a l l t y - A Third W o r l d p e r s p e c t i v e : JWTL Vo l . 2 2 , 
no. 5.19ββ.ρ.70/71. 
According to J. Verloren van Themaat In his article Some notes on IMF condltionallty with 
a human face; International law and development, ed. by P. de Waart .о., p. 299-234, the 
basis tor the IMF condltionallty Is the following: 
- It wants to be sue to get repaid; 
- It wants to be sure that the loan supports the general objectives of the IMF; 
- some allocation criteria should exist. If demand for IMF funds Is larger than the supply 
agreed upon by Its members, (condltionallty Is a "price".) 
- an IMF agreement Is necessary to attract other private and public capital flows. 
148 Plrzlo-Brloll. a . M a k i n g sense o f t h e c o n d l t i o n a l l t y d e b a t e : J.W.T.L Vol . 17 (1983), p. 117. 
Gold, J., op. eft., no. 29, p. 21. 
149 Gold, J., The legal character of the Find's stand-by arrangements and why It matters, IMF 
Pamphlet Series, no. 35. p. 7: 
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In Article XXX (b) the definition of α stand-by arrangement is given: 
"Stand-by arrangement is a decision of the Fund by which a member is assured 
that It will be able to make purchases from the General Resources Account In 
accordance with the terms of the decision during a specific period". 
Together with the letter of Intent of the debtor country to the Executive Board it forms 
the so-called stand-by documents. 1 5 0 
Stand-by arrangements are entered into In the cases m e n t i o n e d a b o v e 
concerning the implementation of conditionallty. But In the decision of March 2, 1979, 
the Executive Board emphasized that member States c a n also turn t o the Fund at an 
early stage when the difficulties that are expected to occur In future have not yet fully 
emerged. It c a n use a stand-by arrangement as a precautionary Instrument, as was 
the original Intention of the stand-by arrangement.1 5 1 
5.3 Contents of stand-by arrangements 
During the process of assisting a member to draw up a stand-by arrangement, the 
Fund will pay due regard, according to paragraph 4 of the 1979 decision, t o the 
domest ic, social a n d polit ical objectives, the e c o n o m i c priorities, a n d the 
circumstances of members, including the causes of their ba lance of payments 
problems. 
Taking these circumstances Into account, the debtor country, with the help of the 
IMF, draws up a viable adjustment program. 
The provisions concerning the adjustment policies c a n be div ided Into three 
categories: 
a. Preconditions: 'actions taken before the program Is agreed upon by the IMF 
Executive Board'. 
b. Performance criteria: 'undertakings given by the country which. If violated, involve 
suspension of further disbursement by the Fund until new understandings are 
reached'. 
c. Policy understandings: 'actions that the country agrees to take, but which do not 
have any explicit sanctions associated with nonfulfillment'.152 
In paragraph 7 of the decision the Executive Board deals with low conditionallty, the 
policies and/or actions a member should take In order to ensure that the Immediate 
use of the Fund's resources Is In accordance with its purposes. These policies are not 
performance criteria and are therefore also applicable to purchases made In the first 
credit tranche. They serve as safeguards for the proper use of the Fund's resources. 
They form the basis of a program; they are In operation from the start.153 
"A major purpose of the Fund In developing stand-by arrangements, and performance 
criteria as a prominent feature of them, was to safeguard the Fund's resources against a 
use contrary to the purpose of the Fund but without the need to rely on decisions 
declaring a member Ineligible to use the resouces of the Fund or limiting Its use of them." 
Article V, section 5: The Fund can take measures In case a member Is using Fund's 
resources 'In a manner contrary to the purposes of the Fund'. 
150 Gold,J.,op.c/f..no.35,p. 1. 
151 Paragraph 1 of the decision of March 2,1979. 
152 Williamson, J., op. dt.. p. 36. 
153 Gold, J., op. c/f., no. 31, p. 28. 
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"The broad objective of condltionallty In the upper credit tranches, when a 
corrective program Is necessary, is to bring about a sustainable balance between 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply In the economy, mainly, but not 
exclusively, by means of credit and fiscal policies".154 
These corrective measures are not always Introduced on the instigation of the Fund; 
sometimes a member has already taken and Implemented corrective measures, 
and only needs time and resources in order to bring about the desired change. The 
program a debtor country wishes to Implement Is usually spelled out In the letter of 
Intent, the Executive Board will determine whether this program is to be supported by 
the resources of the Fund. This program has to be consistent with the purposes and 
policies of the Fund. These corrective measures can either be stated precisely or 
Imprecisely. Some of the stated or defined elements may be turned Into performance 
criteria.155 
In paragraph 9 of the guidelines the principles for selection of performance criteria 
are spelled out: there are to be as few as possible, they have to be limited to those 
that. If observed, will serve as an Indication that the program is succeeding, and they 
must, normally, be limited to macro economic variables or must relate to the 
observance of specific provisions of the Articles or policies of the Fund.,56 
Paragraph 9 recognizes the fact that a member might wish to Include non-
economic performance criteria, which would otherwise be hard to Implement In the 
country. The last sentence of this paragraph makes clear that the Executive Board 
does not limit the use of performance criteria to the macro economic variables or 
other provisions related to the Articles of Agreement, there Is no fixed list of 
performance criteria. The Inclusion of performance criteria In the economic recovery 
program, as well as the fact that the resources the Fund makes available are given in 
phases. Is Intended to make the condltionallty effective. Instalments are made when 
performance criteria are met or, if the country did not meet the set performance 
criteria, when the Fund Is - otherwise - satisfled with the conduct of the member (waiver 
of performance criteria). Imprecisely stated corrective measures, which are not 
regarded as performance criteria, may be viewed as policy understandings. Since it 
is possible to agree upon a stand-by arrangement for up to three years. It may not 
always be possible to formulate one or more performance criteria which will be 
applicable to the whole period. It might be necessary to review them as time 
progresses, either because only then It will be possible to formulate them In a precise 
way or because adjustment Is necessary due to changed economic circumstances. 
These changed economic circumstances can be brought about by the 
Implementation of the stand-by program or by external economic changes.157 
154 Gold,J.,op. ctt.,no.31,p.30. 
155 Williamson, J., op. clt. p. 38: 
'Factors playing a rote In determining the perfofmance-crlterla: 
- objectivity; 
- timely availability of data to assess compliance; and 
- the significance of the variable as an Indicator of overall compliance with the agreed 
program'. 
156 Gold, J., op. ctf.,no. 31. p. 32. 
157 Gold, J., op. eft., no. 31. p. 34/5. 
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5.4 The legal character of stand-by arrangements 
A moot point within the International community is the legal characterization of stand-
by arrangements. Does a stand-by arrangement constitute an International 
agreement between the International Monetary Fund and the Member State or Is It Just 
an arrangement which cannot legally be enforced?158 
The IMF has a clear opinion on the question. In paragraph 3 of the 1979 decision it 
declares that 'stand-by arrangements are not international agreements and therefore 
language having a contractual connotation will be avoided In stand-by 
arrangements and letters of intent'. 
The procedure which Is followed does not give any indication that an International 
agreement Is being concluded. The letter of intent, which Is to be regarded as a 
political statement, is sent by the debtor State's government to the Managing 
Director, who will pass It on to the Executive Board.159 The Fund Informs the member of 
Its decision regarding the requested stand-by arrangement. There is no exchange of 
signatures or documents, as is the normal procedure with the realization of an 
International agreement. 
In paragraph 9 of the 1979 deciston it becomes clear that 'neither the observance 
nor the non-observance of performance criteria provides an automatic verdict 
whether the program Is succeeding or failing'. The non-observance of the 
performance criteria Is not regarded as a breach of contract. If the IMF suspends the 
possibility of making purchases in the upper credit tranches because of non-
observance of the performance criteria by the member state, this Is not a sanction for 
the breach of contract, but a measure to safeguard the proper use of Its resources.'60 
Obligations which might arise from the stand-by documents are obligations which 
arise out of the Articles of Agreement or general decisions of the Fund.161 In the view of 
the IMF neither the letter of Intent nor the stand-by arrangement can be regarded as a 
binding document, because the Intention to be bound (animus contrahendi) is 
lacking.,62 
Other reasons for the IMF not to consider the stand-by documents as legally 
binding are the wish to avoid a contractual relationship with a member state other than 
one based on the Articles of Agreement, the desire to avoid political embarrassment 
the member on the part of undertaking an obligation with an external authority 
regarding internal economic policies, and the desire to avoid conflicts with other 
International organizations whose field of action might be trodden upon.163 Recently, 
158 Gold. J., pp. cit., no. 35, p. 2. 
159 It Is not to be regarded as a declaration, with the Intention to be bound. Nuclear Test Case. 
/CJ Reports, 1974, no. 43 and no. 46. 
IdO Gold, J., op. cit., no. 31, p. 7: 
'A major purpose of the Fund In developing stand-by arrangements, and performance 
criteria as a prominent feature of them, was to safeguard the funds resources against a 
use contrary to the purposes of the Fund but without the need to rely on decisions 
declaring a member Ineligible to the use of the Fund or limiting Its use'. 
loi Gold. J., op. cit.. no. 31, p. 27. 
162 I.C.J., (20-12-1974) Nuc lea r Test-cases: 
"When It Is the Intention of the State making the declaration that It should become bound 
according to Its terms, that Intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal 
undertaking, the State being therefore legally required to follow a course of conduct 
consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind. If given publicly, and with an 
Intent to be bound, even though not made In the context of International negotiations Is 
Wndng' (/CJ Reports. 1974. no. 43, p. 267 and no. 46, p. 472). 
163 Gold, J., several pamphlets. 
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another reason has emerged stand-by arrangements tend to be spread over a 
longer period Consequently, the performance criteria - or at least some of them - will 
be formulated in less definite language During the period which covers the stand-by 
arrangement these performance criteria must be clarified 164 
In spite of the rise and acknowledgement of the 'contrat à contenu variable' (which 
permits modification of the original conditions in the view of the changed 
circumstance In time) the traditional concept, that a purported agreement Is 'Illusory' 
or 'void for uncertainty' If It Is Imprecise or Incomplete, still holds firm 16S 
5 5 The role of the IMF In the handling of debt problem 
The role the IMF plays In the renegotiation process Is quite formidable It comes In at a 
very early stage, at the time the debtor requests a renegotiation of its debts with its 
creditors The creditors request the debtor, as a prerequisite, to enter Into a stand-by 
arrangement with the IMF By means of formulating such an economic recovery 
program, in collaboration with the debtor, the IMF has the opportunity to leave Its mark 
on the economic policies of the country for a considerable period of time. Although a 
debtor State might wish to object to such interference and claims its right to determine 
its own economic policies. It Is hardly left any choice Since the stand-by arrangement 
Is a prerequisite for the start of the negotiation process by the creditor and is viewed 
by the creditors as a guarantee of future sound economic policies, the creditors will 
not be willing to renegotiate any debt of a debtor who Is not willing to comply with the 
requirements set by the IMF. And If no renegotiation of Its debts Is conducted It will be 
very hard for the debtor country to find new money and debt relief, which It so much 
needs. The compliance with the conditions set by the IMF Is the gateway to new funds 
and reorganisation of its debt structure 
164 Gold.J .op ctf.no 35,p 17/8 
165 Gold.J .op clt,no 35,ρ 18 
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INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE NOTION OF EQUITY MEANS OF 
CORRECTING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOAN TREATIES 
Introduction 
The problem of the (over)lndebtedness of the developing countries Is α problem of 
development The economic and social development of the debtor countries has 
stagnated, due to, among other things, the balance of payment problems 
Although underdevelopment Is first and foremost regarded as a political and 
economic problem, it is partly caused by the structure of world economic relations 
Underdevelopment is not a purely national problem, caused by governmental 
Incapacity or corruption. It has its roots In the world economic structure It Is 
embedded In International economic relations ' The international character of the 
development of the national economies has been recognized by the United Nations 
In Its Charter2 Does international law recognize a right to development? 
1 International law of development 
The content of the International law of development is formed by the topics which the 
non-aligned movement has put on the agenda of the International community since 
the beginning of the 1960s financial and monetary cooperation, commerce, the 
transfer of technology, industrialization, the permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, the role of the transnational organizations, etc 3 
It concerns Itself with the social and economic structure of the International order 
Since the economic structure of the International order is one of Interdependence of 
the different national economies the problem of underdevelopment Is not a national 
problem, but a problem with a distinct international dimension 
'Le sous-développement est un phénomène structurelle lié à un type donné de 
relations économiques Internationales, et à une certaine division Internationale du 
travail Le sous-développement est même le produit direct de cette division 
Internationale"4 
One of the excrescences of the underdevelopment of the Third World and their wish 
to reverse this situation is the current debt crisis It is therefore appropriate to examine 
whether the International law of development can play a role in the legal approach to 
this problem 
"Practically all states now officially accept the promotion of the welfare of their 
citizens as one of the legal duties of the state Thus the concept of collective 
1 Bedjaoul M Propos libres sur le droit au développement. Le droit International a l'heure 
de sa codification. Etudes en Ihonneur de Roberto Ago, II, ρ 19 
2 In the preambule Articles 1(3) 55 and 56 
3 Feuer/Cassan, Droit du développement, ρ 12 
4 Bejaoil, M , op cff. ρ 19 
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responsibility of the community for the social and economic well-being of its parts 
has become a general principle of law recognized by the nations. Hence the 
properly founded demand to also recognize the principle In international law".5 
The international law of development consists of two core elements: the right to 
development and the duty to cooperate for development.6 Are these concepts to 
be regarded as international law? 
1.1 Is there a righi to development ? 
In the literature, two approaches to the concept of right to development can be 
found: a third generation of human rights or a right of state. The first approach sees the 
right to development as an Individual nght, the second as a collective right. 
The General Assembly of the United Nations has frequently designated the right to 
development as a human right.7 In its Declaration on the Right to Development the 
General Assembly has explicitly stated that the right to development Is a human right.8 
There are. however, some difficulties attached to this view. To whom can the 
Individual to turn In order to exercise this right to development? To the state of which 
he is a national or to the International community at large? 
As stated In Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to Development, 'the right to 
development is an Inalienable right by virtue of which every human person and all 
peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social. 
cultural and political development, In which all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms can be fully realized'. 
In the case of the traditional human rights, the State Is the bearer of the duties which 
stem from those rights. But In the case of the so-called third generation of human 
rights, the right to development and the right to peace, this Is not clearly defined. Is the 
International community responsible, since the Individual states cannot possibly fulfil 
the obligations which arise out of these rights? Is It possible for Individuals and peoples 
to claim the fulfilment of these rights from the International community; to whom should 
they turn , who should claim them forthem? 
"And If, as Is not Improbable In the case of the solidarity rights, the concept of 
'people' may be considered as being synonymous with the citizens of a state' or 
'nation', then the vicious circle Is complete: the only legitimate representative of 
the citizens of the state is the state, at which moment the concept of human rights 
would have been stood upon its head".9 
It is obvious that the vision of the right to development as a human right will remain a 
troubled one. The above questions will remain unanswered for a long time, and will be 
hard to solve, if indeed they ever will be. 
To classify right to development as an Individual right Is not a useful means to attain 
the objectives of this right. As stated in the Introduction to this chapter, the problem of 
5 Róllng. B.V.A., as cited by W.D. Verwey In Ns article The principle of a new International 
economic order and the law of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. L J.I.L.. Vol. 3 
no.2,1990. p.123. 
6 Garcla-Amador. F.V., The emerging International law of development. Oceano 
a/b//catonsl990.p.31. 
7 For example. A/Res/3Ó/133 and A/Res/2542 XXIV. 
8 A/Res/41/128. Art. 1. 
9 Kooljmans, P.H., Human Rights - Universal panacea .... N.I.LR. 1990. Vol. XXXVII. no. 3, p. 
323. 
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(underdevelopment is not α national problem which c a n be solved by e a c h State 
Individually It is caused by the structure of world economic relations, a n d the relations 
e m b e d d e d in this structure, such as the International division of labour, are 
International The solution for lopsided growth c a n only be found on this level, the inter­
state level 
The second approach regards the right to development as a collective right, a 
right which belongs to states, nations and peoples Why should It be regarded as a 
collective right? 
"En effet s il est parfaitement évident que le droit au développement est un droit de 
l'homme car I Individu est le destinataire final des normes juridiques Internationales, 
Il n'en demeure pas moins vrai que la proclamation d un tel droit s'opère dans le 
cadre bien précis d un système qui est, lui, Interétatique"10 
The question of development Is by Its nature an International phenomenon ! ' The right 
to development as a collective right might serve as a legal instrument In the quest for 
a more equitable economic and social international order 
The collective right to development Is built up out of the following elements the 
right of peoples to self-determination, the right to live In peace, the right of every state 
to exercise permanent sovereignty over Its wealth, natural resources and economy 
the right of peoples to participate on a basis of equality in the decision-making 
process with regard to questions concerning world economy, development and 
peace, and the right of people to active and peaceful co-existence 12 From the 
above listed elements of the right to development it Is clear that the right to 
development may be regarded as a collective right 
The right to development Is based on two pillars the right to self-determination and 
International solidarity It Is built Into the right to self-determination "ce droit au 
développement ne peut être quun droit absolument inherent', 'bullt In', Inclus 
Indissolublement dans le droit a l'autodétermination"13 International solidarity Is 
based on the fact that there Is an Interdependency between the national economies 
The causes of the debt problem are worldwide. It has - to a great extent - been 
brought about by external factors, on which the debtor country cannot exercise an 
Influence on, but which - due to the Interdependency of the different economies - do 
have a noticeable, negative. Influence on the economic and social development of 
the country As each State In Its own way contributes to the development of the world 
economy and In that way has an Influence on other economies, each State should 
have the duty to take Into account the Interests of the other States when taking 
economic measures They should have an eye for the detrimental effects these can 
have on other economies 
12 Is there a corresponding duty to cooperate for development? 
In order to determine whether this Is a genuine legal right, we must analyse the nature 
of the duty stemming from the right to development M Is there a duty for States to 
cooperate for development to be found In the International legal system? 
Ю Bedjaoul M opclt.p 17 
11 Idem ρ 16 
12 Garcta-Amador, F V op cff, ρ 57 
13 Bedjaoul M o p cff ρ 22 
VI Idem ρ 60 
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The answer may be found In a number of legal Instruments such as the Charter for 
the Economic Rights and Duties of States and Lome-Conventions most of them 
initiated by developing countries The United Nations Charter plays an important role 
here 
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States states "that the responsibility 
for the development of every country rests primarily upon itself but that concomitant 
and effective international cooperation Is an essential factor for the full achievement 
of Its own development goals" Article 17 emphasizes that International co-operation 
for development Is the shared goal and common duty of all states and that every 
state should co-operate to achieve this development with active assistance , 5 
But do the good intentions expressed In these and other international legal 
Instruments amount to an enforceable duty to co-operate for development? In order 
to find the basis for a duty to co-operate as the other side of the coin of the right to 
development we should first turn to the United Nations Charter, which Is a binding 
Instrument for Its members, and specifically to the articles 55 and 56 of Chapter IX on 
International economic and social co-operation 
Article 55 states the goals the UN should strive for with a view to the creation of 
conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly 
relations among nations The action undertaken shall be based on respect for the 
principles of equal rights and self-detemnlnatlon This article addresses Itself not to the 
Individual members but to the organization as a whole It is very doubtful whether an 
Individual member could derive a right from the goals stated In this article It only 
compells the organization to promote higher standards of living solutions to problems 
relating to the economic, social, health and related fields and the respect for human 
rights No rights and duties can be derived for the obligation to promote development 
by the organization 
Article 56, however, asks the members to undertake actions In these fields, either 
Individually or jointly This obligation is binding upon the member states of the UN but It 
is an obligation which is very vaguely formulated It seems difficult to derive concrete 
rights form this pledge 
The Declaration on the Right to Development of 1986 could be seen as an recent 
attempt to give a more specific Interpretation to Article 56 of the UN Charter Article 4 
states 
" 1 States have the duty to take steps. Individually and collectively, to formulate 
International development policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of 
the right to development 
2 Sustained action is required to promote more rapid development of countries 
As a complement to the efforts of developing countnes, effective International 
co-operation Is essential In providing these countries with appropriate means 
and facilities to foster their comprehensive development" ,6 
Another attempt to give a concrete interpretation to the right to development was 
undertaken by the International Law Association In 1986 Principle 6. and more 
especially principle 6 2 of Its Seoul Declaration on the right to development refers to 
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations 
"By virtue of the right to development as a principle of human rights law. Individuals 
and peoples are entitled to the results of the efforts of States, individually and 
collectively, to implement Article 55 and 56 of the United Natrons Charter In order to 
15 A/Res/3281 XXIX Charter of Economic Right and Duties of States 
16 A/Res/41/128 14 12 19Θ6-adopted by 146 votes to 1 with θ abstentions 
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achieve a proper social and International order for the implementation of the 
Human Rights, through a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political 
process based upon their free and active participation " 
Although the General Assembly resolution refers to a duty of states to formulate 
development policies, this Is not a legally binding obligation upon the members 
Resolutions of the General Assembly are not Instruments with a legally binding 
character, not even for members who voted In favour of the resolution No rights can 
be derived from a resolution The duty to cooperate, one may conclude. Is not a legal 
duty In International law with regard to the promotion of development 
If, however, we examine the foundations or principles upon which the right to 
development Is built, it could be possible to find principles of "hard" law The 
foundations on which the right to development Is based are the principle of 
sovereignty (principle of non-intervention, free choice of the economic and social 
system, sovereignty over natural· resources) and the principle of equality (formal 
equality of states and material Inequality) , 7 
The principles which form the principle of sovereignty are, nowadays recognized 
as rules of International law 'Viola donc le lien organique puissant établi entre 
souveraineté et droit au développement opposable erga omnes II est evident 
qu'analyse ainsi, cet aspect du droit au développement ne peut que relever du Jus 
cogens" 1 β 
On the other hand, the elements of the equality principle are less easily found In 
legally binding rules of law The principle of material Inequality has been recognized, 
Inter alia In the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade " But whether the favourable 
treatment of developing countries vis-à-vis developed countries can be ensured In 
other cases remains very much the question Does the equality principle, for 
example, contain a duty to give development aid ? If so, this would mean that there 
exists a principle of solidarity which Is recognized as a rule of International law In state 
practice, however, no support can be found for such a statement At the most one 
can derive from the practice of states the fact that the industrialized countnes do feel 
a moral duty to provide development aid and that, perhaps In future, a right might 
evolve out of this practice At present we can only conclude that at most a rule of 
"soft" law can be found with regard to state practice It would be difficult to give a 
concrete contents to the duty to provide development aid Who should be the 
beneficiary'', who has a duty to give the aid and to whom?, what would be the amount 
of the development aid? etc 
The developed countnes may have a duty to give aid to developing states vis-à-
vls the International community, but the question remains, who can enforce this right? 
Is this the responsibility of the United Nations as the representative of the International 
community'720 
Probably the duty to cooperate for development amounts at the moment to not 
more than a duty or obligation to negotiate with a view to defying more precisely the 
target to be reached and the ways and means of reaching them 
17 Feuer/Cassan op clt ρ 28-33 
18 Bejaoul. M , op clt ρ 32-33 
19 For example non-reclproclfy and preferential treatment In the trade relations between 
the developed and developing countries 
2D Bleckmann A Anspruch auf Entwicklungshilfe?. ρ 14 
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The right to development and the applicability to the debt problem 
The right to development has be recognized as a right for States and as a human 
right. As a human right It has. in my view, no role to play In the solution of the 
development problems of the debtor countries. It could play such a role as a 
collective right. There Is, however, no corresponding duty to cooperate for 
development. The right to development for States is directed at the International 
community.21 States should have the duty to take the adverse effect on other 
economies of the economic policies they pursue Into account. This should. In my 
view, be a correct Interpretation of the right to development and Its corresponding 
duty to cooperate for development. There Is still a long way to go before this point is 
reached, but If a start Is made by Interpreting Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations 
Charter in this manner. It will certainly contribute to a 'hardening' of the law of 
development.22 How can the debtor States Invoke the right to development as a way 
of obtaining relief from their debt burden? The debtor State cannot Invoke It against Its 
Individual creditors. It should, however, be taken Into account by the creditor States 
during the renegotiation of the external debt of the debtor State. The renegotiations 
should be conducted In such a way that the repayment arrangement contributes to 
the development of the debtor State's economy.The creditors should take the 
development goals of the debtor State Into account; the burden of the repayment of 
the principle and the Interest should not endanger this development. 
As has been stated in Chapter 3, the odious debts doctrine also takes Into account 
the right to development of the debtor State. The debts of a former regime, which 
were contracted In a manner contrary to the well-being of Its people, the 
development of the country, should not burden the present government. 
2 Equity 
"Without ensuring the principle of equity there Is no true equality of nations and 
States In the World Community consisting of countries of different levels of 
development. A new International economic order should therefore be 
developed by the United Nations and International organizations, by treaties and 
by State practice In conformity with the principle of equity, which means that this 
development should aim at a Just balance between developed and developing 
countries. The principle Is also an Integral element in the Interpretation of the law by 
International courts or arbitration tribunals and may be applied by them to 
supplement the law". 
During its meeting in Seoul in 1986, the International Lawyeis Association adopted a 
declaration on the legal aspects of a new international economic order, with the 
above quoted principle of equity. It may be regarded as a reflection of the discussion 
21 The existence of an International community as such Is recognized in, for example: 
- Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; 
- The Barcelona Traction case (1970): Speaks of obligations of States towards the 
International communi ty as a whole: " Such obl igat ions der ive, for example . In 
contemporary law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, a n d of genoc ide, as also 
from the principles a n d rules concern ing the basis rights of the human person, 
Including protect ion from slavery and racial discrimination". 
- Article 19 of the draft articles on State Responsibility. 
22 See also Koot|mans. P.H., op.clt.. p.327 et seq. 
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concerning the nature a n d role of equity, which has been the subject of much 
debate. One of the points of discussion has been the legal characterization of equity. 
Is it t o be regarded as part of the law or as a principle which Is not part of the law, but 
which does have a profound Influence on the law? Aristotle, In his Ethica Nicomachea, 
said that equity Is to be regarded as a correction of the law: "This Is the essential 
nature of the equitable: It Is a rectification of law where law is defective because of Its 
generality. In fact that Is the reason why things are not all determined by law: It Is 
because there are some cases for which it Is Impossible to lay down a law, so that a 
special ordinance becomes necessary. For what Is itself Indefinite c a n only be 
measured by an Indefinite standard". 2 3 Equity, as a correction of the law, as a 
complement to the law. Is the role it had to fulfil In the English legal system. The English 
notion of equity may be looked upon as the starting point of the use of equity In 
m o d e m legal systems. 
"English equity began as an attempt t o mitigate the Incidence of the rules of 
c o m m o n law in cases where, owing t o their particular circumstances the strict -
one might almost say blind - application of the rule of c o m m o n law would work 
manifest injustice -.2 4 
It Is v iewed as a moderator or a principle which might have a discretionary Influence 
upon the rigorously formulated law. It Is a principle which exerts Its Influence from 
outside the system of law. Does equity fulfil the same role in International law? 
According to the International Court of Justice in its judgement in the case concerning 
the Continental Shelf In 1982, "the legal concept of equity is a general principle directly 
applicable as law".2 5 
What is the consequence of the fact that equity is a general principle applicable 
as law. Instead of a rule of law? "Precisely because - unlike rules - they do not contain 
any concrete rights a n d obligations, but points of departure, objectives, criteria and 
means, they cannot generally be appl ied as an Independent norm, but only In 
combination with one or more rules of law. They may then serve as guiding principles 
In the interpretation and application of those rules ..Λ26 This implies that International 
courts or tribunals which are called upon t o apply International law have to take the 
principle of equity Into consideration.2 7 
Although the ICJ has a c c e p t e d equity as a general principle applicable as law. Its 
position within the legal framework still causes fr ict ion. 2 8 The fact that equity, or 
23 Reference to this citat ion of Aristotle Is to b e found In Van DIJk, P., Nature a n d function of 
equity In Intemattonal economic law, Grotlana. Vol. 7 (1986). p. 6. 
24 Jennings. Sir R,Y., Equity a n d equitable prindptes. Schweizerisches Jahrbuch. 1986, XLII, p. 
27. 
35 'It was often contrasted with the rigid rules of positive law, the severity of which h a d t o b e 
mit igated In order to d o Justice. In general, this contrast has no parallel In the development 
of International law; the legal concept of equity Is a general principle directly applicable 
as law". Case concerning the continental shelf, Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahlrlya, 
242.1982. ICJReports 1982. § 71, p. 40. 
Ά Van DIJk, P., op. cit.. p. 24. 
27 Idem, p. 13. 
2B Brownlle, In his work Principles of Public International Law states: "Equity Is used ... In the 
sense of consideration of fairness, reasonableness, and policy often necessary for the 
sensible application of the more settled rules of law. Strictly, It cannot be a source of law, 
and yet It may be an Important factor In the process of decision', p. 16. 
Jennings, In his article on Equity and equitable principles states: "In a discussion of equity It 
Is often necessary to use the term 'law' In two different ways. First there Is the use of the 
term to Indicate the whole system of law, which of course Includes equity within It. This Is 
the sense In which It Is used by International courts when they Insist that It Is the law which 
requires equitable principles to be applied. But then there Is also law In a narrower and 
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equitable principles, will have to be taken Into account when applying rules, has given 
rise to the suspicion that subjectivity is being introduced.29 This fear for subjectivity 
might be strengthened by the words of the International Court of Justice in Its 
judgement on the Continental Shelf cases In 1969: "In fact, there is no legal limit to the 
considerations which States may take account of for the purpose of making sure that 
they apply equitable procedures, and more often than not it is the balanclng-up of all 
such considerations that will produce this result rather than reliance on one to the 
exclusion of all others. The problem of the relative weight to be accorded to different 
considerations naturally varies with the circumstances of the case".30 But one should 
not confuse the use of equitable principles by the court with a decision ex aequo et 
bono by the court.31 A decision given by the court based on the applicable rules of 
international law, while taking Into consideration equity in order to reach an equitable 
result. Is a decision within the context of Article 3Θ (1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. The taking Into account of equitable principles does not mean that 
the rules of International law which are In force are Jettisoned; on the contrary, the 
application of these rules Is refined and made applicable to a particular case, due to 
the use of equity.32 
Equity as a general principle applicable as law does not only play a role at the 
stage where rules of International law are put to the test, but also In the process of 
creating rules of International law. Equity can be applied In three ways: Infra legem. 
praeter legem and contra legem.33 Equity, thus, fulfils a triple function, a corrective 
function, a supplementary function and an elementary function.34 
stricter sense In which rules of law are actually contrasted with rules or principles of equity 
... These two different meanings of the word law are Inescapable precisely because 
equity Is dlsttnghulsable from law and Is yet part of If, p. 28,29. 
29 Akehurst Is one of the authors who warns against the use of equity: The ... main danger of 
applying equity lies In the f a c t that equity Is subjective ... Even In a national society, equity 
c a n sometimes "vary with the length of the chancellor's foot ' . The p r o b l e m Is far more 
a c u t e In the International society, where polit ical, ethical a n d cultural values are far more 
heterogeneous than In a national society"· Citation Van DIJk, P., op. cit.. p. 5. 
30 /Cy/teports.l969§93.p.50. 
31 ",.. the Court Is then freed from the strict appllcaflon of legal rules in order to bring about an 
appropriate settlement. The task of the Court In the present case Is quite different: It Is 
bound to apply equitable principles as part of International law, and to balance up the 
various considerations which It regard as relevant In order to produce an equitable 
result·, «em §71. p. 60. 
32 Jennings. Sir R.Y., op.cff., p. 28. 
"The result of the appl icat ion of equitable principles must b e equitable. This terminology. 
which Is generally used. Is not entirely satisfactory because It employs the term equitable 
to characterize b o t h the result to be achieved a n d the means to b e appl ied to reach this 
result. It Is, however, the result which Is predominant; the principles are subordinate to the 
goal . The equltableners of a principle must b e assessed In the lights of Its usefulness for 
the purpose of arriving a t a n equitable result... From this consideration It follows that the 
term 'equi table principles' c a n n o t b e Interpreted In the abstract; It refers b a c k to the 
principles a n d rules which m a y b e appropr iate In order to achieve a n equi table result'. 
Case concerning the Continental Shelf. Tunisia v. Ubyan Arab JamaNriya, 24.2.1982, p. 59, § 
Ж 
33 V a n DIJk, P., o p . cit.. p. 24/25: (a) appl icat ion of equity Infra І д т: "Is a t Issue If equity 
forms a part of the rule of law to b e appl ied a n d as such prov ided a guideline for the 
Interpretation a n d appl icat ion of that rule, or If it forms, as a general legal principile, part of 
the a p p l i c a b l e system of law a n d therefore provides the guideline from outside the rule, 
but Inside the system of law. The equity principle may have a specifying and 
supplementary effect with respect to the rule to be applied, but also a corrective one. In 
consequence of which a special meaning may be assigned to the formulation of the rule, 
or the rule may be held not to be applicable to this particular case", (b) application of 
equity praeter legem: "In a situation where no applicable rule of law Is available and the 
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'Equity does not necessarily Imply equality"35 Equity, however, does play a role In 
finding an equitable solution in a particular case It, then, serves as a principle which 
has to be taken Into account as a reaction to an application of the rules, which might 
otherwise lead to an unjust outcome 3 6 "Rétablir l'équilibre entre des situation 
différentes, tel peut être l'objet d'une égalité qui réponde à I équi té"3 7 Equity serves to 
do Justice, to find just solutions for different cases3 8 Equity Is frequently mentioned In 
documents concerning the economic relations between States, such as the 
declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States 3 ' 
generally applicable equity principle Is specified In a rule of law for that particular case. 
Here, therefore, by way of exception, equity may assume the character of an 
Independent rule of law, although there will usually be question of an analogous 
application of existing rules of law", (c) application of equity contra legem 'occurs In 
cases where a court or other Institution administering Justice reaches the conclusion that 
the applicable rule does not satisfy the requirements of equity and, on that ground, does 
not apply this rule but replaces It In this specific case by another rule of law which It 
creates or wNch It applies analogously Since article 38. par 2 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice provides explicitly that this Court may be guided by equity 
Instead of the law - may decide ex aequo ef bono - \f the parties agree to this, It Is 
generally presumed that this derogation from the law Is not permitted without such 
agreement ' 
3i Nathan, Ε , The Vienna Conventton on succession of States In respect of State property, 
archives and debts. International law a time of perplexity, Fssays In honor of Shabtal 
Rosenne. ed Yoram Dlnsteln. Martlnus Nljhoff Publishers. 1989 
36 ICJReports 1969,§91,ρ 49 
36 Mortelmans, К J M . Billijkheid en economisch recht. Utrecht papers o n International, 
social a n d economic law, nr 2,1989. ρ 3 
37 Charles De Vlsscher In De I équité dans le règlement arbitral on Judiciaire des litiges d e 
droit International public. Paris 1972. ρ 4 Citation Van Dijk o p c/f. ρ '41 Also seperate 
opinion Judge Jiménez d e Aréchage "Its having authority to apply equi table principles 
does not entitle a court to reach a capricious decision In each particular case but to 
reach that decision which. In the light of the Individual circumstances. Is Just and right for 
that case ' Case concerning the Continental Shelf. Tunisia ν Libyan Arab Jemahlrlya, 
242 1982, ICJ Reports 1982, ρ 106, §25 
38 Idem, ρ 106, §24 a n d Judgement of the Court In same case 'Equity as a legal c o n c e p t Is a 
direct emanation of the Idea of Justice', ICJ Reports 1982. §71, ρ 60 
39 Declaration o n the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (Res 3201 (S-Vl), 
1 May 1974)· In the preambule equity Is mentioned as one of the principles of a NIEO'. for 
the establishment of a New International Economic Order based o n equity, sovereign 
equality. Interdependence, common Interest and co-operation among all States, 
Irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall correct Inequalities and 
redress existing Injustices ...'. The principle Is further worked out In the declaration, for 
example In 4 (b) 
Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (Res 3202 
(S-VI). 1 May 1974) Equity Is mentioned In part II International monetary system and 
financing of the development countries In all phases of decision-making for the 
formulation of an equitable and durable monetary system and adequate participation of 
developing counties In all bodies entrusted with this reform . ' and In § 2 (c) "more 
effective participation by developing countries, whether recipients or contributors. In the 
decisionmaking process In the competent organs of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association, 
ttvough the establishment of a more equitable pattern of voting rights" 
In the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States the principle of equity Is mentioned 
In the preambule declaring that It Is a fundamental purpose of the present Charter to 
promote the establishment of a new International economic order, based on equity. 
sovereign equality. Interdependence, common Interest and co-operation among all 
States. Irrespective of their economic and social systems And. with regard to economic 
relations In Artide 8: "States should co-operate In facilitating more rational and equitable 
International economic relations and In encouraging structural changes In the context of 
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According to Van Dijk, the function of equity In the above-mentioned documents Is 
quadruple: 
- "as a basis and guideline for the distribution and assignment of benefits, 
possibilities, powers and claims In the context of a concrete scheme ..." 
- "as a basis and guideline for the interpretation of existing rules of law in the fields of 
international economic relations..." 
- "as a basis and guideline for the amendment of existing rules of law In the field of 
International relations" 
- "as a basis and guideline for the establishment of new structures for, and legal 
relations within the International economic order".40 
Equity has a corrective function to the rigid application of the rules of law. It should 
serve as a guiding principle In the Interpretation and application of those rules. 
Equity and Its applicability to the debtproblsm 
Just as the right to development Is applicable as a corrective means when 
determining the capacity to pay of the debtor State, so equity Is applicable as a 
corrective means when reassessing the burden of debt. Is it equitable that all debts, 
and more especially those debts that did not contribute to the development of the 
economy of the country or the well-being of Its people, remain at the expense of the 
debtor State? A creditor who supplied moneys for purposes not in conformity with the 
Interests of the State should not expect that the debtor State, the successor 
government, will carry the burden. The principle of equity may serve as a 
reinforcement of the rules derived from the odious debt doctrine. 
In the case of normal debts, debts contracted In conformity with International law 
and to the benefit of the people of the debtor State, equity may also play a role In the 
reassessment of the debt burden. It Is contrary to the principle of equity that the 
deteriorating economic factors, which caused the aggravation of the external debt 
burden, should only be laid to the account of the debtor State. The principle of equity 
should plan an Important role when renegotiations are conducted in the Paris Club or 
'London' Club. It should serve as a guideline for adjusting the debt burden or, even 
more so, as ground for debt relief. 
a balanced world economy In harmony with the needs and Interests of all countries, and 
should take appropriate measures to this end. 
43 Van Dijk, P.. op.clt.. p. 31/32. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In the previous chapters I have tried to outline the relevant rules of international law and 
their applicability to the current debt problem. Which rules can a debtor State Invoke 
to obtain an adjustment of Its debt burden? In Chapter 3 It was shown that the possible 
use of rules emerging out of the law on State succession in the current situation is 
limited to debts which were contracted not In accordance with international law or 
were used In a way, which did not benefit the development of the economy of the 
debtor State or the well-being of Its people. Applicability of these rules might be 
allowed in the case of a dramatic change of government, although that does not 
amount - In a legal sense - to State succession. Nevertheless I have strictly argued that 
International law. In times In which State succession does not occur frequently and 
radical change of government is more likely to be the expression of discontempt with 
the present regime, should adapt Itself to this reality. It should attach the same 
consequences to such a radical - democratic - change of government as to a 
normal case of State succession. 
In Chapter 4 the rules emerging out of the law of treaties and the law of State 
responsibility, which amount In general to no more than a right to request renegotiation 
of the external debt, were discussed. Especially Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties and Article 33 of the draft Articles on State Responsibility are of use 
to the debtor countries. The Invocation of these principles does not lead to an 
annulment of the external debt, but to a right to request the creditors to renegotiate 
the debts. During these renegotiations the state of the economy of the debtor country 
should be taken into account, its capacity to pay. The two main tools of the debtor 
countries are the right to request negotiations - and the corresponding duty to 
negotiate on the side of the creditor State - and the fact that their capacity to pay 
should be taken Into account. Negotiations are generally conducted within the 
structure of the Paris Club and the 'London' Club. The Paris Club has set the rules. 
Paris Club renegotiations 
The Paris Club has played a very Important role over the last thirty years In the 
management of the external debt problems of debtor countries. The procedure Is still 
based on the four pillars mentioned In Chapter 5: the Initiative for the renegotiations 
should be taken by the debtor; all creditors should be treated equal; the negotiations 
are to be conducted on a case-by-case basis and an economic adjustment 
program, drafted In cooperation with the IMF, Is a prerequisite for the negotiations to 
start. The Paris Club procedures have crystallized In international usage, even In those 
few cases in which the negotiations were not conducted In the context of the Paris 
Club.1 
Do these procedures amount to the emergence of rules of international law? Does 
the outcome of the different negotiation processes serve as a legally valid precedent 
1 Bothe M. and J. Brink, op.dt., p. 109. 
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for future negotiations? Is the fact that the creditor governments have always 
objected to the idea that the standardization of the restructuring evolves towards new 
rules of law, enough to deny the emergence of customary law? 
"Given the natural human Instinct to follow precedents when confronted with new 
and complicated assignments..., an Increasing standardization In documentation 
relating to sovereign restructuring is probably inevitable ... Whatever one's view on 
the merit of the resulting standardization of restructuring documentation, however, 
It Is Important to keep In mind that this consequence is probably attributable more 
to the human element In this process than to any consensus regarding the proper 
way to document restructurings'.2 
The practice, as It has developed In the Paris Club with regard to the procedures and 
contents of the restructuring agreements. Is to be regarded as usage, as common 
practice. With the attitude of the creditors In mind. It cannot be regarded as a rule of 
customary law. as the required opinio Iuris sive necessitatis is lacking.3 
Parts Club and the duty to negotiate 
The practice of the negotiation process within the different fora, such as the Paris Club 
and the 'London' Club, shows that If a debtor country requests for renegotiation of Its 
external debt, due to Its unablllty to meet the obligations forthcoming from Its loan 
agreement and commercial loan contracts, such a request Is honoured by Its 
creditors. Is this attitude of the official and commercial creditors based on the 
conviction that there Is an obligation to renegotiate the external debt In the face of the 
magnitude of the problems facing the debtor country?4 Does the duty to negotiate 
exist In such a long-term contract, as most loan contracts are. If there Is not a provision 
providing for it In the agreement or contract? Is there a rule of customary law obliging 
creditors to negotiate? 
"It should be argued that In such a setting the principle of good faith may Impose 
upon the creditors a legal obligation to participate In renegotiations with a view to 
reaching a solution satisfactory to all sides. However, it appears difficult to base 
such a duty to negotiate upon any specific established principle of public 
International law. In any case. It is obvious that creditors could not legally be forced 
to accept contract amendments by authorities other than the sovereign of the 
legal order to which they are subject".5 
Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations requests that parties to any dispute shall 
seek a solution by peaceful means, such as negotiation. Does this article constitute a 
legal basis for the duty to negotiate at the request of a debtor State? Article 33 Is 
directed at disputes which are likely to endanger the maintenance of International 
peace and security. And although the developing countries frequently state that the 
current debt crisis does pose a threat to International peace and security. It Is very 
doubtful whether this view concurs with the Ideas which are at the basis of the notion 
'threat to International peace and security'. In my view the renegotiations, as 
conducted by the Paris Club, are not based on a duty to negotiate, as formulated In 
Article 33 of the Charter. Although It Is common practice to conduct renegotiations In 
the framework of the Paris Club at the request of the debtor. It Is not possible to 
2 Walker M. and L.C. Buchhelt, op.clt.. p. 459-460. 
3 Bothe M. and J. Brink, op.clt. p.109, also Hahn, Hague Zagreb Essays?, p.22. 
4 ILA Report 1988. Warsaw, p. 424. 
5 idem, p.425 
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conclude that a rule of customary law to negotiate has emerged. It Is, however, clear 
that. If the renegotiations are undertaken , there is a rule of customary law to negotiate 
in g o o d fai th, to conduc t meaningful negotiations. The customary law duty Is 
essentially a procedural one.6 In an arbitral award In 1990 it was restated that 
negotiations between debtor and creditor should be conducted seriously and should 
develop along the broad lines as evolved in the practice of the Paris Club.7 This may 
be seen as a confirmation of the view that the duty to negotiate is a procedural one. 
Article 62 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Article 33 of the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility and the duty to negotiate 
This concerns the possible duty to negotiate which is obligatory to the official creditor, 
since It is an obligation placed upon him by the law of treaties. As has been shown In 
Chapter 4, the law of treaties does play a part In the relationship between debtor and 
creditor. If it Is based on a legally valid loan agreement. 
Article 62 provides an oppurtunlty for a debtor State to suspend the execution of Its 
obligations stemming from that agreement. The equilibrium, which was at the basis of 
the obligations arising out of the loan agreement, has changed during the existence 
of the agreement due to a radical change In the economic circumstances. This 
disparity between the obligations already fulfilled and the obligations still t o be 
performed should be erased. The réévaluation of the agreement Is required. The 
clausula rebus sic stantibus obliges the parties to reasses their agreement by way of 
renegotiations. The clausula rebus sic stantibus does not, in the case of a laon 
agreement, render the agreement 'caduc'. It Is more appropriate to say that It 
imposes a duty to negotiate upon the parties, to have the treaty In force by 
readjusting.8 These negotiations should be conducted In the fashion expressed by 
the ICJ In the North Sea Continental Self Cases: 
"... they (the parties, edv) are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that 
the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them 
Insists upon its own position without contemplating any modification of it".9 
Article 33 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility entitles the debtor State to 
suspend Its repayment obligations towards Its State creditors, if the conditions set by 
the Article are met. The re-evaluation of the loan treaty Is required. In the same sense 
as Article 62 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties It Imposes a duty to 
negotiate upon the parties. In order to adjust the treaty In force. 
Capacity to pay 
The current debt crisis causes grave Internal problems in the debt-ridden countries. 
Due to the fact that a large amount of the capital of the country has to be used for 
repayment on principle and interest of the debt, many people are denied basic 
public services. The state Is no longer able to provide for an adequate level of these 
services.10 This situation is aggravated by the austerity measures the debtor country 
has to take In accordance with the economic adjustment efforts, the adjustment 
6 BolheM. and J. Brink, op.ctt.,p.l09 
7 A.F.I.D. 1990, p. 657. 
β Reuter, P. op.cit.. par. 276. 
9 ICJ Reports 1969, p. 47. 
TO Halle-Marian, Y., op.cit. p. 58. 
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policy measures One of the features of such plan is the reduction of government 
spending and the allocation of the money to export producing entitles One way of 
reducing the problems the government Is faced with, the choice between money for 
public services for its people or money to produce export products to generate 
foreign currency. Is debt forgiveness 
Another way is to make the amount of the payment on the principle and Interest 
dependant upon the capacity to pay This means that a country would be obliged 
only to pay as much as it can afford, without endangering the well being of Its people 
and the running of essential public services 
The rules with regard to state succession, as drafted by the ILC, do advocate the 
capacity to pay as a principle in the succession to state debts by the newly 
Independent state It proposes that the agreement between the predecessor state 
and the newly Independent state should consider the economic situation of the new 
state and the benefits the state derives from Its debts If the economic situation Is 
worse this is not a ground for the repudiation of the debts, but could serve as a ground 
for starting negotiations with creditors These negotiations should amount to a 
reassessment of the obligations still to be performed by the new government, which 
takes the economic situation - thus the capacity to pay - Into account 
If a debtor State is unable to fulfill its obligations towards Its official creditors It might 
refer to the notion of state of necessity This will Justify the suspension of the execution 
of the treaty for the period In which this grave situation exists Since the external debt 
crisis has put most debtor countries In such a situation for a long period already, 
suspension alone will not solve the problems State of necessity will often be Invoked 
by the debtor as a sign to force Its creditors Into negotiations Renegotiations are the 
only solution to the problems faced by the debtor country, which serves both the 
Interests of the debtor and the creditor In such negotatlons the economic situation 
should be taken Into consideration This was stated as early as 1929 by the PCI J in two 
cases concerning loan contracts the Brazilian loans case and the Serbian loans 
case It was stated that economic dislocation did not release the debtor from Its 
obligation, but that the dislocation "may present equities which doubtless will receive 
appropriate consideration In Its negotiations ' ' This is a recognition of the principle that 
the capacity to pay of the debtor country should be taken Into account when 
reassessing its obligations 
In the Pans Club negotiation process a tendency has emerged to move In the 
direction of the acceptance of the principle that the repayment should be related to 
the capacity to pay 1 2 This Is In line with the view prevailing in the literature and the 
discussion about the principle At the ILA Conference of 1986 It was already observed 
that "attention Is again being focused on proposals for mitigating the debt service 
burden by tying financial terms more closely to the debtors ability to pay, such as 
formulae limiting export earnings and capitalizing deffered Interest payments" , 3 Most 
of the times the only way left to a country faced with the decline of Its export prices, 
the rise in oil prices, meeting protectionist measures In the "West", and the 
impossibility receiving new loans and credits, Is to limit Its repayments to a certain 
percentage of its export , 4 This percentage can be determined by way of the debt 
service ratio It Is often stated that a debt service ratio which Is too high, over 15% over 
11 Supra Chapter 4 
12 Barston R Ρ op clt ρ 80 
13 ILA report 1986 Seoul ρ 493 
M MacLean RG op clt ρ 90 
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several years, constitutes a high risk for the proper development of the country. It even 
threatens Its vital interests.15 The debt service ratio, which would justify the reduction of 
payments to the capacity to pay, could be detemlned by either the World Bank or the 
IMF. 
As shown In Chapter 5, the reduction of the payments on the principle and the 
Interest to a certain percentage of export revenues Is an exchange control measure, 
as covered by Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. If these 
measures are taken In accordance with the IMF the debtor country cannot be forced, 
In principle, by Its commercial creditors to act contrary to these regulations. The 
debtor has a possibility to reduce its payments which Is recognized as a principle of 
law. The measures which are taken on the basis of Article III, section 2(b) are measures 
which are related to the capacity to pay of the debtor country. 
Article VIII, section 2(b) Justifies national legislation concerning the outflow of foreign 
currency, this legislation should be upheld In foreign courts. In case the debtor Is 
summoned by Its creditor. But this legislation is not a bar to claims from official 
creditors, to obligations arising out of an international treaty. 
In Chapter 6 It was shown that during the renegotiation of the external debt the 
creditors should take Into account the economic development of the State and the 
well-being of its people. The right to development strengthens the obligation to limit 
the repayment obligations of the debtor State to its capacity to pay. The outcome of 
these negotiations should not endanger the development of the State. The principle 
of equity serves as a corrective means when reassessing the debts. Should the 
debtor bear all the consequences of the deterioration of the world economy? Equity 
forces parties to the renegotiation process to take the external factors Into account. It 
also gives additional Imput to the applicability of the odluos debt doctrine to the 
current debt situation. 
Public International law can be seen as a stumbling block in a sense that It does not 
provide rules which enable debtor States to repudiate all their debts. This, however, 
does not seem to be the ultimate goal of most debtor States. 
In my view, however, the role public International law plays In the debt problem Is to 
be considered as a remedy. It enables the debtor States to request a reduction or 
restructuring of their repayment obligations so that these can be brought to a level 
which enables the debtor States to develop their economies and to ensure the well· 
being of their peoples, by way of supplying an acceptable level of public services. It 
also provides the debtor State with a tool to legitimately renounces its odious debts. 
15 Morrlssette, F,,op.c/f.,p, 52/53. 
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SAMENVATTING 
De afgelopen tien Jaar hebben voor veel ontwikkelingslanden in het teken gestaan 
van de strijd tegen hun buitenlandse schuld Nadat Mexico In augustus 1982 als eerete 
had aangekondigd met meer in staat te zijn aan de verplichtingen tegenover zijn 
crediteuren te voldoen, hebben veel andere schuldenlanden dit ook gedaan 
1 De economische feiten 
Het hebben van een buitenlandse schuld в geen probleem, zolang de debiteur maar 
In staat Is om aan zijn afbetallngsverpllchtlngen te voldoen Het financieren van 
economische ontwikkeling door middel van buitenlandse leningen Is met een 
fenomeen van deze tijd Directe Investeringen en leningen van staten met een 
kapitaal-overschot naar staten met een kapitaal-tekort zijn instrumenten die, In de 
recente geschiedenis, veelvuldig gebruikt zijn om economische vooruitgang te 
bevorderen 
Wat maakt het huidige schuldenprobleem zo anders dan voorgaande monetaire 
crises? Drie factoren zijn er te noemen de snelheid waarmee de crisis zich 
ontwikkelde, de ernst van de situatie en het grote aantal betrokkenen Het 
schuldenprobleem is niet beperkt tot een bepaalde regio De economische factoren 
die hebben bijgedragen tot het ontstaan van deze situatie zijn te verdelen in externe 
en Interne factoren 
Als externe factoren zijn te noemen de plotselinge stijging van de prijs van ruwe 
olie In 1973 en 1979, de stijging van de rente na 1979, de stijging In waarde van de dollar, 
de terugval van de exportopbrengsten van de ontwikkelingslanden veroorzaakt door 
de wereldrecessie en de verslechtering van de voorwaarden waarop handel werd 
gedreven 
Als Interne factoren zijn te noemen het voeren van expansionalr fiscaal en 
monetair beleid, de overwaardenng van de eigen munt, de lage binnenlandse rente 
die kapitaalvlucht bevorderde, en het verkeerde gebruik van de geleende gelden 
Een deel van de leningen werd op een niet rendabele wijze gebruikt 
Tot augustus 1982 was het voor Latijns-Amenkaanse landen relatief gemakkelijk om 
geld te lenen bij commercièle banken Aan deze leningen waren geen voorwaarden 
verbonden, Afrikaanse landen hadden geen, of nauwelijks, leningen bij de 
commercièle banken, zij leenden vooral bij Westerse staten en Internationale 
financiële Instellingen Na augustus 1982 waren de banken veel minder bereid om 
zonder condities geld te lenen aan schuldenlanden Landen die, naast 
heronderhandelmgen met zijn crediteuren, nieuw geld nodig hadden moesten zich 
eerst tot het IMF wenden om een economisch herstelprogramma overeen te komen 
Om het schuldenprobleem het hoofd te bieden zijn er diverse strategieën 
uitgedacht door debiteuren, crediteuren en de belanghebbende internationale 
organisaties De strategie om het schuldenprobleem hanteerbaar te houden wordt 
gedragen door drie pijlers herstructurering van de buitenlandse schuld, het 
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beschikbaar stellen van 'nieuw geld' en het implementeren van het economische 
herstelprogramma, zoals dat in samenwerking met het IMF is opgesteld, Na 1987, toen 
duidelijk was geworden dat de aanpak niet tot het gewenste resultaat leidde, werd 
het herstel van de economische groei In deze landen de vierde doelstelling van de 
schuldenstrategie. Het Baker Plan en het Brady Initiatief zijn een nadere uitwerking van 
deze aanpak. De Ideeën die hierin geformuleerd zijn, dienen veelvuldig als 
uitgangspunt voor de onderhandelingen die gevoerd worden binnen de Club van 
Parijs en de Club van 'Londen'. 
2 De hoofdrolspelers 
Er zijn vier groepen van spelers te onderschelden: schuldenlanden, credlteurstaten, 
commerciële crediteuren en Internationale organisaties (met name IMF en 
Wereldbank). 
De schuldenlanden zijn te verdelen In drie categorieën: ontwikkelingslanden met 
een laag Inkomen en een grote buitenlandse schuld, nlet-olle exporterende 
ontwikkelingslanden met een gemiddeld Inkomen en de olie exporterende 
ontwikkelingslanden met een gemiddeld Inkomen. 
De meeste ontwikkelingslanden met een laag Inkomen hebben slechts officiële 
staatsschulden, schulden die zij zijn aangegaan met andere staten. Hun buitenlandse 
schuld bestaat vooral uit leningen met zachte voorwaarden en een vast 
rentepercentage. 
Bij de niet-olle exporterende landen met een gemiddeld inkomen bestaat de 
buitenlandse schuld voornamelijk uit leningen die zijn aangegaan met commerciële 
crediteuren. Deze leningen zijn veelal bepaald In harde valuta met een variabele 
rente. 
De olie exporterende landen met een gemiddeld Inkomen kwamen In de problemen 
toen de olieprijzen daalden. Zij hadden Inmiddels veel geleend van commerciële 
banken om hun ontwikkeling te financieren. Deze financiering was gebaseerd op te 
rooskleurige toekomstverwachtingen. Ook deze leningen zijn veelal bepaald In harde 
valuta en met een variabele rente. 
In het kader van diverse heronderhandelingen werd de schuldenlanden gevraagd 
om strenge economische maatregelen te treffen, teneinde hun financiële 
huishouding weer op orde te krijgen en hun economie weer op gang te helpen. 
De crediteurlanden hebben geld geleend In de vorm van officiële schenkingen, 
leningen met zachte voorwaarden en exportkredieten. De crediteurlanden hebben 
hun officiële ontwikkelingshulp na 1979 terug laten lopen (een door de recessie 
Ingegeven bezuinigingsmaatregel). Naar aanleiding van de diverse 
schuldenstrategieên werd de crediteurlanden gevraagd om, In het kader van de 
onderhandelingen binnen de Club van Parijs, het peil van hun officiële 
ontwikkelingshulp weer te verhogen en ook meer exportkredieten te verstrekken. 
De commerciële crediteuren houden zich sinds kort bezig met het verstrekken van 
leningen aan ontwikkelingslanden. Zij hebben zich vooral gericht op de 
ontwikkelingslanden met een gemiddeld Inkomen, de armste ontwikkelingslanden 
werden door hen niet kredietwaardig beschouwd. 
De commerciële banken zijn na 19Θ2 veel terughoudender geworden In het 
verstrekken van leningen aan deze landen. In het kader van de diverse 
herstructureringen worden de banken nu gedwongen 'nieuw' geld te lenen. 
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De relevante internationale organisaties in het schuldenprobleem zijn het 
Internationale Monetaire Fonds en de Wereldbank Groep. De rol die het IMF speelt, uit 
zich vooral, naast de diverse leningsfaciliteiten die zij haar leden biedt, In het 
ontwerpen van economische herstelprogramma's voor en met het schuldenland. 
Deze programma's hebben tot doel het financiële evenwicht te herstellen en op deze 
wijze bij te dragen aan hernieuwde economische groei. Daarnaast fungeert zij als 
katalysator voor het verkrijgen van nieuwe fondsen van de crediteuren. 
De strategie van de Wereldbank Groep Is gebouwd rond de vooronderstelling dat 
ontwikkelingshulp geen permanente herverdeling van rijkdom is, maar een manier om 
ontwikkelingslanden te helpen 'self-sufficient' te worden. Als een reactie op de 
ontwikkelingen aan het begin van de Jaren '80 versterkte de Wereldbank Groep deze 
'multilaterale strategie voor ontwikkeling'. Deze strategie richt zich op het versnellen 
van de economische groei en terugbrengen van het armoedepeil. Net als het IMF 
fungeert de Wereldbank Groep als katalysator voor het verkrijgen van nieuwe 
fondsen. 
De onderhandelingen tussen deblteurstaten en crediteuren worden gevoerd In 
twee fora, de Club van Parijs en de Club van 'Londen'. Belde clubs zijn geen 
Internationale organisaties maar ad hoc groepen. 
3 Categorieën van staatsschulden en de regels van staatsopvolglng 
De buitenlandse schuld van een staat bestaat uit staatsschulden en privé-schulden. In 
dit onderzoek komen drie soorten schulden aan de orde. 
De publieke staatsschuld, dit Is een schuld die de staat Is aangegaan tegenover 
een andere staat of Internationale organisatie, de commerciële staatsschuld, dit Is 
een schuld die de staat Is aangegaan tegenover een commerciële crediteur en de 
prlvé-schuld, dit Is een schuld aangegaan door een onderdaan (natuurlijk of 
rechtspersoon) van de staat tegenover een buitenlandse crediteur, 
De regels van staatsopvolglng kunnen een rol spelen In het huidige 
schuldenprobleem. Niet vanwege het feit dat de financiële moeilijkheden die de 
deblteurstaten ondervinden hun oorsprong zouden kunnen hebben In het 
dekolonisatie proces, maar omdat bepaalde regels met betrekking tot de 
behandeling van staatsschulden en regimeschulden (odious debts') misschien van 
toepassing kunnen zijn. Ondanks het feit dat de 1983 Conventie voor staatsopvolglng 
met betrekking tot staatseigendommen, -archieven en -schulden omstreden Is, wordt 
het gebruikt als uitgangspunt. Met betrekking tot regimeschulden ben Ik van mening 
dat de regels die Impliciet In deze Conventie te vinden zijn, namelijk het niet overgaan 
van deze schulden, ook toegepast zouden moeten worden op de situatie waarin 
veel schuldenlanden zich nu bevinden. Deze situatie wordt gekenmerkt door het feit 
dat er In veel schuldenlanden sprake Is van een radicale regimeverandering, van 
dictatoriaal naar democratisch verkozen regering, De schulden, aangegaan door 
het voorgaande dictatoriale regime en niet aangewend ten behoeve van de 
ontwikkeling van het land, zouden niet over moeten gaan naar de nieuwe regering. Dit 
analoog aan het regime zoals dat ontworpen is in de 1983 Conventie in het geval van 
een echte staatsopvolglng. 
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4 De belangrijkste regels en principes van het internationaal publiekrecht ten 
dienste van de debiteurstaten 
Hiervoor wordt allereerst gekeken naar regels die te vinden zijn in het Weens 
Verdragenverdrag 
Artikel 26 stelt dat verdragen bindend zijn voor partijen Deze regel is gebaseerd op 
het principe van de goede trouw Goede trouw verbiedt partijen het ontduiken van 
een verplichting die Is aangegaan, maar het verbiedt partijen ook om van de andere 
partij meer te vragen dan de Intentie was ten tijde van het aangaan van het verdrag 
Artikel 61 is in de meeste gevallen niet van toepassing daar hier het vereiste van 
'absolute onmogelijkheid' wordt gesteld 
Artikel 62 biedt partijen bij een verdrag de mogelijkheid dit verdrag op te zeggen of 
tijdelijk bulten werking te stellen Indien de omstandigheden Ingrijpend veranderd zijn 
Kunnen leenverdragen onder de werking van dit artikel vallen'' Op het eerste gezicht 
lijkt dat niet mogelijk Het Internationale Hof van Justitie heeft in de Fisheries Jurisdiction 
case gesteld dat het niet mogelijk Is een verdrag op te zeggen waarbij partijen met 
gelijktijdig presteren en wanneer de prestatie van de ene partij quid pro quo zijn voor 
al geleverde prestaties door de andere partij Hieruit blijkt dat het niet mogelijk is om 
een leenverdrag eenzijdig op te zeggen, maar het sluit niet uit dat de debiteur de 
werking van het verdrag tijdelijk opschort (artikel 62 (3)) 
Indien de in het Weens verdragenverdrag genoemde principes een nlet-betalen 
door de debiteur niet rechtvaardigen, kan hij proberen of zijn onrechtmatig gedrag 
wellicht door een beroep op de (ontwerp)regels betreffende staatsaansprakelljkheld 
kan rechtvaardigen (circumstances precluding wrongfulness) 
Force Majeure . artikel 31, lijkt op het eerste gezicht een bruikbaar Instrument Het Is 
enige malen ingeroepen voor internationale tribunaten en erkend als een mogelijke 
rechtvaardiging van nlet-betalen, maar In de ontwerp-artlkelen Is de reikwijdte van het 
begrip sterk teruggebracht Het Is alleen van toepassing als het 'materieel' onmogelijk 
Is te presteren 
Sfate of necessity, artikel 33, daarentegen biedt wel mogelijkheden voor de 
debiteurstaten Indien men voldoet aan de vijf voorwaarden dan Is een beroep op 
deze grond gerechtvaardigd Het feit dat de schuldafbetalingen veel 
schuldenlanden In zo'n situatie plaatsen dat het voor hen met langer mogelijk Is hun 
essentiële taken uit te oefenen en zodoende het welzijn van het volk in gevaar 
brengen, rechtvaardigt de keus van de debiteur om de schaarse harde valuta te 
besteden aan zaken die ten goede komen aan zijn onderdanen Ondanks het feit dat 
er dus wel harde valuta aanwezig zijn, rust er In deze extreme situatie niet de plicht op 
de debiteur om ten koste van alles te voldoen aan zijn verplichtingen tegenover zijn 
crediteuren. 
5 Maatregelen eenzijdig door de debiteur genomen en maatregelen genomen 
In samenwerking met de crediteuren 
Eenzijdige maatregelen genomen door de debiteur zijn erop gericht de uitstroom van 
harde valuta te beperken of te verhinderen Deze maatregelen kunnen de vorm 
aannemen van het (tijdelijk) stopzetten van de schuldafbetalingen, het beperken van 
de afbetalingen tot een zeker percentage van de exportopbrengsten van de staat of 
het afwijzen van de schulden 
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Met uitzondering van de laatste uitingsvorm zijn deze maatregelen te beschouwen 
als een controle maatregel op het gebruik van buitenlandse valuta, die gelegitimeerd 
Is Indien de maatregel is genomen conform artikel VIII section 2 van het statuut van 
het IMF Zon maatregel is te kwalificeren als een staatshandelmg die door een 
buitenlandse rechter erkend zou moeten worden, wanneer de debiteurstaat door zijn 
commerciële crediteur wordt gedagvaard Uit de Jurisprudentie blijkt dat, vooral de 
Amerikaanse, rechter hiertoe niet snel geneigd is De debiteurstaat kan zich In de 
meeste gevallen met beroepen op immuniteit van jurisdictie In de relevante 
nationale wetgevingen (FSIA en SIA) wordt het afsluiten van leningen met 
commerciële crediteuren door de staat gezien als een acta iure gestiones In de 
meeste leencontracten wordt een beroep op Immuniteit van Jurisdictie expliciet 
uitgesloten Een beroep op immuniteit van executie, daarentegen. Is veelal wel 
mogelijk 
Maatregelen genomen in samenwerking met de crediteuren vinden plaats in het 
kader van de heronderhandelmgen van de buitenlandse schuld van de 
debiteurstaat Het heronderhandelmgsproces In beide fora Is gebouwd rondom vier 
basisprincipes het recht van Initiatief ligt bij de debiteurstaat, gelijke behandeling van 
alle crediteuren, geval-voor-geval aanpak en conditionalltelt In de 
heronderhandellngen kan de schuld van de debiteurstaat worden herschikt, 
geherstructureerd of geherfinancierd Meestal zijn alle drie de vormen terug te 
vinden De laatste Jaren wordt door de crediteuren, op beperkte schaal, In het 
heronderhandellngsproces gebruik gemaakt van de mogelijkheid om een deel van 
de schuld kwijt te schelden 
In het heronderhandellngsproces is de rol die het IMF speelt een belangrijke Als 
voorwaarde om onderhandelingen te laten beginnen moet de debiteurstaat eerst 
een stand-by arrangement' met het IMF afsluiten Dit Is een plan, opgesteld door de 
debiteurstaat In samenwerking met het IMF, waarin het traject naar economisch 
herstel wordt vastgelegd Een 'stand-by arrangement is met te beschouwen als een 
Juridisch afdwingbare overeenkomst 
6 Het recht op ontwikkeling en de beginsel van billijkheid 
Het probleem van de grote schuldenlast van de ontwikkelingslanden Is een 
ontwikkelingsprobleem Het probleem is geen puur nationaal probleem, dit wordt met 
zoveel woorden erkend in het Handvest van de Verenigde Naties Het Is ondermeer 
veroorzaakt door de economische ordening, zoals die zich in de afgelopen eeuwen 
ontwikkeld heeft 
Erkent het Internationale publiekrecht een recht op ontwikkeling? Het recht op 
ontwikkeling bestaat uit twee elementen het recht op ontwikkeling en de plicht om 
samen te werken voor het teweegbrengen van deze ontwikkeling 
Is dit recht te beschouwen als een individueel recht, een derde-generatie 
mensenrecht of als een collectief recht, een recht van staten en volkeren? Ik ben van 
mening dat de effectiviteit van dit recht ernstig wordt ondergraven Indien men het 
beschouwt als een mensenrecht Het doel wordt beter gediend indien men het ziet 
als een recht van de staat of het volk Het recht op ontwikkeling Is gebaseerd op het 
recht op zelfbeschikking en Internationale solidariteit Het recht op ontwikkeling kan 
niet Ingeroepen worden tegenover de individuele crediteur, het kan echter wel 
ingeroepen worden In het heronderhandellngsproces De heronderhandelingen 
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moeten op een dusdanige wijze gevoerd worden dat het resultaat bijdraagt aan de 
ontwikkeling van de economie van de debiteurstaat. 
'Equity does not necessarily Imply equallty. Het begrip billijkheid speelt een rol bij 
het vinden van een billijke oplossing in gevallen waarbij een te rigide toepassing van 
de regels tot een onrechtvaardige uitkomst zou lelden. Het kan de toepassing van de 
regels van de 'odious debt' doctrine op het huidige schuldenprobleem 
ondersteunen. Daarnaast zou het een rol kunnen spelen bij het bepalen van de 
toekomstige betalingsverplichtingen van de debiteurstaat In het 
heronderhandellngsproces met zijn crediteuren en bij het kwijtschelden van schulden. 
7 Conclusies 
Vormt het Internationaal publiekrecht een oplossing of een struikelblok voor de 
oplossing van het schuldenprobleem? Welke regels kan de debiteurstaat gebruiken 
om een aanpassing van zijn schuldenlast te verkrijgen? 
Uit de behandeling van de relevante regels van het internationale recht zijn twee 
principes te distilleren: het recht op het verzoeken van onderhandelingen (en de 
daarmee corresponderende plicht om te onderhandelen voor de crediteuren) en 
het principe dat de betalingscapaciteit van de debiteurstaat bepalend behoort te zijn 
bij het vaststellen van de nieuwe afbetalingsverplichtingen. 
Indien men zoekt naar regels die de debiteurstaat de Juridische basis verschaffen 
om al zijn schulden af te wijzen dan vormt het Internationale recht een struikelblok. 
Naar zo'n regel zal men tevergeefs zoeken. 
Het Internationale recht Is echter een oplossing voor de debiteurstaten daar het 
hen in staat stelt een vermindering of herstructurering van de betalingsverplichtingen 
te verkrijgen tot een niveau dat de economische groei weer zal stimuleren en dat het 
welzijn van de onderdanen niet In de waagschaal stelt. 
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ANNEX 
Table 1.1 External Debt, 1981-91 
(US$ billions) 
Category 
Tota) debt, DRS countries ' 
Long-term debt 
Official sources 
Private sources 
ShorMeim debt 
Use of IMF credit 
Total external debt, all developing countries 
Memorandum Item 
Officially supported expon credit' 
mi 
668 
495 
181 
314 
155 
18 
83 
751 
1982 
760 
561 
202 
359 
175 
24 
86 
84« 
1983 
826 
646 
226 
420 
146 
34 
86 
912 
.. 
I9M 
862 
688 
239 
449 
138 
36 
81 
943 
149 
I9H5 
966 
789 
304 
485 
137 
40 
80 
1.046 
182 
ІШ 
1.062 
893 
367 
526 
126 
43 
85 
1,147 
209 
I9K7 
1,194 
1.013 
449 
564 
138 
43 
96 
1490 
241 
1488 
1.182 
996 
453 
543 
151 
35 
100 
1.282 
225 
1989 
1,199 
1.000 
474 
526 
167 
32 
107 
1J<I6 
231 
1990 
1,281 
1047 
525 
522 
199 
35 
74 
U S 5 
243 
I99lr 
I J 8 1 
1.050 
534 
516 
194 
36 
70 
1J51 
p Projection 
» Countries reporting to the Worid Bank Debtor Reporting System (DRS) and World Bank staff estimates Debt includes officiai]y supported export 
credit. 
ь World Bank staff estimates. 
c
 OECD This edition of the World Debt Tobies is the first to show as a separate item the slock of expon credit in aggregate and by country 
Source DRS. 
Table U Debí Indicators, 1985-91 
(percent) 
Country group 
All developing countries ' 
Without debt-scrvicmg difficulties 
With debt-servicing difficulties 
Severely indebted 
Middle-income 
Low-income 
Moderately indebted 
Share 
of 1990 
total debt 
100.0 
18.1 
819 
52.4 
39 5 
12.9 
29.5 
/9ÍS 
209.0 
107.6 
269 9 
294.9 
288.3 
321.1 
227.6 
79«« 
236.3 
104.2 
334.3 
388 5 
3719 
4S6 8 
259.0 
Dtbt-tiiwrt 
1987 1988 
227.9 199 6 
92.0 77.4 
337.5 304.2 
394 3 354 8 
366.1 324.3 
521.0 494 8 
261.1 236.9 
ratio 
1989 
1845 
70 9 
2804 
327 5 
295.7 
4804 
219.4 
/990 
176.8 
69 5 
268.9 
297 5 
276.2 
3896 
229.6 
/99/ 
176 2 
69 3 
274 8 
308.6 
2804 
441.6 
232.5 
198S 
29 8 
20 8 
35.2 
38 4 
404 
306 
29 7 
/986 
32 2 
217 
40.0 
43 6 
462 
32 8 
349 
Debt servit e rano 
1987 
28 7 
210 
35 0 
36 8 
39 6 
24.2 
32.5 
im 
27.5 
170 
36 4 
Э9 0 
412 
28 9 
33 0 
1989 
23.5 
14 0 
315 
33 6 
343 
301 
28.8 
/990 
19 8 
124 
26.1 
25 2 
25 5 
23 8 
27.4 
/99/ 
21.2 
11.6 
300 
29 9 
29.7 
31.3 
30.1 
by region 
SÛb-Saharan Africa 13.6 233.8 325.0 359.6 361.2 351.9 329 5 340.8 27.9 30 1 22 9 27 6 24 1 19 1 20.5 
East Asia and the Pacific 18.3 137.1 139.8 1217 1003 907 917 882 246 253 249 18.9 16.7 14.6 139 
South Asia 9.0 266.1 294.4 298.8 285.0 280.3 283.0 293 3 22.8 300 28 6 27.4 260 25.2 25 7 
Europe and the Mediterranean 144 126.0 132.5 134.6 1208 1164 122.5 122 5 224 240 229 24.0 198 164 183 
Middle East and North Africa 11.0 245.8 340.9 349 1 339.4 312.2 243.1 248 1 28 0 37 8 38 0 38.1 36 9 32 7 38.2 
Latin Amenca and the Caribbean 33.7 316 0 380.9 369.6 314 9 277.2 2614 268 0 43 8 48 3 39.0 40 6 32 1 25 3 24.6 
β
 DetH indicatola arc based on Ma] external debt Oong-term debt, shortHerm debt, and use of IMF credit) and associated payments of debl service. 
' DRS counmes. 
Source DRS. 
World Debt Tables 1991-92. Volume I. p. 13 and 14. 
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